The Journal of Historical Review

VOLUME FOUR, NUMBER FOUR / WINTER 1983-84

—Special Issue—

PEARL HARBOR
Revisionism Renewed

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.: *Was Pearl Harbor Unavoidable?* • *The Mystery of Pearl Harbor* • *Senator Ferguson's Investigation* • *Marshall Comes on Stage* • *Marshall Testifies Before Congress* • *Admission of MAGIC* • *What We Knew*

JAMES J. MARTIN: *Where Was General Marshall?*

The Journal of Historical Review
is published quarterly by the
INSTITUTE FOR HISTORICAL REVIEW
Thomas J. Marcellus, *Director*
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A Note From The Editor

Pearl Harbor: The Latest Wave

The latest furious round of publication and ensuing controversy about Pearl Harbor erupted at the end of 1981, and has not simmered down yet. The opening shot was the release in November that year of Gordon W. Prange's massive *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor*. Prange had been working on the book for more than thirty years; his first missed deadline for publication by McGraw-Hill was in 1951, and thereafter he continued to periodically promise completion of the manuscript and never came through, all the while adding more to it and using up advances. It finally got to the point where McGraw-Hill decided to cut its losses and refuse any further communication with the indefatigable, eccentric author. But two of Prange's former students, Donald Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, took up the task of reducing and shaping Prange's thousands of manuscript pages and notes into publishable form, the result of which was *At Dawn We Slept*. Prange had died in May 1980. The book was promoted by McGraw-Hill as the definitive work on the subject, full of new information. Without question it did contain more in the way of details from Japanese sources about the military genesis, planning, execution, and follow-up of the attack than any other work, details gleaned in interviews conducted by Prange in the late '40s and early '50s while he was serving in Japan as Chief of the Historical Section under General MacArthur, and which were indeed "new"—back then. The book's strength and value was as a *military history* of the Japanese side; when it ventured afield into painting the diplomatic and intelligence pictures, assigning responsibility and blame on the American side, its inadequacies were apparent. Prange's collaborators Goldstein and Dillon were determined to produce an account that would not only stand up as a *general* history, but in fact deal the final, crippling blow to the revisionists interlopers. They added an appendix called "Revisionists Revisited," a *precis* of chapters 139-43 in the fourth volume of Prange's original manuscript, in which they attempted a refutation of all revisionist theories and evidences, and concluded that "in a *thorough search* of more than 30 years, including *all publications released up to May 1, 1983*, we have not discovered one document or one word of sworn testimony that substantiates the revisionist position on Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor." (Emphasis added.) It was clear that the book was meant to supplant Roberta Wohlstetter's *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (1962) as the fundamental Establishment, pro-Roosevelt account, which would constitute the final word on Pearl Harbor and effectively end revisionism on the subject for all time.

It was not to be. No sooner had *At Dawn We Slept* appeared than it became clear just how much recent important evidence Goldstein and Dillon in fact *ignored*. Their statement that they had searched through all publications "released up to May 1, 1983" was simply not the truth—as later admitted by Goldstein, who explained that he and Dillon had relied for this statement on the assurances of another historian, Ronald Lewin, that none of the voluminous National Archives Records Service (NARS) and other data released in 1980-81 supported a revisionist view. Even if Lewin was right, which he wasn't, it was a reflection of Goldstein and Dillons' level of scholarly integrity that they would make a sweeping assertion of up-to-date accuracy and comprehensiveness on a claim of personal familiarity which was false.

Much of the NARS and other recent data did indeed support a revisionist position, and was used as such by John Costello, a British historian whose book *The Pacific War* appeared almost simultaneously with Prange's, starting a debate which soon drowned out the premature huzzas for Prange uttered by some overeager reviewers not familiar enough with the evidential record to even have an intelligent opinion on the matter. In two chapters at the end of his general history of the Pacific-theater war, Costello discussed the new evidence which, he claimed, indicated that: eleven days before Pearl Harbor FDR had received a "positive war warning" from Churchill that the Japanese would strike against America at the end of the first week in December—a warning which caused the President to do an abrupt about-face on plans for a time-buying *modus vivendi* with Japan and which resulted in Secretary of State Hull's deliberately provocative ultimatum of 26 November 1941 which guaranteed war; the United States *had* intercepted, between 2 and 4 December, the "Winds Execute" message which meant an imminent diplomatic break and thus war, this message *had* been passed on to the higher authorities in Washington, and its receipt *had* been covered up by Washington after the Pearl Harbor attack. The new evidence for the receipt of "Winds" was National Archives document SRH-051: "Interview with Mr. Ralph T. Briggs," conducted by the Naval Security Group and declassified by the National Security Agency on 11 March 1980. Briggs said in this interview that he was the one who had intercepted the crucial message, while on duty as chief watch supervisor at the Naval Communication Station at Cheltenham, Maryland. Briggs further stated that he was ordered by his superior officer in 1946 not to testify about the matter to the Joint Congressional Committee and to cease any contact with Captain Laurance Safford (then waging a lonely and career-destroying battle to convince investigators that a "Winds Execute" had been picked up), and that all copies he had made of the message intercept were missing from the files. Briggs's sensational interview, buttressing a key point in the revisionist position, was published in the Fall 1980 issue of the *Newsletter* of the American Committee on the History of the Second World War. It is therefore interesting to note the use that Goldstein and Dillon, of "thorough search off . . . all publications released up to May 1, 1981" fame, made of it: none. Briggs appeared nowhere in *At Dawn We Slept*.

He did appear in another book, published in early 1982: Ronald Lewin's *The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan*. In this Establishment brief Lewin spent several pages discussing the "Winds Execute" business in an attempt to discredit it. His tactic was to cast doubt on the accuracy of Briggs's recollection and thus on the receipt of the execute, but *then* to say that, well, even if the execute came in and was passed on, it didn't really mean much, didn't tell anyone anything not already known, and at any rate would have only added to the confusion among the intelligence-gatherers, what with all these other messages coming in creating so much apparently unconnected intelligence "noise" . . . and so forth. (Revisionists have come to refer to this Establishment tactic in dealing with uncomfortable evidence as "pulling a Wohlstetter.")

But, as was the case with the Prange book vs. Costello's, hardly had Lewin's work appeared than an answering blow with yet more—much more—new evidence came from the revisionist side: John Toland's *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath*. This book was remarkable in many ways, not least in that its author 1) had for many years been recognized as a certifiably Establishment, "safe" historian not known to hold any brief for the revisionist position (and who had indeed, in two earlier books on aspects of the Pacific war,

presented only orthodox opinions on Pearl Harbor), and 2) went further even than some of the "old-line" revisionists had been willing to go, in stating that FDR not only welcomed the war and thought that an attack somewhere was likely, but *knew* that the attack was coming *at Pearl Harbor*. Toland wrote: "Was it possible to imagine a President who remarked, 'This means war,' after reading the [thirteen-part 6 December] message, not instantly summoning to the White House his Army and Navy commanders as well as his Secretaries of War and Navy? One of [Secretary of the Navy] Knox's close friends, James G. Stahlman, wrote Admiral Kemp Tolley in 1973 that Knox told him that he, Stimson, Marshall, Stark and Harry Hopkins had spent most of the night of December 6 at the White House with the President: All were waiting for what they knew was coming: an attack on Pearl Harbor. . . . The comedy of errors on the sixth and seventh appears incredible. It only makes sense if it was a charade, and Roosevelt and the inner circle had known about the attack."

Unlike Prange's book, Toland's was not a military history, full of "I was there" anecdotes from gunners' mates and mess stewards second-class, and the like. It was a searching attempt to find and fix responsibility at the levels that counted. Essentially it consisted of a history of the nine official Pearl Harbor investigations, concluding with Toland's own "tenth investigation." In building his case for FDR's perfidity and both a pre- and post-attack conspiracy and cover-up, Toland utilized and claimed vindication of much of the evidence other revisionists had used over the years. But his "tenth investigation" included much that was new with him. Two key points backing his contention that "Washington knew" were that the Dutch army in Java had passed on to the United States intercepted Japanese messages predicting the attack, and that a Dutch naval attache in Washington received information at the Office of Naval Intelligence indicating that the Americans knew a Japanese carrier task force was steaming toward Hawaii. Further: an American steamship had picked up the Japanese task force's radio traffic and reported it to the FBI, and, independently, a seaman in the intelligence office of the 12th Naval District headquarters in San Francisco had intercepted the Japanese radio traffic and used it to plot accurately the location of the task force as it headed eastward toward Hawaii—providing this information to his superiors which, he was told by one, was passed on to the White House. Toland referred to this man, who had requested anonymity, as "Seaman Z."

There was much more in Toland's account, including intriguing references to important information possessed by an "Admiral V"—but these were his essential new points of evidence.

The critical response as a whole to Toland's blockbuster book was anything but equivocal. Reactions tended to be either very strongly pro or very strongly anti. The attack on his new evidence was led by scholars David Kahn and Captain Roger Pinneau, who sought to poke holes into each piece. They stressed that there was no hard evidence that Washington had in fact received the report from the Dutch in Java, that Toland totally misinterpreted the diary entries of the Dutch naval attache in Washington, and that, as regards the supposed evidence of interception and tracking of the Japanese task force's radio traffic, that task force was in fact under orders to maintain strict radio silence—a fact indeed confirmed by the record and by the surviving Japanese themselves. Another historian who joined in attacking Toland on these grounds was John Costello, the "mild" revisionist who had in his own book stopped short of claiming that FDR knew *where* the Japanese were going to strike.

(continued on page 404)

Was Pearl Harbor Unavoidable?

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.

Remember Pearl Harbor? Of course you do. No American will ever forget December 7, 1941. Our casualties came to 3,435—Japan's were fewer than 100. We lost 188 planes outright—Japan 29. Our proud Pacific fleet was smashed. Eight battleships were useless. Japan lost five midget submarines. It was the greatest military and naval disaster in our history.

But Pearl Harbor didn't happen all in one day. The seeds for that disaster were sown at least as early as 1935. For that was the year of the seventh world congress of the Communist International, popularly known as the Comintern.

American Communists were then told how to capture our government. We protested, but being asleep to the communist menace, did nothing more.

The Comintern also resolved to undermine Russia's neighbors —Germany and Japan. As former Ambassador Bullitt tells us, the Soviet Union "ordered its communist agents abroad to create 'public front' and anti-fascist movements in order to obtain support for the Soviet Union against Germany and Japan." The same congress agreed to support communist activities in China. Japan didn't waste words. Japan acted.

The first thing Japan did was to inspire an anti-communist movement in north China. Secretary Hull* protested. Japan told our ambassador that Japan desired Chinese cooperation to combat the spread of communism and anti-Japanese activities. Japan

*U.S. Secretary of State 1933-1944 Cordell Hull

also expressed worry about the great increase of armaments in Soviet Russia.

Japan's next move was to sign an anti-Comintern pact with Germany. This pact held that communist interference not only endangered the internal peace and welfare of Germany and Japan but also threatened "the general peace of the world."

Japan's activities in north China were resented by the Chinese government. Friction increased until an incident provoked Japan's undeclared war on China. Japan claimed the hostilities were caused by a communist intrigue against her legitimate rights. Washington officials considered it Japanese aggression.

The undeclared war dragged on. By the fall of 1938 Germany was no longer satisfied with merely an anti-communist pact—she wanted a military alliance with Japan. She applied strong pressure.

All this placed Japan on a spot. The Japanese people, like the American people, did not want to be involved in a world war. Their leaders were divided into two factions. One group—the war party—wanted to join the Axis, remove the Russian threat, and conquer new worlds. One of these leaders was Foreign Minister Arita. Another group—the peace party—wanted to prevent war at all costs. They foresaw a victory for the "democracies." Then where would Japan be? This group was led by Premier Hiranuma.

Ambassador Grew** joined in the effort to prevent a military alliance with Germany. On April 19, 1939, he was assured there would be no alliance, although the anti-communist pact might be strengthened. So the peace party turned its efforts to preventing further political ties with the Axis.

Both parties wanted security for Japan. The war party pointed to England's negotiations with Russia and the American backing of anti-Japanese sentiment in China. They argued that Japanese security rested with the Axis. The peace party felt otherwise, but their opponents were hard to convince. Cabinet permission was finally obtained to seek a "gesture of welcome" from the United States. As a result, Arita handed Grew a note for President Roosevelt. It was cabled to Washington on May 18, 1939.

This note spoke of the gathering war clouds in Europe and stated that Japan and the United States had a mutual interest in seeing that civilization was not destroyed. It went on to say that true world peace might be established and maintained if all nations had their "own proper places in the world." They hoped this idea would make possible "closer cooperation between Japan and America as well as the foundation of a deeper mutual understanding between the two nations." It was indefinite, but it was a bid for friendship.

Later that day Grew cabled that he was leaving for America

**U.S. Ambassador to Japan 1932-1943 Joseph C. Grew

"and confiding the embassy to the effective hands of Eugene H. Dooman, in whose judgment and analytical ability I have full confidence and whose views on policies and procedures coincide very closely with mine."

On May 22 Germany became very tired of waiting. She signed a military alliance with Italy which didn't include Japan.

The American public was not told about Japan's plea for cooperation until 1943, when the State Department released two bulky volumes of selected documents relating to Japan. However, there were many other things that were not made public even then. It took a congressional investigation to reveal the facts which follow:

Behind this general message was a more specific proposal. The Japanese premier, Baron Hiranuma, met very secretly with our Mr. Dooman. He didn't even let his own foreign minister know about it. He felt that with American help the Japanese peace party might prevent a world war with dangerous consequences for Japan.

The premier told Dooman the Japanese had a "real feeling of grievance against the occidental powers, especially Great Britain. When the first World War broke out Japan was an ally of Great Britain. There was no legal obligation on Japan to support her ally, but she conceived she had a moral obligation to do so. She accordingly declared war against Germany, her navy undertook operations against the German fleet in the Pacific, her merchant marine cooperated in various ways and finally her military forces eliminated Germany from Shantung.

"The only thanks we got from Great Britain," continued Baron Hiranuma, "was the abrogation of that very alliance which inspired Japan to support Great Britain." Japan was also worried about negotiations then going on between Britain and the Soviets. She thought the naval treaties operated to prevent her from safeguarding her interests.

Hiranuma claimed that Japan's objectives in China were "essential for her security in a world of sanctions, embargoes, closing of markets to foreign competition, and lack of free access to raw materials, and so long as such conditions exist any moderation of her objective in China . . . could not be considered.

"Nevertheless, if conditions could be brought about which would assure to all nations markets for the world's goods on the basis of quality and price and supplies of the materials which they needed, the importance to Japan of securing a market and sources of raw materials in China would greatly diminish; and by the same token there would not be the same urge on Germany and Italy to expand at the expense of weaker and smaller nations.

"The United States and Japan were the only powers which

could help to prevent the crystalization of the trend toward the division of Europe into armed camps."

He felt that world-wide economic and political troubles could be settled by an international conference. Japan, he said, would agree to include the Far East situation among the problems to be discussed. He proposed that "if the President were prepared to make a confidential approach to the European democracies he would be glad to approach Germany and Italy, and if there were returned favorable replies by these nations he would be glad to have the President call the conference under such conditions as might be agreed upon after discussion thru normal diplomatic channels."

In conclusion the premier said: "This might prove to be the last opportunity to save the world from chaos."

Dooman reported all this to Washington in a 21 page document dated June 7, 1939. He gave it as his opinion that Japan was "groping for security against the gathering storm in Europe." Japan, he said, was faced with the alternative of going over unreservedly to the totalitarian side or restoring relations with those nations which the peace party believed would be victors.

He felt the desire for a settlement did not spring "from moral regeneration, but from realization of stark facts." The China incident had failed. A European war threatened. Japan's peace party leaders realized Japan's security depended on liquidating the China affair. The proposed conference would permit Japan "to moderate its peace terms in China" without losing face.

Dooman indicated that it might be a very crucial moment in world history. He urged careful consideration.

On July 1 Hull sent Dooman's message over to Roosevelt along with a proposed reply which FDR okayed and returned the same day. This reply answered the general proposal in diplomatic language that meant we would not cooperate in any joint peace efforts until Japan withdrew from China.

It made no reference to the specific proposal to call an international conference. It said the United States did "not perceive any practicable steps which it might usefully take at this time in addition to those already taken . . . and . . . would be pleased to have such further information as your excellency may find it agreeable to offer by way of amplifying and making more definitive your excellency's concept as to the steps which might usefully be taken toward moderating the situation in Europe."

On July 26, before Dooman received this reply, Washington added more fuel to the fire by giving Japan six months notice that we were terminating our commercial treaty. Japan's peace party, hoping for a friendship bid, was shocked. Even the pro-Axis, anti-British foreign minister couldn't understand "why the Amer-

ican government should have found it necessary to give notice of the abrogation in such a hasty and abrupt manner."

On July 31, when Dooman saw Roosevelt's reply, he immediately wired back for further guidance on the answer to the specific proposal for "an international conference to be called by the President to discuss problems causing world unrest, including Far Eastern problems." Dooman was anxious to know if we really wanted to explore the proposal or were in the process of studying it.

The next day Dooman was informed by Undersecretary Sumner Welles that the original reply was intended to cover both the general and specific messages and therefore neither of Dooman's suggestions applied. On August 3 Dooman wired back that the reply would be interpreted "by the premier as a closing of the door to insure peace in the Far East."

Welles then told Dooman that the termination of the commercial treaty had been drafted weeks before and was therefore not related to the Jap proposals. He instructed Dooman to hold back the answer until it would seem that the two matters were not interrelated.

The answer was finally delivered to Japan on August 8. That very evening a five minister conference was called in Tokyo to discuss an alliance with Germany and Italy.

On August 12 British, French, and Soviet military missions began staff talks in Moscow on measures of collaboration in the event that Germany should precipitate a war.

Japan, still worried about the Soviets and communism, desperately needed friends. The Axis offered an alliance. Roosevelt offered a cold shoulder. Until August 23 there was little doubt but what the Axis alliance would be signed. On that date it was the turn of Japan's war party to be shocked. Germany signed a 10 year nonaggression pact with Japan's traditional enemy, Soviet Russia.

This pact put an end to a Japanese-Axis alliance for the time being. It gave us another opportunity to woo Japan from the Axis camp. We muffed that, too, but that is another story. It wasn't until more than a year later, September 27, 1940, that Japan finally signed a defensive military alliance with the Axis.

Would Pearl Harbor have occurred if President Roosevelt had cooperated with Japan's peace party in 1939? Who can say?

The Mystery of Pearl Harbor

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.

After the Pearl Harbor attack, Americans were told that it had come without any warning. The official story has been that it was a surprise attack that forced us into war against our wishes.

For years the charges that Roosevelt lied and cajoled us into war were vehemently denied. In 1948 the great historian Charles A. Beard presented a preliminary case for the truth in *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities*. He was immediately reviled.

In an article in the August issue of the *Atlantic*, he was accused of being "the darling of the McCormick-Patterson Axis . . . The most indecent of Beard's numerous innuendoes in his book are those respecting the Roberts Commission. Mr. Stimson suggested Justice Roberts to head the Pearl Harbor Commission . . . Beard insinuates that Justice Roberts' appointment was part of a triple play to put Kimmel and Short 'out' and conceal the iniquities of FDR and Stimson in a cloud of dust."

These were the words of the court historian, Samuel Eliot Morison. In 1942, Professor Morison of Harvard was drafted by President Roosevelt and placed on the public payroll as a Navy officer with orders to write the official *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* (fifteen vols.).

Beard, searching for the truth, was not permitted to see the papers he considered pertinent. Morison, writing the official line, had no such problems. In the words of the Secretary of the Navy,

"All naval activities, afloat and ashore, were directed to make available to Captain Morison such records as he might desire to consult."

Even so, the facts confirm Beard's "innuendo." They bear out that Mr. Stimson had a heavy responsibility not only for the Pearl Harbor disaster, but also for the Roberts Report which made Admiral Kimmel and General Short the scapegoats for blame that rightly rested on high officials in Washington, notably Mr. Stimson himself.

Mr. Stimson not only nominated Justice Roberts, a pre-Pearl Harbor advocate of "Aiding the Allies," as top investigator, he also nominated the two Army members. This gave him a majority of the five-man Presidential Commission. In writing his suggestion to FDR he added: "Marshall and I united on all the foregoing suggestions after very careful consideration by each of us."

One of Mr. Stimson's nominees was Joseph T. McNarney, a recently promoted brigadier general and right hand of Chief of Staff George C. Marshall. Officially, the appointment was suggested in order to give the Commission an air expert. It was also hinted that the General was not personally suspect as he had been out of Washington at the time of the attack.

In fact General McNarney, as a colonel, had acted as General Marshall's junior representative when signing the March 27, 1941 secret military agreements with the British. Two of his superiors, the Chiefs of War Plans and Military Intelligence, as aides of Marshall, were heavily involved with Pearl Harbor responsibilities. At the time of the attack, General McNarney was actually in London participating in further secret negotiations.

The other Stimson nominee was Major General Frank R. McCoy, an aide, friend and co-conspirator of Mr. Stimson's for more than thirty years. Back in 1911-1912 Mr. Stimson, as President Taft's Secretary of War, became involved in a controversy with congressional leaders. Major McCoy, then his aide, helped him draft a Presidential veto which divided his party but helped Mr. Stimson defeat the congressional leaders.

In 1931-1932 Mr. Stimson, as Secretary of State, failed to sell his anti-Japanese ideas to President Hoover. He then turned to the League of Nations, of which we were not a member, and persuaded the League to investigate Japan's activities in Manchuria and to appoint General McCoy to the investigating committee. General McCoy sold Mr. Stimson's ideas to the committee and the League—with the result that Japan withdrew from the League.

Before the members of the Roberts Commission left for Pearl Harbor Mr. Stimson invited General McCoy to spend an evening at his home. The invitation was repeated upon the Commission's return. It should also be noted that another protégé of Mr. Stim-

son's, Felix Frankfurter, his assistant years before (1906), invited both Justice Roberts and Secretary Stimson to his home for a private dinner and quiet evening during the period the Roberts Report was being drafted. Mr. Stimson duly wrote in his diary that he had informed Marshall that he thought the Roberts Report took both of them off the hook.

A well done for Messrs. Roberts, McNarney and McCoy.

One of the Commission's Navy members, Admiral Standley, later publicly rebuked Justice Roberts and the War Department. Among other things, he wrote: "I knew from firsthand experience the shortcomings of our base at Pearl Harbor, for which Short and Kimmel were in no way responsible. From the beginning of our investigation, I held a firm belief that the real responsibility . . . was lodged thousands of miles from the Territory of Hawaii."

In his latest paean to his patron, *The Two-Ocean War*, the now retired Rear Admiral Morison praises FDR's foresight in leading this country into World War II by secret steps taken ahead of the public opinion he later led so skilfully to the goal he publicly denied—war.

Morison presents the events preceding Pearl Harbor in abbreviated and tendentious form, now the official one: that Japan invaded Manchuria and China and the American people had a duty to prevent any Nipponese expansion in Asia, whether the American people wanted to or not. His chapter, "Disaster at Pearl Harbor," presents self-serving sections on the "Last Days of 'Peace' in the Pacific" and "The Unsuspecting Victim." The fourth and final section, "Who Was Responsible?" gives a grotesque glimmering of the facts that were available to the historian.

Not satisfied with his own travesties, the retired Admiral tells us: "The best book by far on the question of why we were surprised at Pearl Harbor" is Roberta Wohlstetter's *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*. A first reading of this book revealed more than one hundred factual errors. It raised other questions which, if properly researched, would undoubtedly unearth still more errors, not to mention child-like acceptance of Administration releases in preference to the obscured realities.

Some of Mrs. Wohlstetter's errors are trivial (such as footnotes that do not check). Others are ridiculous (such as her "Note on Rank." She wrongly accuses the Navy of having a monopoly on the double standard of "temporary" and "permanent" ranks. She evidently does not know that both General Short and Admiral Kimmel had higher "temporary" ranks on December 7, 1941 than the "permanent" two-star ones on which their later retirement pay was based).

As the student probably more familiar with the Pearl Harbor record than any other living person, the writer appreciates the

tremendous task that Mrs. Wohlstetter faced. The record is voluminous. The printed works of the Joint Congressional Committee ran to 44 volumes. Like many others, she overlooks four volumes—three State Department tomes and Ambassador Grew's *Ten Years in Japan*, which were part of the Committee's official record. In addition, there are the Departmental documents and histories, the official papers of other countries, including those of the defeated nations, the books written by participants and other authors, and the myriad magazine articles, newspaper stories and personal interviews which have added a tremendous amount to the information about Pearl Harbor. There is still more, much of it suppressed for political reasons even now, 25 years after the great tragedy.

Mrs. Wohlstetter completely ignores the revisionists, those historians who have sought to reveal the truths the political powers prefer to keep hidden. Nevertheless, her well-subsidized volume won rave reviews across the nation and even in the *American Historical Review*. Columbia University awarded her the $4,000 Bancroft prize, apparently accepting Admiral Morison's accolade that "she is cognizant of all the intricate details of the codes, has made a thorough study of all extant sources, and uses them with the perception of a well-trained mind. Her book ought finally to dispose of some of the nonsense about Pearl Harbor that has been written."

In fact, the book contains as much nonsense about Pearl Harbor as any that has been written.

Mrs. Wohlstetter concentrated on the Intelligence phase of the episode. She accordingly devoted considerable attention to the messages of the two services and the information Washington gained from reading Japanese codes. These messages played a major role in the last months, days, hours and minutes preceding the disaster. If she had done a thorough and objective job, her book would have been a very valuable contribution. Unfortunately, she joined the union of court historians.

In a volume dealing with communications, particularly Naval communications, you would expect accuracy in reporting the filing time mentioned in each such message. This is particularly so since the top official Naval historian gave the book such a boost. Unfortunately, Mrs. Wohlstetter never learned the Navy's time system.

Every Navy message states its date and time in six digits—the first two represent the day of the month, the second two the hour of the day, and the last two the minute of the hour. For example, one of the key messages was number 242005. Mrs. Wohlstetter writes, "The digits 242005 mean November 24, 20:05, which is 8:05 P.M. Washington time."

If she had read the congressional hearings through Volume 33

to page 1150, she would have noted, "For communication within the Navy, Greenwich civil time (GCT) is used in headings of messages." If she had read the hearings at all thoroughly she would have learned that Washington's time is Plus 5, i.e., five hours earlier than Greenwich time. So that this crucial message was actually sent at 3:05 in the afternoon, Washington time.

How valuable is a book on pre-attack intelligence that is five hours off on the timing of all Naval communications coming out of Washington? How dependable is a Naval historian who acclaims such a book the best on the subject?

Whose Responsibility?

Another serious error is Mrs. Wohlstetter's statement, "No one knew who possessed the final command responsibility for defense of the Hawaiian Islands in the event of an enemy attack." It was clearly understood by all concerned at the time, as revealed in all the investigations, that Pearl Harbor was the responsibility of the Army in general and of the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, in particular. His agent on the scene was Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short. General Short took orders from and reported to no one else *but* George C. Marshall. What he lacked in matériel, orders, intelligence (information) and proper alert status was the responsibility of none other than General George C. Marshall.

Mrs. Wohlstetter also states, "The [Japanese] Pearl Harbor task force was under orders to return up to 24 hours before D-Day if anything favorable developed in the U.S.-Japanese negotiations." Actually, while this Task Force had orders to return to Japan if detected by any foreign forces up to 24 hours before D-Day, it could have been recalled up to the moment the planes left the decks, if anything favorable had developed in the United States-Japanese negotiations.

One could go on and on for a hundred more blunders. The facts were just too much for Mrs. Wohlstetter. Someday, someone, or some foundation, should underwrite an objective study of the Pearl Harbor disaster. Until that day comes, Americans who want to know the truth must rely on the writing of revisionists hacking away at the well-financed, well-reviewed writings of the court historians and official publications.

Like Mrs. Wohlstetter, Admiral Morison in his own book ignores the contributions of revisionists, while finding the writings of the Administration's apologists "especially valuable." He does, however, mention *The Great Sea War* by the late Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and E.B. Potter of the U.S. Naval Academy staff. Perhaps he did not notice that this semi-official volume states:

> By December 6 it was known in Washington that the Japanese were sending their Washington embassy a message for the U.S. State Department breaking off diplomatic relations, the sort of message that in times past had been followed up with a surprise attack on the opposing fleet. It was known too that Japanese diplomats in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, and Washington were burning their secret documents and codes—usually done only when war is imminent.
>
> Thus by Saturday afternoon there was every reason to believe that war with Japan was only hours away. Then between 0400 and 0600 on Sunday, December 7, the U.S. Navy Department deciphered instructions to the Japanese ambassadors to deliver their message at 1 P.M. One o'clock in the afternoon in Washington would be 7:30 at Pearl Harbor.

However, Admiral Morison does admit that FDR's " 'short of war' was not so very short for the Atlantic Fleet. . . . These officers and men were enduring all the danger and hardship of war; yet it was not called war. They were forbidden to talk of their experiences ashore, or even to tell where they had been or what they were doing." He also admits that our economic measures against Japan were taken with the cooperation of the British and Dutch, and that "the fundamental reason for America's going to war with Japan was our insistence on the integrity of China."

Actually, of course, the contest for China, during more than a half century, had been between the Western ideas of Japan and the Communist ideas of the Soviet Union. We decided China's future as early as June 1940—when we decided on war against Japan. Yet, the Admiral tells us, "the Administration and the head of the armed forces, as we have seen, were doing their best to prevent or postpone a war with Japan. Roosevelt even sent a personal appeal to Hirohito on the evening of 6 December."

It is true that General Marshall and Admiral Stark did warn the President not to send Japan an ultimatum before we were ready. However, the President rejected their advice and sent an ultimatum on November 26. Roosevelt's message to Hirohito was sent only after FDR had been alerted that the Japanese message which meant war was already on its way. The message to Hirohito was one for the record, after he knew there was no hope for peace.

Missing Files

Speaking of the decoded Japanese messages, the Admiral states: "The recipient, without taking notes, had to read these signals in the presence of the messenger who returned them to Army or Navy Intelligence office, where all copies but one were

burned." Actually, of course, there was nothing to prevent these officials from making notes. At least one did. The so-called "messenger" was a top Army or Navy Intelligence officer who stood ready to supply any background or further explanation requested. On this point, the Intelligence admiral in charge of these intercepts testified: "They might hold the book as long as they wished, or send for it to come back again, but in the interest of security, we did not like to send out individual copies for retention." Any neglect of these important messages by any recipient was a sign of rank incompetency.

On at least one occasion, early in 1941, the State Department was permitted to retain a copy of a message. This was when Under Secretary Sumner Welles informed the Soviet Embassy of a decoded message indicating Germany's intention to invade Russia. There are indications that a German spy in the Russian Embassy reported this information to Berlin. Shortly afterward, we decoded a message from Berlin to Tokyo indicating that we had read the Japanese message. Fortunately, the Japanese continued to use the PURPLE code all through the war and we continued to read Japanese messages right up to VJ Day.

When the Admiral states that "all copies but one were burned," he is in serious error. Normally, four copies were kept —two in the Army files and two in the Navy files. In each case one set was filed by the Japanese serial number and another by the serial number assigned it by the Service filing it.

There are strong indications that copies of some of these intercepted messages were ordered to be destroyed shortly after December 7, 1941. They were missing from the files when sought in December 1943. Fortunately for the cause of truth a set was located and they were replaced in both the Navy and Army files.

(*A Note From The Editor*, continued from page 390)

Toland counter-attacked in a new "Postscript" for the paperback edition of his book, released in February 1983. He did not back down from the claim of the radio traffic intercepts, but pointed out that despite undoubted *orders* for radio silence, that silence must have been broken at some points, and he presented evidence for why this was so. Neither did he back down from the claim that the information of these intercepts, and other information about the task force, *was* passed on to Washington; if there remains no documentary proof of receipt, there is a good reason for that which should be familiar to all students of Pearl Harbor's aftermath. Toland's purpose in writing the "Postscript" was not, however, mainly to reply to his critics, but to present yet more new evidence which had come in to him since the first edition of the book was published. Among this was material relating to J. Edgar Hoover's foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack (knowledge which was, according to Toland's source, quoting Hoover, passed on to FDR), a question which has intrigued scholars for some time. Indeed, independently of Toland, the matter was revived in a major way in December 1982 in the form of an article in the *American Historical Review* based on newly declassified documents.

In December 1983 the National Security Agency declassified and released the text of a 16,000-word interview, conducted by the Naval Security group, in which Toland's "Seaman Z" was revealed as Robert D. Ogg, a retired businessman. In the interview conducted in May, and later approved in transcript by the subject, Ogg maintained the accuracy of what he had earlier told Toland: that he *had* picked up the Japanese task force's radio signals, *had* plotted its location, and *had* been told by his superior that the information was passed on to the White House. When asked about the Japanese insistence that their force had been under radio silence, Ogg replied: "I feel there is no possible question that they did not maintain radio silence, but I don't believe they used it [radio communication] in any great activity."

Ogg's relenquishment of anonymity, and the release of his interview statements, breathed new life into the Toland debate. But there was more in December 1983 which was to open up a whole new angle in Pearl Harbor revisionism, further fanning the flames of contention. Joseph Leib, a former New Deal bureaucrat and retired newspaper correspondent, wrote an article which appeared in *Hustler* magazine, "Pearl Harbor: The Story the Rest of the Media Won't Tell," in which he claimed that his friend, Secretary of State Hull, had confided to him on 29 November 1941 that J. Edgar Hoover and FDR knew that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor withing a few days, and that the President, over Hull's strident objections, was going to let this happen as a way to get the country into war. Hull's dilemma was that he could not reveal this openly to the press, since the White House would simply denounce him, and no one would believe him. He turned over to Lieb a document containing a transcript of Japanese radio intercepts which supposedly detailed the Pearl Harbor plan, making the reporter promise never to reveal the source. Leib rushed the story, minus the identification of Hull, to the United Press bureau, which refused to run it since it was so incredulous. But Leib did manage to persuade UP's cable editor, Harry Frantz, to transmit it on the foreign cable. Although the story managed somehow to get garbled in transmission, it did create a front-page banner headline in the Sunday, 30 November, Honolulu *Advertiser*: JAPANESE MAY STRIKE OVER WEEKEND! Thus Leib, writing in 1983, has finally cleared up the mystery of the origins of that headline, which has always been a particularly curious part of the Pearl

(*continued on page 424*)

Senator Homer Ferguson and the Pearl Harbor Congressional Investigation

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.

Prior to the Pearl Harbor Congressional investigation this writer had twice met Homer Ferguson. During the 78th Congress when Ferguson was a freshman Senator, I was Associate Research Director of the Republican National Committee. That sounds like a political position but essentially it was a fact-finding one—finding facts the Democrats didn't want known.

Our first meeting was in the Spring of 1943. Senator Ferguson was then an up-and-coming Senator feeling his way around Washington. He was interested, among other things, in the Republican effort to curb the political propaganda then being issued by the Office of War Information at taxpayers' expense.

The second meeting was during the 1944 campaign when the Senator came to New York to prepare for a Town Hall debate with Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. On both of these occasions the Senator impressed me as a sincere, hard-working legislator who was seriously interested in the nation's welfare, Constitutional principles and the cleaning up of political corruption.

Well-informed Americans had long known that many facts of the Pearl Harbor disaster had been concealed for reasons other than national defense. Many clippings, tips and authentic leads had found their way into Republican files. Scared service officers had given facts confidentially. Throughout the 1944 campaign, the Republican high command was consistently faced with the

question: "Should we use the information in our possession?" Senator Ferguson, public servant that he was, thought that the public should know some of the facts before it voted. He was later to find out that General Marshall had personally acted to suppress the truth, including facts relating to his own responsibility.

Once the war was over, Senator Ferguson demanded "the whole truth about this unfortunate event." Public pressure mounted. Realizing that an investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack could not be averted, the Administration jumped the gun and set up a Committee which they thought they could completely control. Plans were made to rush this investigation to a hasty conclusion. An Administration-approved staff was carefully selected. The Republican minority was allowed no assistance. The schedule called for perusal of the evidence by the Committee staff, a month of hearings conducted by the Committee Counsel, and two weeks for writing the report. The Committee members would be kept busy listening to selected testimony. The staff, friendly to the Administration, would handle all details and prepare the report for the Committee members to sign. This was pretty much standard New Deal procedure.

However, there was one flaw in these plans. They reckoned without Senator Ferguson. Denied official assistance, he and Senator Owen Brewster, ranking Republican Senator on the Committee, sought research assistance. My background and experience fulfilled their needs. Senator Brewster retained me to assist all the minority members in their efforts to ferret out the essential facts which some people desired to be withheld. Since Senator Ferguson devoted more time and effort to this investigation than any other minority member, my work simmered down to working constantly with him while reporting to Senator Brewster and maintaining liaison with Republican Representatives Frank B. Keefe and Bertrand W. Gearhart.

Realizing the importance of this investigation of Pearl Harbor and the need to prevent a similar surprise attack as an advent to a possible World War III, Senator Ferguson immediately put aside his personal and social obligations and all but the most important of his other Congressional duties. His first move was to see the Committee Counsel, Mr. William D. Mitchell, a former associate of the Secretary of War—whose actions were being investigated. The Senator expressed his desire to cooperate with the Counsel and asked what he could do to assist in the preparation of evidence. The Counsel had not counted on such assistance. In fact, he seemed to consider it an indirect reflection on his own ability. Apparently he expected the Committee members to act as an audience while he did all the probing. He just didn't know Senator Ferguson. The Senator wasn't going to sit idle if there

was any investigating to be done. From this early interview the Counsel developed an antagonism toward the Senator. Because the Senator was always bringing out important evidence the Counsel had missed, this antagonism grew until Mr. Mitchell finally resigned before the completion of the investigation. The Counsel's methodical plan had been rent asunder by the Senator's uncanny ability to unearth facts the counsel either couldn't or didn't want to find.

The Senator was hampered at every turn. Before the Committee had been appointed, President Truman issued an executive order that no one would be allowed to make public any information concerning the success of the American experts in deciphering foreign codes. If this order had been allowed to stand, the American public would never have learned that the Japanese code had been solved and that Washington officials had been reading Japan's diplomatic messages for a long time before the Pearl Harbor disaster occurred. Republican members of the Committee convinced the majority that this order must be countermanded. Accordingly, the President modified it to permit public testimony before the entire Committee.

This did not satisfy Senator Ferguson. It still prohibited him from talking to Army and Navy officers individually. If left in force, the investigation would have become merely a "fishing expedition," for no Army or Naval officer would have endangered his career by talking to Committee members in private and disclosing leads for intelligent questioning. Senator Ferguson persuaded the Committee to request the President to direct all persons to volunteer whatever information they had to any and all Committee members. The President refused but finally, under pressure, permitted prospective witnesses "to disclose, orally, to any of the members of the Joint Congressional Committee" any information they had on the subject but qualified it by adding that this did "not include any files or written material." This effectively prohibited the placing of any files or written material in the hands of the Committee members unless it was previously approved by top authorities of the department involved. Cabinet members and the majority of the Committee were allowed to rule out evidence as "not material to the investigation," without members of the Committee ever seeing the material thus ruled out. Under a majority vote of the Committee the individual members were denied permission to search files, even when accompanied by Committee counsel, and not even the Committee counsel were permitted to look at the late President Roosevelt's files.

After much persistent effort, some of the testimony of the previous investigations was finally obtained. There were numerous volumes, and insufficient copies to go around. The Senator

carried some home with him every night and eagerly read the digests of others as quickly as they were prepared for him.

The hearings were opened on November 15, 1945. No one was adequately prepared. That would have been humanly impossible. Senator Ferguson had requested that the Committee be furnished copies of all exhibits at least ten days before the hearings. He was ignored. In fact, more than 1,000 pages of un-indexed exhibits were furnished Committee members in the 48 hours preceding the opening of the hearings. This deluging tactic continued throughout the hearings. Exhibits were seldom available for study before they were presented and used by the Counsel. It seemed part of a plot to prevent intelligent questioning by Committee members. It might be inferred that this was a deliberate design to cover up. The exhibits alone, when printed up 11 months later, were to comprise 28 full volumes. This does not include quantities of other material which were placed in the Record without exhibit numbers. No newspaper man had time to go through the thousands of pages of the exhibits. To this day many important facts remain buried in the Record and have never been adequately brought to the public's attention.

The inundation of Committee members with so much material had the desired effect on most of the busy members. They threw up their hands and relied on the testimony and what little they could read in spare moments between other Congressional duties. This was not so with Senator Ferguson. His secretary and staff were instructed not to interrupt him except in cases of extreme emergency. He settled down to a routine, devoting almost all of his waking hours to the Pearl Harbor investigation.

He became so engrossed in the problem at hand that one morning he even came to his office without a necktie. When we were ready to start for the Committee room, I remarked that he was not wearing a tie. He looked surprised and much dismayed. He immediately borrowed one from his secretary. He had been "living" Pearl Harbor with such concentration that he had neglected to put his tie on at home, and had arrived early and worked on Pearl Harbor matters for at least an hour, without noticing that he was "tieless."

Under the normal routine, the Senator and I got together every morning for about an hour before hearings opened. I gave him research material from my files and reported on what I had digested the night before. There had been nine previous investigations—four of them Secret and five Top Secret, involving code breaking. For each witness it was necessary to know the phases with which he was familiar, what he had previously testified and what others had previously testified about him or the facts with which he should have been familiar. In most cases there was

conflicting testimony that had to be recognized and brought together. Many of the hundreds of exhibits had to be re-examined for their relationship to each witness. There was never sufficient time for the Senator to do as good a job as he would have liked. It was a case of doing the best he could; he spared no effort to accomplish this.

At ten o'clock each morning we proceeded to the hearings, with an assistant or two to help lug the many bulky documents needed for the session. We were usually greeted with a new stack of documents at the Committee table. When Senator Ferguson was doing the questioning I remained at his side to supply the needed documents and make suggestions, should the answers take an unexpected turn.

At noon we returned to his private office. One of his secretaries would bring us some soup, a sandwich and ice cream, which we ate together as we discussed questions and procedures for the afternoon session. Frequently there was a call to his wife, who was ill during the first part of the investigation. She followed the proceedings very closely, encouraging and aiding him in his efforts. Occasionally someone with a clue or suggestion would drop in for a few minutes. The luncheon period, always busy, passed very quickly and we then reassembled in the Senate Caucus Room for the afternoon session.

The Senator rarely missed any of the hearings. Once he was called to the White House and on one or two other occasions he had to absent himself for a short period in order to cast his vote at a Committee meeting or on the Senate floor. However, he read carefully all testimony taken during his short absences. He followed every detail.

After the afternoon session we retired to his office again, discussed the events of the day and mapped out the program for the morrow. I gathered for him the material he wanted to read that night and he suggested how I might best spend my time in culling information for his use. At six or seven o'clock each evening he would start for home carrying several grips of documents. One set of testimony was delivered to his home and another to his office. He kept duplicates of the most important exhibits in both places. However, he became so interested in his work that he frequently mislaid his papers. This presented quite a problem to the young lady who was charged with keeping them in order. She, of course, was unable to follow all the contents and sometimes could not locate papers from his description of their contents. In some cases he would leave at home papers he wanted the next day. Fortunately, Senator Brewster's copies were available and we were able to locate the needed documents without too much loss of time. This, however, necessitated a

constant watch on all important papers to see that they did not go astray.

When the Senator was questioning witnesses he had a habit of tossing aside documents that had served their immediate purpose. They had to be gathered up and reassembled with care. There was a telephone booth behind the Committee table from where I could telephone for papers required in a hurry when the questions indicated a need for certain documents that were not in the Committee room.

The Senator once explained that when he was a Michigan Circuit Court Judge he had a very capable secretary who read everything before it was filed and could locate anything he ever wanted on very short notice. Apparently he operated with little thought for this important detail. Unfortunately, the young lady who handled his papers on Pearl Harbor did not have the time to read the many lengthy documents involved and frequently was at a loss when asked to provide a paper in which "such and such a witness" had made "such and such a statement."

During the entire investigation the Senator's attitude was strictly judicial. There was no hint of the prejudiced prosecutor. He was after the facts—all the facts. Rarely ruffled, questions poured from him with a regularity and relentlessness that would have exhausted the average man. A sip of water and his voice was good for another half hour. It did not matter to him where the chips fell. He must have the facts. Throughout the hearings he refused to pass judgment. Time after time he told newspapermen that he would wait until all the evidence was in. At the end he would finally relent when it became evident that the majority had effectively blocked the presentation of some of the most important evidence.

The first Navy Department witness, Admiral R.B. Inglis, in charge of Naval Intelligence, told the Committee that he thought that Congress and the American people were largely to blame for the Pearl Harbor disaster. This was apparently the Administration line. It was one of many Administration acts intended to divert attention from its own responsibility. Senator Ferguson then started the following colloquy:

> Senator FERGUSON: Do you think the people were to blame?
>
> Admiral INGLIS: Are you asking for my opinion?
>
> Senator FERGUSON: Well, you put it in the memo and they persuaded you to take it out. I am asking you whether that is your opinion?
>
> Admiral INGLIS: My opinion is that they did contribute to some extent to the Pearl Harbor attack.
>
> Senator FERGUSON: Well, now, you explain how that contributed to the Pearl Harbor attack.

Admiral INGLIS: Because the Armed Forces were not as strong as they might have been had the country been unified and had the appropriations been larger for the Army and Navy.

Senator FERGUSON: All right; now, do you know anything about the appropriations?

Admiral INGLIS: I only know that the Navy kept asking for more than they could get.

Senator FERGUSON: Did you know this, that when the Navy asked for an item that on many occasions the Budget Director and the Executive branch of the Government cut it down?

Admiral INGLIS: Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: And Congress often put them up?

Admiral INGLIS: I did not know about the latter. I did know about the former.

Senator FERGUSON: Did you know that the people, the Congress for the people, did put those up?

Admiral INGLIS: Now that you mention it I believe very likely that there were certain specific instances where the Congress did increase appropriations.

Senator FERGUSON: Well, now, how could you blame the people for not getting armament?

Admiral INGLIS: I am not blaming them, Senator. I am just saying that that was my opinion, that that was the frame of mind that this country was in at the time.

This was but one of many opinions the Senator exploded with facts. Appropriation figures placed in the record showed clearly that the Executive branch did cut Army and Navy requests while Congress raised the amounts requested by the President in his budget.

The first witness provided another good example of how Senator Ferguson brought out essential information from leads which the Committee Counsel and Democratic members of the Committee missed entirely. In reading his statement the Admiral had said, "The Chief of Naval Operations, on November 25, 1941, directed that all trans-Pacific shipping be routed through Torres Straits between Australia and New Guinea." When it was the Senator's turn to interrogate the witness the following interchange occurred:

Senator FERGUSON: From whom did you get you information that it was diverted on the 25th?

Admiral INGLIS: I have got the source right here, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: Will you give us the source?

Admiral INGLIS: Yes, sir, there was a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations dated November 25, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON: That was Admiral Stark?

Admiral INGLIS: Admiral Stark was the Chief of Naval Operations at the that time; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: That came out in Washington; is that true?
Admiral INGLIS: That is true.
Senator FERGUSON: Have you the order with you?
Admiral INGLIS: No, sir.
Senator FERGUSON: Will you get me the order?
Admiral INGLIS: I will sir.

Later the Admiral produced the message which read:

Route all trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits, The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet, providing necessary escort. Refer your despatch 230258.

Senator FERGUSON: Now, I will ask you why you did not put in the part that was to provide for escorts.
Admiral INGLIS: I think that was perhaps omitted by my staff because it might have been somewhat controversial.
Senator FERGUSON: You think that this part of the message is controversial, "providing necessary escort"?
Admiral INGLIS: It might lead to controversy because of the word "necessary." There might be a difference of opinion as to ships for escorts as opposed to the need for keeping them concentrated for combat.

The reader should bear in mind that this message was sent two weeks before Pearl Harbor was attacked. There was a definite indication that officials in Washington were then worried about an attack on American ships in the Pacific Ocean. It was later to be revealed through the persistence of the Senator that President Roosevelt, on November 25th, according to Secretary Stimson, "brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday (December 1)." The Senator then tried, as follows, to find out why this information had been withheld from the Committee:

Senator FERGUSON: Why was this not turned over?
Admiral INGLIS: Perhaps it was.
Senator FERGUSON: I will ask Counsel now, when did Counsel get this Exhibit 37.
Mr. MITCHELL: I first saw it about 10 minutes ago.

And so through the efforts of the Junior Senator from Michigan the American public was able to learn that our ships in the Pacific were being provided naval escorts two weeks before war was declared. This little instance was typical of the way the Senator brought out important information throughout the entire investigation. It was most annoying to the Committee Counsel and majority members.

The witness who received the most attention from the Senator was the Army's Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall.

Before this witness appeared, an article in *Life* magazine by John Chamberlain had revealed that during the 1944 Presidential campaign General Marshall had twice written the Republican candidate Governor Thomas E. Dewey personally, confidentially requesting him not to bring up the Pearl Harbor disaster during the campaign. The Committee was interested in these letters but the General did not wish to disclose them publicly. He asked for an executive meeting of the Committee to discuss the matter. He asked Committee members to pledge themselves not to reveal what went on during this executive session. Senator Ferguson stalwartly refused to attend any Executive Committee meeting on these terms. He felt that the public was entitled to the whole truth. Through his insistence the complete contents of these letters were made public over the objections of the Committee Counsel and General Marshall.

General Marshall's testimony was staged in a very dramatic manner. An urgency for speed was created. It was first announced that he had to leave immediately on a presidential mission to China. The order of the witnesses was quickly changed. General Leonard C. Gerow was brought in out of order. This General had proved himself a hero in the Normandy landing. He was much bemedalled. He was asked to accept the blame for the fact that a proper alert message had not been sent to General Walter C. Short in Hawaii before the attack. Being a good soldier he accepted the blame manfully. He was then brushed aside and General Marshall was placed on the witness stand so he could testify before leaving for China. There was much off-the-record talk that a plane was warming up to take him there.

He appeared first on Thursday morning, December 6, 1945. The Committee Counsel and Democrats questioned him through Thursday and Friday. On Saturday morning he was turned over to the Republican Committee members with a great deal of gossip holding that he would have to get away that afternoon. Senator Brewster's father had passed away the night before, and he was unable to be present. Representative Gearhart questioned him a short while and then the General was turned over to Senator Ferguson.

The Senator had devised what we called a "blue plan" for questioning the General. The General was involved in almost every phase of Pearl Harbor from the ordering of the fleet to Pearl Harbor up to the very moment the fleet was struck. He was responsible for the fleet's protection while in Pearl Harbor. He was involved in all military preparations and lack of preparations. It was in his power to decide whether defense material went to Hawaii or foreign nations. He was consulted on almost all of the diplomatic maneuvers which preceded the disaster. There

was no witness before the Committee who was in a position to know as much about the events leading up to the disaster as the General. Accordingly, the Senator put his best efforts into preparing a thorough system for questioning him on every important phase. This "blue plan" was typed into a loose leaf binder with a full set of questions on each phase. He did not mean to let the General go until he had answered all his questions. The Committee Chairman, Senator Alben W. Barkley, stated on the record that he had hoped to conclude with the General on that day, and the Vice-chairman, Representative Jere Cooper, stated that he understood that the General's plane was waiting, ready to take him to China. (It later developed that the General had not even seen the President for a briefing, since accepting his appointment over the telephone.)

The Senator could not be side-tracked; he questioned the General all through Saturday and again on Monday and Tuesday of the following week—and still further during the second round of questioning on Thursday. There was an attempt to deride his questioning. Some majority members did not think his questions were pertinent. Senator Scott W. Lucas, a Democratic member of the Committee, spent the weekend with the President. Finally, the General was ordered to the White House. The fact was that Senator Ferguson was hitting home.

On the first day alone Senator Ferguson brought out, among other things, the following facts that the Committee Counsel had missed:

1. That General Gerow was in charge of war plans and had no authority over General Short; in fact, he had nothing to do with operations until we were actually engaged in war.
2. That under Army regulations General Gerow had no responsibility for sending or not sending a proper alert to General Short.
3. That General Marshall himself as Chief of Staff was the person responsible for the fact that General Short was not properly alerted.
4. That there was no responsible Army officer on duty Saturday evening, December 6th, or Sunday morning, December 7th, who could take action before General Marshall's belated arrival at 11:20 Sunday morning and, therefore, it could not be said that Washington was on a full alert, even though it was known that the situation was critical.
5. That General Marshall had appointed as head of Army Intelligence a man he knew was short of the required qualifications.
6. That although the head of Army Intelligence "should have had access to all intelligence" he did not have such access and, therefore, his confidential bulletins were not the best information available.

7. That lack of manpower available for deciphering Japanese codes was not due to lack of Congressional appropriations.

8. That General Marshall knew that Great Britain was informed of what we read in the Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor.

9. That "we have been trying to keep that [the above] quiet as much as we could."

10. That General Marshall knew no reason why Admiral Kimmel had been cut off from the group receiving the information obtained from reading Japanese codes.

11. That General Marshall denied knowledge that the Japanese knew we were reading their codes. (The Senator brought out from a later witness, much to the embarrassment of the Committee Counsel and other witnesses, that Washington had such knowledge and copies of it were circulated to the General in the regular manner.)

12. That before the Roberts Report "was made public there were certain things withdrawn and that the complete Roberts Report went to the President before portions were withdrawn."

13. That the United States initiated the American-Dutch-British Agreement.

14. That General Marshall had approved this agreement, as did the Secretaries of War and Navy, and that the agreement went into general effect *before* the attack.

15. That officers of the United States were furnished to China for combat duty against Japan *before* December 7, 1941.

All this and more was brought out solely by the Senator's questioning. It should be borne in mind that this was after the Committee Counsel and the majority members of the Committee were fully satisfied that they had placed in the record all the significant information that General Marshall could furnish. If their record had been allowed to stand, General Gerow would have been left responsible for an important act of omission for which in fact only General Marshall or Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson were responsible.

There was only one witness, among the scores who testified, who distressed the Senator to the slightest degree. That witness was the former Supreme Court Justice, Owen J. Roberts. President Roosevelt had appointed him to make the first investigation of the attack. The Roberts Commission started its investigation right after the event. Witnesses were then well able to remember clearly what had transpired. Justice Roberts first interviewed all the top Washington officials *off the record*. He then proceeded with his Commission to Honolulu where all the local witnesses were interviewed *on the record* without benefit of the information Washington had, and had failed to use adequately. The Roberts

Report later blamed Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the disaster, and caused their removal while Washington top officials were found to have "fulfilled their obligations." The Senator felt that this witness would be able to provide valuable information concerning what had transpired in Washington. Certainly when the Justice made this inquiry no one could have forgotten where he was on the night of December 6th nor would any important documents have been lost. The Senator with his judicial background revered and respected any man who had been a Supreme Court Justice. He prepared a long list of questions to ask this Justice—questions which, if they had been answered unequivocally, would have been invaluable to the Committee in fixing responsibility for the disaster.

There had been a great deal of mystery concerning a "winds message." It seems that the Japanese had broadcast a code to appear in a weather broadcast when they decided to break relations or go to war. If they were to break with the United States the broadcast would include the three words "east wind rain." Some witnesses testified that such a message was broadcast and received in Washington before the attack. Some thought it had been received in Honolulu. One key witness changed his previous testimony. The message itself could not be found. One intercepted message was missing from the files. One Navy witness swore he last saw the message when it was assembled with others for the use of the Roberts Commission. Four years after the event memories were hazy and conflicting. There were some indications that changed testimony might have been prompted. What was the truth?

When Senator Brewster asked the Justice about this message, the Justice replied: "I don't know anything about this winds message. . . .

> Senator BREWSTER: So, so far as you now recall, there was no mention about either the original or implementing winds message, as it is called?
>
> Mr. Justice ROBERTS: *I have no recollection of any such thing and I think you will search the testimony in vain for reference to it.* (Emphasis supplied)
>
> Senator BREWSTER: Well, we understood there were important gaps in that as the result of representations as to security.
>
> Mr. Justice ROBERTS: *Oh, No. The stenographic testimony is complete.* There is nothing eliminated from the stenographic testimony. (Emphasis supplied)

A few moments later Senator Ferguson started his questioning. He read to the Justice the testimony of a Navy Captain that the last time he saw the Winds message was when it was assembled

into a file to show as evidence to the Roberts Commission.* The Justice testified that "The file originals of anything of this kind were not in our custody at any time." The Senator then quoted from a transcript of the testimony before the Commission of which Justice Roberts had been the Chairman:

> Senator FERGUSON: You were the chairman and this is in your language:
>
> > The CHAIRMAN: It has been reported to me that about 10 days before the attack a code was intercepted which could not be broken, but it was forwarded to Washington to the War Department to be broken, and the War Department found out it could be broken and did break it, and found it contained three important signal words which would direct the attack on Pearl Harbor, and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio those three signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here as an indication that the code had been followed and that the attack was planned.
>
> I wish you would look at that.
>
> Mr. Justice ROBERTS: You don't need to show it to me.
>
> Senator FERGUSON: What were you talking about?
>
> Mr. Justice ROBERTS: I was talking about some information that had been given to me somewhere around Pearl Harbor. People were coming to me all the time telling me that there was such and such a rumor. You see I say "It has been reported to me."
>
> Senator FERGUSON: Wouldn't this describe the winds code message?
>
> Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Very likely it would; very likely so. . . .
>
> * * * *
>
> Senator FERGUSON: Mr. Justice, this last part—
>
> > . . . and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio these three signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here . . .
>
> You were in Hawaii then?
>
> Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Yes.
>
> Senator FERGUSON: As an indication that the code had been followed and that the attack was planned.
>
> Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Yes; that is what I say.
>
> Senator FERGUSON: Wouldn't that indicate that the winds execute message had been received and that you had some information on that point?
>
> Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Surely. Somebody had told me that or I wouldn't have asked the question.
>
> * * * *

*It was later found that they were assembled for the then Acting Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal.

Senator FERGUSON: Colonel Fielder (G-2 Intelligence, Hawaii) said:

> I have no knowledge of that whatever.
>
> The CHAIRMAN: You know nothing about it?
>
> Colonel FIELDER: No.
>
> The CHAIRMAN: You had no communications from the War Department as of December 5th forwarding to you the meaning of the three code words which would be the signal for the attack?

I was coming back to that.

Now, that would indicate that there were three code words showing there was going to be an attack as far as the United States was concerned, at least someone told you about it?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: That is right.

* * * *

Senator FERGUSON: Now, I refer to exhibit 32 on December 5, 1941, there was a message sent by General Miles:

> Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters, G-2.
>
> Hawaiian Department, Honolulu Territory, Hawaii.
>
> Contact Commander Rochefort (Communications Security Unit. 14th Naval District, Hawaii) immediately through Commandant Fourteenth Naval District regarding broadcast from Tokyo with reference weather.

Signed "Miles".

Did you have that message before you, do you recall?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: I think so.

Senator FERGUSON: Did you know that they were talking there about the original code message?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: I mean the original winds message.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: No, sir; I don't know it now.

Senator FERGUSON: Now, going on:

> The CHAIRMAN: I refer to something else which you may or may not know anything about. I refer to the fact that some ten days before December it is supposed that a Japanese code message you intercepted and was broken down by the Department in Washington, one of the military departments, which gave certain key words which would be flashed over the radio directing the attack on Pearl Harbor.
>
> Colonel BICKNELL: (Asst. G-2 Intelligence, Hawaii): Yes.
>
> The CHAIRMAN: And that, having broken that down, one of the military establishment in Washington caught over the radio the three key words and relayed them here to you. When I say "you," to the Islands—
>
> Colonel BICKNELL: Yes.
>
> The CHAIRMAN: Do you know of any such story?
>
> Colonel BICKNELL: I never heard of such a thing, no, sir.
>
> The CHAIRMAN: Never heard of it?
>
> Colonel BICKNELL: No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: I have no other questions. are there any other questions?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: I was talking about the same rumors that had come to me from somewhere.

Senator FERGUSON: As you were there with Bicknell?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: Did you follow that up? I have looked over the testimony and I haven't been able to find it but I want to know now, from your recollection, do you know whether you ever tried to follow that up here in Washington after you failed on Bicknell and Fielder?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Yes, sir. We asked for all the messages there were about any broken codes and we were told we had had all they had except this magic thing. ("Magic" referred to intercepted Japanese messages in their most secret code.)

Such testimony from a former Justice of the Supreme Court was sickening.* Testimony which he said would be sought in vain turned out to have been the subject of almost the only questions he asked Hawaiian Intelligence officers. When the Justice did not find the information he expected, he had dropped this line of questioning. Apparently, Washington officials in 1941 thought they could place the blame in Hawaii if they could show that this message had been received there. Washington officials had been vindicated on their own say-so, while the two Hawaiian Commanders were held up to national scorn on the basis of the Roberts inquiry. The Senator was visibly taken back by such testimony, but he kept on a rapid fire questioning. He hit home again.

Senator FERGUSON: Do I understand you did not get the magic?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: No; we were never shown one of the magic messages.

Senator FERGUSON: Not one?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Not one.

Senator FERGUSON: Were you ever shown the substance of the magic messages?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: Did you know there were such messages?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Well, I knew that the Army or Navy or State Department had been cracking a super code of the Japanese for weeks or months and that they had been taking off all kinds of information. We asked the War Department and the Navy Department to tell us what they got from that and they told us. They did not show us the messages, any of them, and I didn't ask them to.

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*Justice Roberts retired in 1945 and this testimony was taken on Jan. 28, 1946.

Senator FERGUSON: That being true how was this finding possible, on page 19:

The Secretary of State—

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Now, Senator, is this an investigation of the Roberts Commission or an investigation of what happened at Pearl Harbor?

Senator FERGUSON: I am trying to get the facts.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: When you ask "How is this finding possible?" I don't find you criticizing me a bit.

Senator FERGUSON: I am not criticizing. I want to know on the facts you had before you—

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: How we could make a certain finding.

Senator FERGUSON: Yes.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: I think that is criticism.

Senator FERGUSON: You think that is criticism?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Go ahead. I will be glad to answer your question.

Senator FERGUSON: (reading)

> The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping the War and Navy Departments in close touch with the international situation and fully advising them respecting the course and probable termination of negotiations with Japan.

Now, I merely mean if you didn't have any of these messages, for instance, the message setting the deadline of the 29th, the pilot message, the 1 o'clock message, the 13-part message up until midnight or 9 o'clock, and the 14th part and 1 o'clock message on Sunday morning, how could the commission make a finding, if they didn't have the facts?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: I spent an entire day in Secretary Hull's office. Secretary Hull showed me, as a Commissioner sent over by the Commission, because we wanted to do him the courtesy of sending someone there to take his evidence instead of dragging him over to the Navy Department. Secretary Hull showed me his personal memorandum where he had noted that on a certain day he had told the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy this, that and the other thing, and where he got that information I did not ask him, but I was perfectly convinced, and our commission was convinced from my report to them of the testimony he brought to me, that Secretary Hull had been warning the War and Navy Departments day by day and day by day that something might happen this day or that day, that the situation was degenerating, and so on.

Senator FERGUSON: All right. Now, Justice, that part of the testimony is not in the testimony furnished us, is it?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Certainly not. They had a stack of memorandum from State Department that high, or Secretary Hull's personal memorandum and in order to recap it I asked him to write the letter which is in our record.

* * * *

Senator FERGUSON: All right. Then we come to the next finding in your conclusions:

> The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications thereof.

Now, without having the intercepted magic messages, did you make this finding? I will put it that way.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Why, certainly. The Chief of Staff and Admiral Stark told us and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy told us that everytime Hull gave them a warning they would go and repeat it to the Chief of Staff and to the Admiral. I did not need to look at any messages to find out whether Marshall and Stark had been sufficiently warned. That is all I was interested in.

Senator FERGUSON: Now, Justice, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, the President, and Secretary of State were each being furnished this magic. Did you not know that they were all being furnished the magic?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: I did not know it and I would not have been interested in it.

Senator FERGUSON: Well then, as to whether or not—

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Now, let's go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON: Do you have something to say?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Let's investigate the Roberts Commission. I would not have been interested in it, Senator. I wanted to know whether the military men were put on full warning and put on their toes by the men who did have the information. I got a unanimous statement that they were.

By this time the Justice was becoming belligerent. He had indicated that he had been interested in what Hawaii had done, and not in questioning Washington policy or officials. The Senator, with at least two hours of further questioning before him, tried again.

Senator FERGUSON: On page 2 I see this:

> The oral evidence received amounts to 1,877 typewritten pages and the records and documents examined exceed 3,000 printed pages in number.

Now the photostatic copy of the transcript has only 1862 pages, 25 less, and there is—would you look at the page?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: I do not need to, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: Can you answer it if you do not need to look at it?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Yes, I can answer it. I do not know why the discrepancy.

Senator FERGUSON: Do you know whether there is any evidence that we do not have?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: I know there is none you do not have.

Senator Ferguson made one more attempt to get some facts:

Senator FERGUSON: On the day that you spent some 2 hours with the President the day you made your report did you have a discussion of the facts?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON: There was no discussion of the facts?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Well, it depends on what you mean by a "discussion of the facts."

Senator FERGUSON: Well, will you try and give us what took place there and that will answer the question.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Well, I think it a highly improper thing but if you ask it I suppose I am bound to answer it.

* * * *

Senator FERGUSON: Well now, Justice, what was wrong with the question I asked you, to tell me what the President had said?

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Well, now Senator, I am not going to indicate whether Senator Ferguson is wrong. We have been inquiring about how wrong Roberts is. Don't let us get clear off that line.

Senator FERGUSON: I was wondering why we shouldn't have the facts as a Committee.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS: Well, I am not going to argue it with you, Senator. I said I was going to try to answer your question.

The Senator seemed disheartened. My personal reaction was that the Senator was deeply shocked by such conduct. The Senator's own judicial background had led him to revere all Supreme Court Justices. He felt he was only doing his duty to get the facts for the American public. The Justice adopted a bellicose attitude. He resented the disclosure of the one-sidedness of his prior investigation. He created an atmosphere that implied the Senator had no right to question him. In his well-considered report the Senator had this to say:

It is extremely unfortunate that the Roberts Commission Report was so hasty, inconclusive, and incomplete. Some witnesses were examined under oath; others were not. Much testimony was not even recorded. The Commission knew that Japanese messages had been intercepted and were available, prior to the attack, to the high command in Washington. The Commission did not inquire about what information these intercepts contained, who received them or what was done about them, although the failure of Washington to inform the commanders in Hawaii of this vital intelligence bears directly on the question of whether those commanders

performed their full duties. Mr. Justice Roberts testified before this Committee:

> I should not have bothered to read it (the intercepted Japanese traffic) if it had been shown to me.

If it were necessary to do so, detailed examples of the many shortcomings of the Roberts Commission could be set forth. The duty of our Committee to examine the entire subject afresh does not require an extended criticism of the Roberts Report.

It should be noted, however, that Justice Roberts had sufficient legal experience to know the proper method of collecting and preserving evidence which in this case involved the highest interests of the Nation. The facts were then fresh in the minds of key witnesses in Washington. They could not have then been ignorant of their whereabouts at important times or have forgotten the details of events and operations. No files would have been "lost" and no information would have been distorted by the passage of time. The failure to observe these obvious necessities is almost as tragic to the cause of truth as the attack on Pearl Harbor itself was a tragedy for the Nation.

(*A Note From The Editor*, continued from page 404)

Harbor puzzle. He promises to release more information about his knowledge in other forums.

Leib's story was not the capstone to the recent revisionist wave. Percy L. Greaves, Jr., who had been research chief for the Republican minority in the Joint Congressional Investigation, and contributed a masterly chapter on "The Pearl Harbor Investigations" to the fundamental revisionist work *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* (1953)*, announced the completion and forthcoming publication of his own book, provisionally entitled *The Real Infamy of Pearl Harbor*. It is a work long-awaited by revisionists, who recognize in Greaves the man who probably knows more about the Pearl Harbor record than any other alive, having been in on the investigation from virtually the start and devoted some 40 years to the subject. His is a voice of authority which will have to be contended with, and which promises to raise a new storm of controversy over an issue that just won't die.

* * * * *

All of which brings us down to the late Winter of 1983-84 and this issue of *The JHR*, entirely devoted to Pearl Harbor. Represented here are some of the fruits of Mr. Greaves's new work, in the form of four chapters which he has granted us permission to pre-publish: "Marshall Comes on Stage," "Marshall Before the Joint Congressional Committee," "Admission of MAGIC Demolishes FDR's Claim of Surprise," and "What We Knew." These chapters contain extensive extracts from the testimony presented before the congressional investigators; precise citations from that record and other sources are dispensed with here, but will of course appear in the complete published book. The chapters are preceded by three of Mr. Greaves's most trenchant essays from years past, quite deserving of re-circulation. These begin with "Was Pearl Harbor Unavoidable?," which appeared originally in the *Chicago Sunday Tribune Magazine* of 7 December 1947. This explores the missed chances in 1939 for the United States to cooperate with and encourage the Japanese peace party; that Washington was not interested in such a course meant that Japan, in opposing Stalin's appetites in Asia, was left with nowhere else to turn for support than the Axis powers, and it explains a crucial part of the background to the later tragedy of war. Next appears "The Mystery of Pearl Harbor," taken from an original article published in *National Review* of 12 December 1966. (Yes: William F. Buckley, Jr., was once unafraid to publish revisionist material.) This article has been noteworthy in revisionist lore as containing a devastating rebuttal of the book which was, before Prange's, the anti-revisionists' principal bulwark, Roberta Wohlstetter's *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*—a work all too often cited by the innocent, even to this day, as "authoritative." Greaves notes that there were more than 100 factual errors in Wohlstetter, including one *fundamental* error of assumption which fatally undermines her *entire* thesis. He also goes after FDR's personal, hand-picked, paid, beranked and bemedalled court historian, the late Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison. Finally, we have a unique inside-look at the Joint Congressional Committee investigation in Greaves's "Senator Homer Ferguson and the Pearl Harbor Congressional Investigation," a valuable memoir written in 1948 and published here for the first time.

(*continued on page 511*)

*1982 paperback edition available from the IHR, $11.00

Marshall Comes on Stage

FROM "THE REAL INFAMY OF PEARL HARBOR"

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.

If the testimony on the knowledge and actions of the top Navy command on that momentous weekend seems to be confusing and inconsistent, that on the Army side was downright mysterious and almost impossible to comprehend without an understanding of two facts of human nature. The first is that few people will voluntarily confess their mistakes, particularly if they think they can keep them hidden. The second is that few of us have the courage to endanger our careers by confessing the truth, if silence, a little loss of memory, or a change in our recollections can raise our rating with our superiors. Members of the Army and Navy have always found it difficult to differ with, criticize or embarrass their superiors.

The mysteries hidden by the conflicting testimonies of the top Army officers and their juniors may undoubtedly have been due primarily to the derelictions of George C. Marshall, the FDR-appointed Chief of Staff. If Marshall had recalled the truth for the record, his reputation as well as that of his chief, FDR, would certainly have suffered.

One morning as this author met with Senators Ferguson and Brewster before the start of that day's JCC hearings, Ferguson reported an incident of the previous evening. In the men's room at a social affair, he, Ferguson, had overheard Marshall tell the JCC Chairman, Senator Alben Barkley, later Vice President under Truman, that he could not say where he was on the night of

December 6-7, because it might get "the Chief," FDR, in trouble. In confirmation of this, we now have the word of a very responsible person, James G. Stahlman, that Secretary Knox told him that both Marshall and Stark were among those who met with Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins at the White House on the night of December 6-7, 1941.

Marshall's Rise to Chief of Staff

Thus, we can easily understand Marshall's difficult position, as well as that of those serving under him. In his long Army career, Marshall had his ups and downs. He started in 1902 as a Second Lieutenant after graduating from Virginia Military Institute. He entered World War I as a Captain and, before its close, was promoted to a temporary Colonel. In May 1919, long after the Armistice, he became Aide-de-Camp of our World War I military hero, General John J. Pershing. Shortly thereafter, he was returned to his permanent rank of Captain to start the slow peacetime promotion back up to Colonel.

While General Douglas MacArthur, West Point 1903 and thus a contemporary of Marshall, was Chief of Staff (1903-1935), Pershing suggested to MacArthur that he raise the recently promoted full Colonel Marshall to Brigadier General. Marshall had served largely in service schools and staff positions, so to round out his experience he was given a command assignment with a top regiment. Marshall, however, devoted so much of his energies to establishing Civilian Conservation Camps, a New Deal program with which the Army was asked to cooperate, that the Inspector General found that the regiment's training program had suffered seriously. Marshall thus missed an opportunity to win his first star and was relegated to the position of Senior Instructor of the Illinois National Guard (1933-1936). Marshall appealed the appointment, but to no avail.

It was only after the first retirement of MacArthur that Marshall's friends succeeded in obtaining his promotion. In July 1938, he was brought to Washington as Director of War Plans. From then on, with the help of Roosevelt's close advisor, Harry Hopkins, his advancement was rapid. He was Deputy Chief of Staff in less than a year and Chief of Staff three months later, advancing from one star to four stars in that short period.

As Chief of Staff, Marshall was

> the immediate advisor of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment, and is charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development and execution of the military program.

After June 1940, the Secretary of War was Henry L. Stimson, a long-time advocate of tightening the noose around Japan's economic neck.

As Chief of Staff, Marshall was also

> in peace, by direction of the President, the Commanding General of the Field Forces and in that capacity directs the field operations and the general training of the several Armies of the oversea forces and of the GHQ units. He continues to exercise command of the Field Forces after the outbreak of war until such time as the President shall have specifically designated a Commanding General thereof.

In this capacity, Marshall reported directly to FDR, a President who felt it was his duty to support and subsidize the Soviet Union while opposing the Japanese. Marshall did not always agree with the actions of his two superiors. However, he was certainly in sympathy with their overall plans and policies. Whatever his weaknesses may have been, Marshall was certainly a loyal and devoted deputy of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Marshall's Responsibility for the Fleet

As Chief of Staff, he and the President were the only ones with legal authority to issue command orders to the Field Commanders, including Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Marshall's appointee as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. The Secretary of War, as a civilian, was outside this line of command. On February 7, 1941, Marshall wrote a long letter to his new appointee.

> My Dear Short: I believe you take over command today. . . .
>
> Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Army materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and anti-aircraft guns. . . . What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this materiel throughout the Army, and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army.
>
> The fullest protection for the Fleet is *the* rather than *a* major consideration for us; there can be little question about that; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii. . . .
>
> You, of course, understand the pressure on the Department for the limited materiel we have. . . . However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first concern is to protect the Fleet.
>
> My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy

> against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.
>
> Please keep clearly in mind in all your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentration, and that purpose should be clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. . . .

During the JCC hearings, Marshall testified:

> I had a very vital interest, the Army had a very vital interest, in the Fleet at Pearl Harbor because the obligation to protect Pearl Harbor was an Army obligation.

It was thus Marshall's obligation to supply the Hawaiian Command, to the best of his ability, the materiel it needed for the defense of the Fleet. Yet, he sat on the Board that allocated scarce materiel and in the capacity acquiesced to the granting of much of the materiel Hawaii needed to the British, the Chinese and the communist Soviet Union. He also ordered that most of Hawaii's needed four engine bombers be sent on to the Philippines. No doubt this was all in agreement with the wishes of his two superiors. Marshall testified that he concurred with a November 24, 1941, memorandum of his War Plans Chief on the proposed *modus vivendi* that:

> Even a temporary peace in the Pacific would permit us to complete defensive preparations in the Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material assistance to the British—both of which are highly important. . . . War Plans Division wishes to emphasize it is of grave importance to the success of our war effort in Europe that we reach a *modus vivendi* with Japan.

This would seem to indicate that in November 1941, Marshall gave the Philippines and "our war effort in Europe" a higher priority than Pearl Harbor and the Pacific Fleet.

Marshall a Key Figure

As we have seen, when Secretary Stimson sent his warning messages of November 27, over Marshall's signature, he included the sentence: "Report measures taken." Under Army regulations then in force, an officer reporting the measures taken as the result of such a message can assume his measures are approved unless later countermanded or supplemented by his superior. Short reported to Marshall that he had alerted for sabotage, which Marshall had earlier stated was one of the two "real perils of the situation." While Marshall could not recall that reply, he was forced to admit he must have seen it. The original had been

stamped, "Noted: Chief of Staff," and was stapled under MacArthur's reply, which Marshall had initialled. Yet, Marshall took no action. Hawaii remained on that sabotage alert from November 27th until the time of the attack. With planes bunched and ammunition inaccessible, our Hawaiian forces had the worst possible disposition for repelling an attack.

Marshall, and Marshall alone, was responsible for this unfortunate situation. While it is true that he had many other worries and was admittedly more concerned about the Philippines and "our war effort in Europe," he was on record that "The fullest protection for the Fleet" was his obligation.

The record is clear that much of the damage incurred at Pearl Harbor was due to Marshall's failure to inform or instruct Short further on the basis of the mass of information available to him. Marshall was very reluctant about admitting this and every attempt was made to relieve him of that responsibility.

With the possible exception of the diplomatic phase, Marshall was heavily involved in all the developments that led to the Pearl Harbor disaster. With Roosevelt dead, Hull too weak to face cross examination by the Republican members of the Committee and Stimson conveniently incapacitated until after the Committee Reports were issued, it seemed evident that Marshall was likely to be the most important Administration witness before the Congressional Committee.

And so it was.

Attempts were made to alleviate his ordeal. Marshall retired as Chief of Staff on November 18, 1945. He then expected to have a few weeks for preparation prior to his appearance before the JCC. A lawyer had been engaged to assemble and brief him on all previous testimony with which it was felt he should be familiar. Marshall was to be one of the last Washington witnesses (for the prosecution) before the appearance of the Pearl Harbor witnesses (for the defendants). Then, there was a quick shift in plans.

Communism in China

Back in 1931, at the time of the Manchurian Incident, the then Secretary of War, Patrick J. Hurley, happened to be in Shanghai. He interviewed some of the leaders of the fledgling Chinese Nationalist Government which we had recognized in 1928. He then proceeded to Japan where he in turn interviewed some of that country's Army leaders and cabinet members. He concluded that Japan was serious in her desire to dominate the mainland and had the military capability to do so. Like his cabinet colleague, Henry L. Stimson, then Hoover's Secretary of State, he

developed an anti-Japanese bias and opposed early freedom for the Philippines. Unlike Stimson, however, Hurley opposed sending Japan any threatening diplomatic notes unless we meant to back them up with force. He expressed his attitude on Japan's venture in Manchuria succinctly: "Like it or *fight*!"

There was no more vociferous opponent of the New Deal than Patrick Hurley. However, when war came he undertook a number of assignments for FDR, the New Deal's architect and archangel. On August 18, 1944, FDR appointed Hurley, a Republican, as his personal representative to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

> to promote efficient and harmonious relations between the Generalissimo and General Stilwell to facilitate General Stilwell's exercise of command over the Chinese armies.

Hurley left for China the next day via Moscow.

The basic problem at that time was that General Stilwell wanted to unite the Chinese Communist Army with the Chinese Nationalist Army in the war against the Japanese. While in Moscow, en route to China, Hurley met with the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. Molotov gave Hurley the impression that the Chinese Communists were only very impoverished people and that

> The Soviet government should not be associated with these "communist elements" nor could it in any way be blamed for this situation. . . . The Soviets would be glad if the United States aided the Chinese in unifying their country. . . . Molotov made it clear also that until Chiang Kai-shek tried by changes in his policies to improve Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet government did not intend to take any interest in Chinese governmental affairs.

Chiang Kai-shek vs Communism

So Hurley went on to China to meet with Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek. He found Kai-shek willing

> to grant Stilwell command of the Chinese armies; but he would not consent to arming and use of the Communists' troops unless they would accept the authority of the Government.

However, the Generalissimo hesitated to give Stilwell the broad powers he desired. Exasperated, Stilwell got Marshall to draft an ultimatum over Roosevelt's signature for Stilwell to present to Chiang. That did it. Chiang realized it was Stilwell's doing and was "deeply offended." He wired Roosevelt that he was willing to place an American officer in command of the combined forces fighting Japan, "but, *'I cannot confer this heavy responsibility upon General Stilwell'*." Marshall attempted to support Stilwell

as the only one fit for the task, but FDR finally relieved Stilwell and replaced him with General Albert C. Wedemeyer.

Hurley was later to learn that Stilwell's State Department advisors, John P. Davies and John Stewart Service, were strongly pro-communist and anti-Chiang. Stilwell's diary was later found to contain many statements derogatory of Chiang as well as the solution for which Stilwell had been working:

> The cure for China's trouble is the elimination of Chiang Kai-shek. The only thing that keeps this country split is his fear of losing control. He hates the Reds and will not take any chance of giving them a toehold in the government.

It would seem that Chiang had some justification for telling Hurley that

> he was convinced Stilwell "was in conspiracy with the Communists to overthrow the government."

Stilwell, like Marshall, considered the Communists our allies.

Hurley still had his work cut out for him. Chiang wrote Roosevelt that he had complete confidence in Hurley and was relying on him for help in negotiating with the Chinese Communists. As a result, FDR appointed Hurley to be the American Ambassador to China. Whereupon Hurley began negotiating with the Communists with the defeat of Japan as the primary objective. His difficulties were increased by a very active faction of State Department employees who were advising the Chinese Communists to hold out while they were devising plans for arming the Chinese Communist troops. Hurley had to request the removal of John Davies and John Service from the China Theater.

Hurley then thought he was making progress in establishing unity between the two Chinese factions. They seemed to agree on cooperating in unification of their Armed forces while moving toward the establishment of

> a democratic constitution adopted by a convention in which all the people of China not just the political minorities would participate.

Chiang's Government was to remain in control for the time being with a War Cabinet which would include representatives of the Communist and other parties.

Yalta Gift to Communists

Then came the secret Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945. The text was shown to General Marshall for comment, but he offered no criticism. It was signed by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. In order to induce the Soviet Union to enter the war

against Japan after the defeat of Germany, it had been secretly agreed, without consulting Chiang Kai-shek, to grant the Soviet Communists certain rights in China.

After reporting his progress in China, Hurley heard rumors of what he called "a far-reaching betrayal of China's interests." He returned to Washington to investigate. He found FDR only a physical shadow of his former self. FDR denied to him that he had made any agreement

> that would destroy the territorial integrity and political independence of China, and assure Communist conquest of that country.

Witnessing FDR in his "sickness of death," Hurley felt that FDR believed he was telling the truth. Hurley finally located a copy of the agreement and showed it to FDR, who became disturbed. FDR then directed Hurley

> to go to London and Moscow; to speak to Churchill and to Stalin; and seek a way to ameliorate the betrayal of China.

On visiting Churchill, Hurley was assured that Great Britain would support the American policy of support for Chiang Kai-shek's National Government. Hurley's report on his conference with Stalin, April 15, 1945, in the presence of Ambassador Averell Harriman and Foreign Minister Molotov stated:

> In short, Stalin agreed unqualifiedly to America's policy in China as outlined to him during this conversation.

Japan Loses—Communists Win

Before Hurley could complete his mission, Roosevelt died on April 12th. On assuming the Presidency, Harry S. Truman soon took steps to assure both Churchill and Stalin that he would carry out FDR's policies, including those reached at Yalta. On June 18, 1945, Hurley was told by the Secretary of State:

> *As you know, the President is wholly committed to the fulfillment of the agreement made at Yalta.*

On his return to China, Hurley found out that the Chinese Communists had learned of the still secret Yalta Agreement as it pertained to China. Mao Tse-tung proclaimed that

> our ultimate program is to push China forward to Socialism and Communism; this is definite and beyond question.

A month and a half later, Truman sent Hurley a message to deliver to Chiang Kai-shek on June 15, 1945. It would inform him that the Soviet Union was entering the war against Japan and Soviet troops would be entering Chinese territory.

> As compensation, Stalin had demanded, and the United States and Great Britain had agreed with his demands

for special rights in Mongolia and Manchuria. The Soviet interpretation of the Yalta Agreement went far beyond its actual terms. When Chiang protested to Truman, he was told to work out any differences in interpretation with Stalin.

It thus became evident that the Republic of China was left at the mercy of Stalin. A Chinese-Soviet treaty was signed on August 24, 1945. As General Wedemeyer has written, there was a stepped-up program of Communist propaganda. Chiang Kai-shek was painted as an enemy of the people. Soviet forces compelled United States naval vessels to withdraw from Manchurian ports. In fact, Communists actually fired on an American Admiral's launch. China's sovereignty over Manchuria, agreed upon at Cairo, was out the window.

We supposedly went to war to free China from Japanese domination. Yet we quietly acquiesced to Soviet domination of the very areas to which Japan had brought prosperity before the commies started their disruptions creating the very incidents that gave Japan an excuse to rush in troops for the protection of Japanese lives and property.

Chaos Returns to China

Hurley considered this acceptance of "Communist imperialism" a change in American policies. So he asked for an opportunity to discuss our policies in Asia with the President and Secretary of State James Byrnes. He left for Washington on September 22nd, and on October 13th, met with Truman and Byrnes. He told them he wanted to resign because there was no longer support for the policy which he had been sent to China to carry out. They urged him to reconsider and return to China. He was told that Truman's policy in China was the same as Roosevelt's. Thinking of the Yalta Agreement, Hurley asked for a "statement defining the current policy."

While awaiting the issuance of such a policy statement by the Secretary of State or the President, Hurley took a vacation. Getting impatient, he finally issued a statement of his own from New Mexico. He referred to our November 26, 1941, ultimatum to Japan asking Japan to vacate China, asserting that:

> The American policy stated by Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt was the immediate cause of our war against Japan. . . . Japan is defeated. Chinese independence for which we fought Japan has not yet been achieved. Until it is our victory cannot be real.

Meanwhile, General Wedemeyer was facing increasing problems in China. Conditions in China were fast becoming chaotic. He was operating under directives that placed him, as both the American Commander of the China Theater and Chiang's Chief of Staff, in an impossible situation. On November 20th, he sent two long messages to his superiors. They described the situation, including the advances made by both the Soviet and Chinese Communists. It was his belief that

> Chiang Kai-shek sincerely desires to achieve stability in China, to unify the country, to institute democratic procedures and to implement social reforms of a wide and sweeping character. . . . He is selfless in his approach to the situation. However, surrounding him are men without scruples who are primarily interested in self-aggrandizement. Chiang is extremely loyal to those officials and war lords who in the past have supported him. As a consequence, they have been appointed to positions of responsibility in the Government even though they are incompetent and/or unscrupulous. . . . Whereas the politician in China seeks to enrich himself through machination and chicanery, the Chinese businessman has a code of ethics that is exemplary and he usually conforms to this code.

Wedemeyer concluded that there was only a remote chance that the Chinese Communists and the National Government would ever come to a satisfactory agreement. He also concluded that the Soviets had broken their agreements and were creating "favorable conditions for the realization of Chinese Communist aims." He further concluded that the presence of American Forces

> might possibly develop a tense and dangerous situation with the Soviet Government and will inevitably lead to serious involvement in fratricidal warfare.

Wedemeyer then recommended that he be relieved as Chiang's Chief of Staff and that American Forces be removed from the China Theater

> as early as practicable and concomitantly furnish continued and accelerated economic assistance to the existing recognized China Government; or, until China has developed adequate internal power . . . proclaim a U.S. policy embodying the determination to continue military and economic support to the Chinese Central Government.

Without saying so specifically, Wedemeyer was describing a chaotic situation of irresponsible and inefficient government incapable of maintaining peace in the market place. The situation he disclosed closely resembled that which years earlier had led

the Japanese to send a police force to China to protect the lives and property of Japanese businessmen then subjected to constant communist propaganda and harassment.

U.S. Refused to Oppose Communists

Washington's reply to Wedemeyer stated that, while the State Department wanted to help Chiang get the Japanese out of China, it "does not wish to support the National Government directly against the Communists." The State Department,

> convinced that Mao's Communists represented an important popular movement and that the United States could not openly combat it without suffering disastrously under the charge of "imperialist meddling," wished to stay clear of the struggle between Chiang and Mao.

In short, to oust the Japanese we had fought a world war, but to oust Communists would be "imperialist meddling." Many people still do not realize that FDR's desire to hide the economic failure of the New Deal and end the resulting mass unemployment led him to take us step by step into a bloody and expensive World War, a war that was to make large parts of Asia and Europe safe for communism.

On November 23, 1945, Wedemeyer wired back that it would be impossible to support Chiang and at the same time avoid his war with the Chinese Communists.

> Such United States support to the National government will definitely involve American forces in fraticidal warfare. There can be no mistake about this. . . . If the unification of China and Manchuria under Chinese National forces is to be a U.S. policy, involvement in fratricidal warfare and possibly in war with the Soviet Union must be accepted and would definitely require additional U.S. forces far beyond those presently available in the theater.

This caused Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal to enter in his diary:

> It appears that if Manchuria and perhaps North China are not to pass to Chinese control but rather pass to Soviet control or separate states under its domination by a progression of circumstances, then Russia will have achieved in the Far East approximately the objectives Japan initially set out to accomplish.

Hurley Resigns

Disgusted with his inability to get any clear statement of Amer-

ican policy in China, Pat Hurley tried to resign his Ambassadorship to China by phone. Hurley wanted to quit because he believed Truman "accepted the Yalta Secret Agreement as 'basic policy' toward China." Secretary Byrnes refused to accept Hurley's resignation. So Hurley returned to Washington. There he found that the pro-communist State Department men he had replaced in China had not been reassigned "as President Truman had promised." On November 26th, further developments annoyed Hurley, including attacks on him in the Communist newspaper, the *Daily Worker*, on the floor of the House of Representatives, and in private statements attributed to Secretary Byrnes that he would prefer as Ambassador in China a "deserving Democrat" who agreed with the Yalta policies.

Hurley wrote a letter of resignation

> denouncing the un-American elements in the State Department, and warning that the failures in American policy in China were paving the way for another world war, and revealing the provisions of the Yalta Secret Agreement which had opened China to Soviet domination.

Senator Vandenberg persuaded him to remove any mention of the still secret Yalta Agreement on the premise that there was still some hope that changes might be made in it.

After rewriting his resignation, Hurley, who was unable to get an appointment with the President, called on the Secretary of State on the morning of November 27th. Byrnes again tried to persuade him not to resign, stating that both he and the President "upheld traditional American policy toward China." Apparently Byrnes believed that he had persuaded Hurley to return to China and so informed Truman by phone. Then, as the Cabinet gathered at the White House for lunch, the Washington news ticker carried parts of a speech Hurley was to deliver to the Press Club that noon, in which he announced his resignation. After lunch, Byrnes phoned Hurley, who confirmed his resignation. When Byrnes so informed the President, Truman rang up Marshall to offer him Hurley's former position as Ambassador to China. Marshall promptly accepted the appointment.

Marshall Before the Joint Congressional Committee

FROM "THE REAL INFAMY OF PEARL HARBOR"

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.

Truman's quick action had two immediate effects. First, the news of Marshall's appointment completely blanketed the media publicity that Hurley had hoped would be produced by his resignation and his startling reasons for doing so. Second, it called for a change in Marshall's schedule and that of the Joint Congressional Committee (JCC) investigation of the events preceding the Pearl Harbor attack.

There was just no way Marshall could avoid testifying before the JCC. He had been involved in more of the matters under investigation than any other then living person. He was in good health and could not plead infirmities, as did Hull and Stimson. The Army Pearl Harbor Board had concluded that Marshall had failed to fulfill his responsibilities in a number of respects. However, the pressure of his new assignment to solve the pressing problems in China could be used as an excuse to reduce to a bare minimum the length of his JCC appearance.

To accomodate General Marshall, the Committee's schedule of witnesses was altered radically so as not to delay his departure for China. On Monday, December 3, 1945, the Committee's General Counsel, William D. Mitchell, informed the Committee that Marshall would appear on Thursday, December 6th. The impression was given that he could be finished with that week. Mr. Mitchell also informed the Committee:

> We would like to call General Gerow [pre-Pearl Harbor Chief of the Army's War Plans Division] and get as far as we can with him

> before General Marshall is called, because there are certain things that General Gerow knows that would be well to lay into the record, if we can, before General Marshall is called.

So on Wednesday, December 5th, the previously scheduled witness was put aside to permit General Gerow's appearance. He made a very striking appearance as he rose to take the oath. He stood erect in the spic and span uniform of a Lieutenant General with a chest full of brightly colored ribbons. He was the epitome of the war hero, which he was. Not only had he fought well for his country, but he was also willing to become the sacrificial lamb for his December 1941 superior, General George C. Marshall.

Gerow to Marshall's Rescue

Counsel Mitchell accepted without question the Administration's position on the Pearl Harbor disaster. His examinations of witnesses thus sought to establish it on the record. The Administration position was primarily that of the Roberts Commission. The Pearl Harbor commanders had been adequately alerted and they must therefore assume the primary responsibility for the enormity of the losses. If anyone in Washington had been at fault it might have been General Gerow for not realizing that General Short had failed to obey the commands Washington claimed were in the war warning message of November 27th. This was the message to which Short had replied:

> CHIEF OF STAFF
> WAR DEPARTMENT
> WASHINGTON DC
> REURAD FOUR SEVEN TWO TWENTYSEVENTH REPORT
> DEPARTMENT ALERTED TO PREVENT SABOTAGE PERIOD
> LIAISON WITH NAVY
> SHORT

After Counsel Mitchell had established the fact that General Gerow had led one of the Army Corps in the landing on Omaha Beach in Normandy on D-Day, he had Gerow read the official duties of the War Plans Division. As might be expected, they dealt with the preparation of plans and policies should we be engaged in a war. They said nothing at all about pre-war operations. Another Army Division was actually charged with Operations and Training, but neither Mitchell nor Gerow mentioned this.

Mr. Mitchell's questioning then revealed that Gerow had participated in the secret international conversations from January 29, 1941, to March 7, 1941, in Washington that led to the ABC-Agreement. It was also brought out that he was familiar with the April 1941 conversations in Singapore

> to prepare plan for conduct of military operations in Far East on basis of report of Washington conversations.

Mitchell then asked Gerow if he knew of any agreement "which assumed to bind the United States to engage in war against Japan before Japan attacked the United States?" The General replied, "No, sir." He was also asked if he knew "of any assurances that we had given the British at Singapore of armed support under three or four eventualities?" Gerow responded: "I know of no such assurances, sir." For Mitchell, that disposed of those matters.

Then, Mitchell pressed his luck a bit too far when he asked:

> Mr. MITCHELL: Were any deployments, or steps ever taken by the United States prior to December 7 to put any of those plans into operation? December 7, 1941. You told us the British and Dutch plans were never approved. I want to know whether approved or not approved, the United States ever put those plans, or any part of them into effect before December 7, the joint plans, if you know?
>
> General GEROW: I don't believe, sir, I can answer that question offhand. We certainly made some preliminary dispositions, so we would be prepared to carry out those plans but without studying the history of the orders prior to December 7, sir, I prefer not to answer that question.

Gerow testified that the November 27th conference "was directed primarily to the message to the Philippines." He admitted that he later held another conference at which it was "agreed that General Miles would send a message to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department with regard to being on guard against subversive activities." This had led him to tell the Roberts Commission that he assumed Short's reply, addressed to the Chief of Staff in reply to No. 472 "was an answer to the G-2 message that was sent out by General Miles." The number 472 meant nothing to him.

Mr. Mitchell then read part of Secretary Stimson's report which admitted that Short's reply:

> was susceptible of the interpretation that he was on the alert against sabotage only, and not on the alert against an air raid or other hostile action. . . . a keener sense of analysis and a more incisive comparison of the messages exchanged, would have invited further inquiry by the War Plans Division of General Short and his failure to go on the necessary alert might well have been discovered.
>
> The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates knew that a report of the measures taken by General Short had been asked for. General Short's reply was brought to the attention of the chief of the division. A clear and satisfactory reply should have been required. This was not done, and a more efficient functioning

> of the division would have demanded that a careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short's message be made and no room for ambiguity permitted.

Then Mitchell asked the General,

> Do you think that is a fair statement of the situation?
> General GEROW: Yes, sir; I do, and if there was any responsibility to be attached to the War Department for any failure to send an inquiry to General Short, the responsibility must rest on the War Plans Division, and I accept that responsibility as Chief of the War Plans Division.

Several facts should be pointed out. The details of General Short's three possible alerts were a matter of record in Washington. So Short's response specifying the sabotage alert was informing Marshall that he had bunched his planes and placed his ammunition where it was relatively inaccessible. Secretary Stimson, who was responsible for sending the November 27th messages over Marshall's signature, saw Short's answer and did nothing about it. The truth would seem to be that the attention of all these Washington officials was concentrated on the Far East and the Philippines. They actually gave little thought to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Mitchell questioned General Gerow until 4:40 p.m. on Wednesday, December 5, 1945. No Committee member was permitted to question the General or add to what Mr. Mitchell had asked Gerow to spread on the record.

Tender Loving Care for Marshall

General Marshall appeared the next day, Thursday, December 6th. The impression was created that his JCC testimony would be completed that week. He was subjected to a friendly examination all that day by Mr. Mitchell. It was really surprising the number of things the General could not recall, remember or recollect. He did not think our ABC and ADB "conversations" committed us to go to war "prior to our being attacked." When asked, "Did the Army make any deployments or dispositions of troops pursuant to those plans that you remember prior to December 7, 1941", he replied: "I do not think there were any definite moves unless it may have been into Iceland and I do not recall that."

When General Marshall had appeared before the Navy Court of Inquiry on September 2, 1944, he was shown the Japanese intercept setting the deadline of November 29, 1941, and asked whether he had seen or been informed of the contents. He had been trying to keep these Japanese intercepts out of the record. His reply at that time was:

I don't recall. These were highly secret matters and papers. The papers were carefully guarded, and our War Department copies today do not indicate when I saw them. I am reasonably certain, however, that I did see them or was informed concerning these papers at the time.

When JCC Counsel Mitchell asked him:

Do you remember seeing any of those [intercepts] in which the Japs instructed their Ambassadors here to get an affirmative agreement first by the 25th of November and later at least by the 29th?

General MARSHALL: I remember that very well, sir.

Such were the vagaries of the General's memory of some of the most important events of his life.

Evasive Answers

Mr. Mitchell continued his inquiry of Marshall on Friday, December 7, 1945. He did not question him concerning the Pilot message distributed Saturday afternoon, but he did ask if he remembered his "movements on the evening of December 6, as to where you were?"

Marshall answered, "I can only account for them by sort of circumstantial evidence." He then enumerated a number of places where he was not, ending with "the probability is . . . we were home." The General was supposed to have had a duty officer at his office and an orderly at his home who would know where he was at all times when he was not at their location. None of his duty officers or orderlies was ever called.

Mr. MITCHELL: You are sure you were not at the White House that evening?

General MARSHALL: No, sir; not at all.

That reply was undoubtedly the most enigmatic of the whole investigation. It would seem he was not sure.

Asked what he knew about "the 14 part message and the 1 P.M. message," referring to December 7, 1941, he replied:

On that particular morning I presumably had my breakfast at about eight, and following the routine that I had carried out on previous Sundays, I went riding at some time thereafter.

I think in one of the previous statements I made in this investigation of Pearl Harbor incidents that I said I probably rode at 8:30. Discussions with the orderlies and also evidence that I have seen of other individuals leads me purely by induction and not by definite memory to think that I must have ridden later; just what time I do not know; but between 8 o'clock and the time I went to the

War Department I ate my breakfast, I probably looked at the Sunday papers and I went for a ride. . . .

The average length of my rides was about, the time period of my rides is about 50 minutes because I rode at a pretty lively gait, at a trot and a canter and at a full run down on the experimental farm where the Pentagon now is and returned to the house, so I would say that the high probability is that the ride was an hour or less, generally or certainly not longer.

My recollection beyond that is that while I was taking a shower either as I went into the shower or while I was actually taking a shower, word came to me that Colonel Bratton had something important and wished to come out to Fort Myer. I sent word that I was coming to the War Department, so I finished my shower, dressed and left for the War Department.

My average time of taking a shower and dressing would be about 10 minutes, possibly less. As to what time I arrived at the War Department is a matter of conjecture; I have no recollection.

On my arrival there Colonel Bratton handed me these intercepts which included the 14 sections of the Japanese message, and I started reading them through. You recall it is a rather lengthy document and of such a nature that there were portions of it that I read twice.

When I reached the end of the document the next sheet was the 1 o'clock message of December 7.

Mr. MITCHELL: That is the message that directed the Ambassadors to deliver this thing at 1:00 p.m. Sunday to the American Government?

General MARSHALL: Yes, sir, that message. That, of course, was indicative to me, and all the others who came into the room, of some very definite action at 1:00 o'clock, because that 1:00 o'clock was Sunday and was in Washington and involved the Secretary of State, all of which were rather unusual put together.

I think that I immediately called Admiral Stark on the phone, and found he had seen the message, and I proposed a message to our various commanders in the Pacific region, the Philippines, Hawaii, the Caribbean, that is the Panama Canal, and the west coast, which included Alaska. Admiral Stark felt that we might confuse them, because we had given them an alert and now we were adding something more to it.

I hung up the phone, which was the White House phone, and in longhand wrote out the message. My recollection was that he called me back. I am told now that the White House telephone records show that I called him back. I had no recollection of reading the message to him. I thought, on the contrary, he called me just as I finished the message saving the last sentence.

However, one way or the other, there was a call or conversation between Stark and myself, the effect of which was he wished me to add to the message specifically "Show this to your Naval officers," which I did in longhand.

I then directed Colonel Bratton to take it immediately to the message center and start it. There was a proposal then that we

have it typed. The decision was that there was no time for typing, and Colonel Bratton left with the message.

On his return I questioned him as to the length of time involved and I could not make out whether or not he was talking about the time of encoding as well as the time of dispatching and the time of receipt, so I sent him back accompanied by Colonel Bundy, the officer in charge of the immediate details of all Pacific affairs.

They came back and gave me the estimates of the time of deliveries in these various parts of the world. My recollection is that I sent at least Colonel Bundy back again, and I thought Colonel Bratton with him. I believe others state that there was no third trip. There were certainly two—my own recollection is there were three. However that may be, that was the procedure on the dispatching of the message.

Do you wish me to go ahead?

Mr. MITCHELL: Yes.

General MARSHALL: The next information I had was the notification of the actual attack on Pearl Harbor. Of my own recollection I do not recall whether I was at the War Department or at the house. I am told on one side by the Secretary of the General Staff at that time, the Acting Secretary at that time, General Dean, that I had returned to the house. I am told, on the other hand, by my orderly that I was at the War Department. I do not know where I was.

Anyway, shortly thereafter, if not immediately then, I was at the War Department, because it was a very quick drive, and on Sunday there was no traffic. It was a matter of about 7 minutes from my house to the Munitions building.

The information then came in in fuller detail, and telephone communication was established and I talked to General Short's Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips. You could hear the explosions at the time.

Mr. Mitchell had one other very interesting and revealing exchange with the General.

Mr. MITCHELL: Did you have your staff organized at that time so that if an especially significant or important intercept was made of a Jap message, was there anyone on duty who had authority, if they were unable to reach you, to send a warning message out?

General MARSHALL: No, sir, I don't think there was a set-up for that special purpose. We had always had an arrangement there whereby the officer on the receiving end, at the central point in the War Department, knew where the principal people were, where to reach them. In my own case, for example, during that period and for about a year thereafter, I always maintained an orderly at the house at the telephone. If I left the house to go to a moving picture, which was about the only place I went, he was there and knew where to reach me. . . .

Mr. MITCHELL: If they had not been able to reach you on the

morning of the 7th, or at any time when an important message came in, was there anybody but yourself that had authority to send a warning message to the outlying post?

General MARSHALL: Yes. The authority was vested, for instance, in the Deputy Chief of Staff [Major General William Bryden]. Or even the head of War Plans Division.

Not according to Army regulations.

There is no dispute about that, I do not think, because the actions always had been on a very decentralized basis. . . .

Mr. MITCHELL: But the War Plans Division would have operations authority to send a message that involved action?

General MARSHALL: Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL: Was the Deputy Chief of Staff the only other one that had authority to send a message without reaching you?

General MARSHALL: I think that would be the accurate way of stating it, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL: I have, of course, been speaking of the military officers. The Secretary of War, if he had information, for instance, he wouldn't have had to ask your permission. He would have directed an order.

Secretary Stimson, if this thing had come to him, and he had felt a warning ought to be sent out, he would have authority to send it out?

General MARSHALL: Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL: Did you have any talk on the morning of the 7th with Secretary Stimson before the news of the attack came in?

General MARSHALL: I don't recall it. He was at the State Department I knew, but I can't recall that I saw him before lunch.

This interchange raises more questions than it answers. Under the Army order of Command, orders could be sent to Short only by the Commander in Chief, Roosevelt, the Chief of Staff, Marshall, or his Deputy, Bryden. Neither Stimson nor Gerow were in the line of command. That was why they had to send the "war warning" message they sent on November 27th over the name of Marshall. Another question raised but not answered was: How did Marshall know Stimson was at the State Department on the morning of December 7th? That meeting was arranged Saturday night after the three Secretaries were informed of the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply. If Marshall knew of that meeting on the morning of the 7th, he would have had to have known of the 13 parts delivered on the night of the 6th.

More Tender Loving Care

Mr. Mitchell finished his friendly inquiry in the middle of the afternoon of Friday, December 7, 1945. The questioning then passed to the tender, admiring care of the Democratic members

of the Committee. The Vice Chairman, Representative Jere Cooper, asked General Marshall if, in the weeks before the attack, he had been "kept fully advised as to the diplomatic developments." Marshall replied:

> I was kept fully advised; and so far as Mr. Hull personally is concerned, I remember hearing him say with considerable emphasis in those last days apropos of his discussions with the Japanese envoys, "These fellows mean to fight and you will have to watch out."
>
> The VICE CHAIRMAN: You heard him say that?
>
> General MARSHALL: I heard him say that and I have a very distinct recollection of it.

At another point, the General stated that the Japanese

> had committed themselves to the war, I think, on the assumption that the collapse of Russia was going to take place in the next 2 weeks. It did not take place. Had they not attacked on December 7, had they waited, for example, until January 1, there is a possibility that they would not have launched the attack, I do not know, because it appeared quite a definite possibility that Russia might get to her feet, which she did.

As the usual time of adjournment, 4 p.m., approached, and the fifth of the six Democratic Committee members was about to start his questioning, the Committee Chairman, Senator, later Vice President, Alben Barkley, interposed:

> The CHAIRMAN: Before you begin, Senator, may I ask General Marshall, for the benefit of the committee and to determine about its sittings a little later today and tomorrow, in an effort to conclude with you what are your plans, as far as you have made them, to leave for China?
>
> General MARSHALL: All I can do, sir, is have a plane in readiness as soon as you release me.
>
> The CHAIRMAN: So your plans are to go forward at once as soon as we are completed?
>
> General MARSHALL: Yes, sir.
>
> The CHAIRMAN: Would it be agreeable for the Committee to sit a little later than 4 o'clock today to accommodate General Marshall, in the hope we might conclude with him tomorrow?
>
> Senator GEORGE: Mr. Chairman, we ought to go on a reasonable length of time.
>
> Senator BREWSTER: I suggest 4:30.
>
> The CHAIRMAN: Well, we will go at least until 4:30.

Senator Lucas and Representative Murphy then each asked a few questions and the Friday session ended at 4:35 p.m. with:

> Mr. MURPHY: Had you any warning, General, or any reason to

expect on the night of December 6 or on the early morning of December 7 that there was any general urgency requiring you to be at the War Department earlier than the hour you did arrive there on the morning of December 7?

The record at that point had Marshall arriving at his office at shortly before 11:30 a.m. on December 7. "On that particular morning I presumably had my breakfast at about eight, and following the routine that I had carried out on previous Sundays, I went riding at some time thereafter."

General MARSHALL: I had no such conception or information.

Mr. MURPHY: Did you at any time prior to December 7 ever have anyone tell you that the fleet, the United States Fleet in the Pacific Ocean, was not able to take care of itself in the event of an attack?

General MARSHALL: I do not think I ever did, sir. I had heard a discussion by Admiral Richardson as to the requirements that the fleet had to have to be built up before taking out to sea and be properly supplied.

Mr. MURPHY: I have no other questions, Mr Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The Investigation Begins

Fortunately, the Republicans did not yield to pressure. This author, as Chief of the Minority Staff, working with Senator Ferguson, had prepared a whole blue book of pertinent questions to be asked the General. Due to the sudden death of his father, Senator Brewster was unfortunately absent. So Representative Gearhart opened the questioning on Saturday morning.

The General admitted that he thought:

the Japanese were engaged in a campaign southward. . . . We had in mind the possibility of an effort on the Panama Canal. We had in mind the possibility of an effort to strike a blow at our air plants in Seattle, at our air plants in San Diego, and we had in mind the possibility of a blow in the Central Pacific, in the Hawaiian district.

We thought the latter was the most improbable. . . .

We thought it was impregnable against a Japanese landing expedition.

When the Congressman informed Marshall that Gerow in testifying had "accepted full responsibility for not having acted on the inadequacy, as he called it," of Short's November 27th report, Marshall replied:

I was not present in the room and I admire very much his attitude.

When the Congressman persisted in wanting to know why Marshall did not take exception to Short's reply, the General answered:

> I can only say, sir, that that was my opportunity to intervene and have a further check made and I did not take it. Just why I do not know.

The General asserted that Short had been

> issued a command and directed to do something. . . . Once you issue an order, amendments or, you might say, codicils are very dangerous business when it is an operational order.

When asked why more of the information he had was not forwarded to Short, he replied:

> The point, I think, that should be made clear, if possible, is that you must avoid confusing the commander with a mass of data.

When pressed further he admitted:

> I would say offhand that the messages you just read would have been helpful to General Short, but particularly more so to Admiral Kimmel.

When the Congressman read some of the Army Pearl Harbor Board's conclusions on Marshall's failures, his reply was that Short had been given

> a direction to do something which was an alert against the possibility or probability of war. He was a responsible commander; he had a definite task.

The real question was whether or not Marshall had been a "responsible commander."

Attempt to Rescue Marshall

Then, at midmorning, Senator Ferguson, at the end position behind the Committee table, took over. This author, with his collection of questions and documents, was at his elbow. We had a host of important questions to ask that the Committee's Counsel and Democratic Party members had failed to raise. Ferguson persisted until Marshall had to admit it was his responsibility and his alone to have alerted Short. Additional admissions by Marshall and conflicts in testimony were spread on the record to the embarrassment of the Administration's friends. The Saturday afternoon hours rolled by until the following intercession took place:

The CHAIRMAN: May the Chair ask at this moment, it is practically 4 o'clock—whether the committee desires to sit longer today? I frankly, was hoping we might conclude with General Marshall today on account of his matters but whether we can is not within my control.

Would the committee feel justified in sitting longer if there is a chance to conclude with General Marshall or not?

Senator FERGUSON: There isn't a chance, unless the committee is willing to sit well into the evening.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair would not want to compel the Senator from Michigan to tell how long it will take.

Senator FERGUSON: I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN: In view of the fact that we cannot conclude with General Marshall, what is the wish of the committee as to recessing now?

The VICE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Chairman, might I inquire something of General Marshall. I understand he stated yesterday his plane was waiting, ready to take him to his duties in China.

General MARSHALL: It will have to continue to wait. I am to be at your disposal until you have finished.

The CHAIRMAN: Under those circumstances, the committee will recess until 10 o'clock Monday morning.

Senator Ferguson continued questioning Marshall all day Monday and all Tuesday morning. At the opening of the Tuesday afternoon session, the Chairman stated:

The President has asked General Marshall to come down to the White House at 3:15 for a conference on his mission to China. Therefore, the committee will have to excuse General Marshall at 3 o'clock in order that he may fill that engagement. If he has not concluded his testimony at that time we shall have to excuse the General in order that he may fill that engagement, with the understanding, of course, that he may resume at his convenience, but in all likelihood not today. The Chair might express the hope that we may conclude with the General by the time he has to fill that engagement. Senator will you proceed?

"Spy" at Pearl Harbor Probe

Senator Ferguson finished shortly thereafter and Congressman Keefe took over the questioning. He was a lawyer by profession and a tall man with broad shoulders and a deep voice when he wanted to use it. He had hardly gotten warmed up when General Marshall left for the White House and General Miles assumed the JCC witness seat. While Senator Ferguson was questioning Miles, Senator Lucas interrupted to raise a question about this author's presence at the Committee's table. He asked:

just who the gentleman is and what right he has to sit alongside the committee table and chuckle at a member of the United States Senate . . . I think it is about time that the committee find out just who he is, or what his business is.

Senator FERGUSON: I would be glad to tell the Senator and the committee. His name is Percy Greaves. He is with Senator Brewster and has charge of Senator Brewster's files in this case. . . . I understand Senator Brewster will be here tomorrow.

On this particular day, in view of Senator Brewster's absence, Senator Ferguson had moved over into Senator Brewster's seat. In order to be next to Senator Ferguson, this author had moved from his usual seat at the end of the table, around the corner to Senator Ferguson's seat behind the table. Thus this author was sitting in a Committee member's seat and could have been taken for a member of the Committee.

Senator Lucas then wanted to know:

Was he [Greaves] the Republican National Committee research man in the campaign of 1944? Let him answer that.

Senator FERGUSON: Is that your position?

Mr. GREAVES: I was with the Republican National Committee up until the end of last year.

Senator LUCAS: This is a nonpartisan hearing.

The CHAIRMAN: In view of that information, would it be out of place to inquire who has compensated Mr. Greaves for the services he has rendered to Senator Brewster or Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON: He is not rendering any services for me.

Senator LUCAS: Not much.

Senator FERGUSON: He is here with papers, but he is with Senator Brewster. You have to confer with Senator Brewster. He will be glad to tell you.

The CHAIRMAN: He has been sitting by the Senator from Michigan during these whole hearings and apparently prompting the Senator in the interrogatories he has addressed to the witnesses. Maybe that is not a service to the Senator from Michigan and the Senator will have to be the judge of that, but it has been a matter of common observation that that has transpired ever since we began the hearing. I do not object to it personally. I do not care how many assistants any member of this committee may have or desire, or need, but it is not at all out of place that the committee know who it is and who is compensating anybody who is assisting any Senator, in order that the whole facts may be known.

The incident was a one-day press sensation. At the close of the session, reporters crowded about this author. The Washington *Times-Herald* carried a four column picture of the JCC showing this author sitting next to Senator Ferguson with Senators Lucas and George in the background. The headline read, " 'Spy' Identified at Pearl Harbor Probe." New York's *PM* referred to this

author as "the mysterious 'sixth Senator' " whose "Incognito Is Punctured."

When Senator Brewster returned, we met with Senator Robert A. Taft, Senate Minority Leader. At this meeting it was agreed that this author should continue in his regular seat. Funds for his services and that of his staff had been raised privately by John T. Flynn. It was decided to place Greaves on Senator Brewster's personal payroll and Greaves was asked to prepare a memorandum on the incident for Senator Brewster. In this memorandum, this author stated that he never had any intention to

> reflect on any Members of the United States Senate by thought, word or action. . . . As you know I receive no compensation from Republican Party sources and had not for many months before I entered your service. My activities with you have not been of a partisan or a political nature.
>
> I sincerely hope that my conduct has not caused you any embarrassment and that my services meet with your satisfaction.

This was placed in the record by Senator Brewster. Senator Lucas proposed to find out more about this author in executive session but no more was heard about it.

Foiled Counsel Resigns

The above incident was an unsuccessful attempt to stop the Republican Senators from having at their elbows the assistance that was needed to break through the rather obvious attempt of the Majority Party to cover up the Administration's role in precipitating the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor while failing to provide the Hawaiian Commanders with the materiel and available information that could have enabled them to repel that attack. The hearings had been scheduled to last only four weeks. The Committee's friendly counsel, Mitchell, and his chief assistant Gerhard A. Gesell, later rewarded with a Federal judgeship, were to do most of the selection and questioning of witnesses. The Committee members were expected to be mere observers, asking only occasional questions. As shown by the tender, admiring care of General Marshall, the JCC Counsel had little thought of prying into matters which might embarrass the Administration or reflect on the reputation of FDR or his appointees.

The Democratic Majority had refused to supply any staff to the Republican Minority. In an attempt to have a real investigation of facts the Administration had hoped to suppress, John T. Flynn had privately raised the funds to supply the Minority with a staff of seven. With this aid the Minority was able to break the situation open. Daily hearings were held from November 15, 1945, to

February 20, 1946, followed by two short reopenings in April and May. The final printed hearings with exhibits, which included the hearings and reports of the previous secret and top secret investigations, ran to 44 volumes. While many pertinent witnesses were not called and much relevant material was suppressed, the printed record was replete with material those responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster had hoped would never see the light of day.

Within a week after the Greaves incident, JCC Counsel Mitchell and his assistant threw in the sponge and resigned effective January 5, 1946. The Committee then had to find a new General Counsel and a new Associate General Counsel. A recess of one week was called so the new committee staff could become familiar with the record.

Marshall Released to China

General Marshall resumed the witness seat on Wednesday, December 12, 1945. Representative Keefe then resumed his questioning of Marshall with increasing vigor. He spent all that day getting previously missed information into the record.

He would not let the General evade his responsibility for his many failures to act when his action was called for. He would not let the General evade his responsibility for his unexplained unavailability during the evening of December 6th and the early morning hours of December 7th. He questioned Marshall also on the selection of the members of the Roberts Commission which had whitewashed Washington officialdom while placing the full blame on Kimmel and Short. At this point Senator Barkley intervened:

> The CHAIRMAN: The Chair would like to suggest that the hour of adjournment has come. Unless we can conclude with General Marshall in a few minutes, we will have to recess.
>
> I don't know what the chances are to conclude.
>
> Mr KEEFE: Well, Mr. Chairman, I confess I am not quite through.
>
> The CHAIRMAN: Then we might as well recess.

Mr. Keefe finished up on Thursday morning and at noon General Marshall was released to fly to China to make his contribution to the Communist victory over Chiang Kai-shek. Through the efforts and persistence of Senator Ferguson and Representative Keefe, the likelihood that the JCC would ever reach the same conclusions as the Roberts Commission had been forever demolished. For interesting accounts of their contributions, the reader is referred to the pertinent pages (pp. 448-451) of this author's

chapter on "The Pearl Harbor Investigations" in *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*, edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, and John Toland's *Infamy* (pp. 161-170). A minor slip in Toland's book has Marshall's testimony starting on "Tuesday morning, December 6." Actually December 6 was a Thursday. The pressure to finish with him in two days of friendly questioning was thwarted. Marshall's six days of testimony changed the tenor of the entire investigation.

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Admission of MAGIC Demolishes FDR's Claim of Surprise

FROM "THE REAL INFAMY OF PEARL HARBOR"

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.

We now come to the critical twenty-four hour period before the attack. What did the leaders in Washington know? When did they know it? What did they do about it? Unfortunately, the testimony is a jumbled mass of contradictions. Most witnesses swore under oath that they had performed their duties. Nonetheless, valuable hours were lost before responsible persons took actions that available information clearly indicated. The record seems to make clear one thing—junior officers were very reluctant to testify to facts that might embarrass their superiors. Undoubtedly there were private conferences before each investigation at which the involved officers tried to agree on how they would testify. In fact, some witnesses admitted this was so. They had merely met to refresh their joint memories. However, there were also cases where witnesses later changed their original testimony, given with the aid of notes written in December 1941, in order to conform with what they considered the wishes of their superiors.

Any serious attempt to account for the tremendous losses at Pearl Harbor must attempt to explain why the Hawaiian commanders were so ill prepared to repel the attack. They were taken completely by surprise. The first question is: Given the information available to them, did the Hawaiian Commanders make reasonably intelligent decisions? Were the Army's sabotage alert and the Navy's preparations to carry out the War

Plans calling for raids on Japanese islands reasonably proper policies for the period from November 27 to December 7, 1941? As requested, Short had reported the measures taken. Kimmel was certainly carrying out the instructions received in the November 27 message. They were both acting in conformity with the orders and information sent them.

This reduces the pertinent query to: Did Washington officials have information which, if known in Hawaii, would have improved the defensive situation for the Fleet, the available planes and the ground forces? If so, when did the Washington officials have this information and what did they do about it?

The most important information the Washington commanders had, which the Pearl Harbor commanders did not, was the detailed knowledge revealed by a reading of the intercepted Japanese messages. This included not only the detailed reports Tokyo had requested on the movements and conditions within Pearl Harbor, but also the rapid deterioration of Japan's economic conditions and U.S.-Japanese diplomatic relations, as specifically related by Japan's "deadline" messages, her reaction to our ultimatum, the contacts with Hitler and Mussolini, the code destruction orders and the series of last minute messages that were intercepted starting early on the morning of December 6th. The knowledge gained from these intercepts supplies the key that opens the door to the determination of the responsibilities for the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Secrecy of MAGIC

Before and during the war the information gained from these intercepts could not be leaked or revealed to the public and thus also to the Japanese. The later reading of Japan's Naval codes made possible our greatest naval victories in the Pacific. The reading of Japan's diplomatic codes, those involved in our pre-Pearl Harbor intelligence, also provided much valuable information. Before V-E Day, we were able to intercept and read all the Japanese messages between Berlin and Tokyo. After V-E Day we intercepted and read Japan's futile plea for the Soviet Union to act as an intermediary in negotiating an end to the war.

All this, however, does not relieve the Washington officials of responsibility for failing to change the alert conditions in Hawaii during the week, days or hours preceding the attack. It does, however, suggest a reason why those responsible for this failure to take such action might seek to keep all knowledge of these intercepts off the public record. It may also explain why an Army officer, in a position to know, twice told this author—once in the presence of General Bonner Fellers and again in the presence of General Albert C. Wedemeyer—that shortly after Pearl Harbor

General Marshall warned his staff officers they would have to go to their graves with this secret. This informant refused to let his name be used because he feared it might affect his son's Army career. It may also explain why Captain Safford could not find many of the pertinent intercepts in the files when he first looked for them in early 1944.

Marshall was the chief protagonist for keeping knowledge of the intercepts permanently secret. It was by his order that an attempt was made to keep such information from the secret Army and Navy investigations authorized by Congress. Stark also desired to keep this vital information from the secret wartime investigations conducted by trusted Army generals and Navy admirals, all with the highest security clearances. Accordingly, those who first testified under oath before the Navy Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board failed to reveal any hint of the full truth known to them. Most of them sought refuge in the obfuscating reply, "I do not recall." Some avoided direct answers, pleading that the question was irrelevant or immaterial. Others refused to answer because they claimed to do so would not be in the public interest, or because it would force them to disclose a "state secret."

Safford Exposes the Secret

The chief protagonist for revealing the news learned from reading the intercepts was Captain L.F. Safford. In 1941, he had been in charge of the Communications Security Section of Naval Communications. Later, for his work in solving foreign codes and constructing our own, Congress awarded Safford $100,000. Like millions of less informed Americans, Safford at first blamed Admiral Kimmel for the terrible losses at Pearl Harbor. Then, to his amazement, he found out that his superiors had not provided Kimmel with the benefit of the information that his Section had decoded in the months before the attack. His sense of injustice was aroused.

This led him to take two steps which were later to lead to the eventual revelations that both the wartime and first postwar Administrations sought to keep secret. In February 1944, he called on retired Admiral Kimmel in New York and, from notes and memory, related to him much of the information available in Washington that would have been of great value to the Pearl Harbor commanders.

Fearing war casualties, Kimmel sought a wartime recording of "testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor." As a result of Kimmel's prodding, Secretary Knox appointed the retired Admiral Thomas C. Hart to travel where necessary to record such testimony. At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack,

Hart had been the Commander in Chief of our Asiatic Fleet based in the Philippines. On April 28, 1944, Hart met informally with Safford to learn what he knew. From memory, Safford related some of his pre-Pearl Harbor knowledge, which he had gained from decrypting Japanese intercepts. This was news to Hart. He cautioned Safford against making statements he could not prove and instructed him to return the next day to give formal testimony.

Safford returned to the Navy Department and made a search for copies of the pertinent intercepts. He could not find them in either the Navy or War Department files. Nevertheless, he testified the next day from notes and memory as to what he and his superiors knew pre-Pearl Harbor. Then Hart asked him:

> 21. Q: Is there any documentary report which shows the date and hours of delivery of the foregoing information to various officials?
>
> A: There is no documentary evidence.
>
> 22. Q: Are you able to state, from memory, the date and hour on which the important information, say, from 1 December onward, was transmitted?
>
> A: I can, from my recollection of Lieutenant Commander Kramer's verbal reports to me.
>
> 23. Q: Please give what you recall. . . .

At that time, Safford's remarkable testimony contained one misstatement, viz.:

> The "Winds Message" was last seen by myself about December 14, 1941, when the papers which had been distributed in early December were assembled by Kramer [Navy courier], checked by myself, and then turned over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission, according to my understanding at the time.

Actually, the intercepts were never made available to the Roberts Commission.

After speaking again with Kramer, Safford later testified before the Hewitt Inquiry that the assembled messages were given to James Forrestal "about 9 December 1941." The following day Kramer corroborated this. Forrestal became Acting Secretary of the Navy while Knox was out in Hawaii investigating the attack for FDR. As Under Secretary, Forrestal had not been privileged to see the intercepts. After the attack he learned about them and as Acting Secretary requested copies.

Forrestal's appointment schedule for December 10, 1941, shows entries for Commander McCollum of Far East Intelligence at 3:47 and Kramer at 4:49. Kramer recalled explaining to him "the way things shaped up from this traffic." It was this bundle of

intercepts shown to Forrestal that Safford located some months later in a Navy safe. Safford, in one of his many meetings with this author, told him that he, Safford, then duplicated them and had copies replaced in both the Army and Navy files. Thus, they were available for the later investigations. However, the "Winds Execute" message was not among them.

Kimmel's Struggle Succeeds

The Navy Court of Inquiry, authorized by Congress, opened hearings on July 31, 1944. With the information furnished him by Safford, Kimmel and his attorneys made every effort to have the intercepts introduced as essential evidence. As an "interested party," Kimmel and his attorneys were permitted to attend the NCI secret sessions. At the end of each witness's testimony, a representative of each "interested party" was permitted to ask questions.

At the end of that first short session, Kimmel stated before the court of three Admirals:

> I have been branded throughout this country as the one responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster. I feel that this investigation should go far enough to disclose all the facts in connection with the matter and that witnesses from the Army, from the State Department, or from any other federal department ought to be called before this court in order to establish the facts that are necessary. It will be a long time before I am afforded any other opportunity to refute the statements made in the report of the Roberts Commission. People may die who can make statements before this court sufficient to establish the facts and to refute the utterly false and misleading statements made throughout the Roberts Commission.

The first witness, Admiral Stark, was asked his reason for detaching some ships from the Pacific Fleet for duty in the Atlantic early in 1941. Stark sought to go off the record as he thought "making this matter public would be detrimental to the best interests of the United States." Kimmel objected and his objection was upheld. Stark then stated his reason for shifting these ships was that the move was in accordance with WPL-46. This war plan was based on the secret ABC agreement with the British, which Administration defenders have tried to contend was only a tentative proposal, no part of which went into effect before we were actually at war.

Kimmel and his attorneys kept trying to get relevant evidence into the record over the objections of witnesses and the Court's Judge Advocate. On Friday, August 25, 1944, at the close of his testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Kimmel was asked:

> Admiral, is there anything that you want to tell the Board now which may not have been said by you or not brought out by other witnesses in the hearing before the Roberts Commission? . . .
>
> Admiral KIMMEL: . . . . Since Pearl Harbor, information has come to my knowledge that vital information in the hands of the War and Navy Departments was not supplied to responsible officers in Hawaii; in particular, that the War and Navy Departments knew that Japan had set a deadline . . . for the signing of an agreement . . . that on 26 November an ultimatum was delivered to Japan by the United States. This was done not withstanding a joint recommendation to the President by General Marshall and Admiral Stark that no ultimatum of any kind should be made to Japan. I had been advised of this recommendation and had received no qualification of that information. I had no knowledge of the delivery of the ultimatum to Japan on 26 November, 1941. I am further certain that several days prior to 7 December, 1941 there was information in the War Department and the Navy Department that Japan would attack the United States . . . that there was information in the War and Navy Departments on 6 December, 1941, that the hour of attack was momentarily imminent, and early on 7 December, 1941, the precise time of the attack was known. It was known at least three or probably four hours before the attack. All this information was denied to General Short and to me. I feel that we were entitled to it. . . . Had we been furnished this information as little as two or three hours before the attack, which was easily feasable and possible, much could have been done.

The Admiral was told by General Russell, a member of the Army Board, that:

> Some of the things to which you have referred may become the subject of further investigation before the Board is through. . . . It might come to pass that we would want the source of certain information referred to by you in your statement. Would you be willing to cooperate with us to the extent that we might be furnished the source of the information contained in your statement?
>
> Admiral KIMMEL: I will cooperate to the best of my ability, in conformity with the restrictions which have been imposed upon me.

Kimmel's difficulties and final success in getting the Japanese intercepts into the record have been well told in Chapter Seven of John Toland's *Infamy*. Except for an inconsequential error in one date, his account is both accurate and highly interesting. This author can vouch for it. In addition to his familiarity with the official record, this author had a number of confirming conversations with Admiral Kimmel and his two top counsels, Charles B. Rugg and Captain Robert A. Lavender, all of whom were dead when Toland undertook his painstaking research.

The intercepts were finally introduced before the Navy Court

on August 28, 1944, after Secretary Forrestal reversed the previous decision to exclude them. They were introduced as TOP SECRET evidence to be

> extracted from the record and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

Stark's counsel immediately protested:

> We object to bringing those documents in on the ground that the use which may be made of them in these proceedings may disclose secrets which should be held inviolate for the best prosecution of the war. Our objection is not because of what the documents themselves may contain but because their use here may compromise many years of hard work the results of which are most important to the Nation's future interest. We can have no assurance the wide publicity of parts or even all of these proceedings will not eventuate.

Stark's objection was not sustained by the Court.

En route to Hawaii, the Army Pearl Harbor Board (APHB) took testimony in San Francisco. While there, the Board's President, General George Grunert, addressed a letter to General Marshall on August 30, 1944. This letter said, in part:

> Information, apparently material, has been brought to the attention of the Board, which it did not have when you testified. Hence, the Board requests that you subject yourself to a rehearing as early as possible after the Board's return to Washington, D.C., now scheduled for Sunday, September 24, 1944.
>
> The particular subjects on which the Board would like to get additional information follow:

The letter then listed the information that Kimmel had conveyed to the APHB on August 25th.

Upon receipt of this letter, Marshall gave an "oral instruction" to Colonel Carter W. Clarke to conduct an "investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled." This became known as Part I of the Clarke Investigation. Eight Army officers were secretly queried by Colonel Clarke and his aide on their knowledge of the MAGIC intercepts. Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, whom Marshall had recalled from Europe, appeared on four different days. He was the G-2 officer responsible for the pre-Pearl Harbor distribution of the Japanese intercepts. A written report was made to Marshall on September 20, but the investigation continued through September 28. So Marshall was prepared when he reappeared before the APHB on September 29, 1944.

Part II of the Clarke Investigation, 8 July 1945—13 August 1945, was the result of another "oral directive" by Marshall. Clarke was directed to investigate a 5 July 1945 statement by an Army officer before the Hewitt Inquiry. In reference to the "Winds Execute" message, the witness had stated:

> Then, if I remember correctly, I asked Colonel Sadtler whether he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of this message, and his answer was, if I remember correctly . . . that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall.

After questioning that witness and four Army officers, supposedly implicated, Carter Clarke, a Colonel during Part I and a Brigadier General during Part II, concluded:

> I find that no written message implementing the Winds Code message was ever received by G-2, and I find that no records pertaining to Pearl Harbor have been destroyed by G-2 or by anybody connected with G-2.

Officers, not wishing to destroy their careers, denied saying what they had been reported as saying.)

Pilot Message Distribution

This brings us back to the events in the War Department during the 24 hours before the attack.

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton was the Army officer charged with the distribution of the Japanese intercepts to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and Chief of Staff, the Chief of War Plans Division and the Chief of Army Intelligence (G-2). His chief assistant was Colonel Carlisle C. Dusenbury. While the conditions of delivery of these intercepts in locked pouches would differ, the standard operating procedure, if both of these men were present, was for one to take a pouch to the State Department while the other made the deliveries within the War Department at the old Munitions Building. When deliveries were made after office hours, phone calls would be made to the residences of the recipients before attempting deliveries.

The first key Japanese intercept of this crucial period was the so-called Pilot message. This message announced that the long awaited Japanese answer to our November 26th ultimatum would shortly be transmitted by the "Purple" code in English. The Japanese Ambassadors were to put it "in nicely drafted form" and hold it for delivery at a time to be specified in a later message. The time sheet for this Pilot message shows it was intercepted by a Navy station on the West Coast from 7:15 to 7:20 a.m., East Coast time on December 6, 1941. It was teletyped in

Japanese code to the Navy in Washington. The Army Signal Corps received it from the Navy more than four hours later at 12:05 p.m. This abnormal time delay was never accounted for. It was then decoded, translated and typed by the Army's Signal Intelligence Service before delivery to the Army and Navy officer couriers.

Bratton, the Army courier, testified he received the Pilot message "around about 2 o'clock" and distributed it "that afternoon about 3 o'clock." He stated it was delivered to the full list of persons for whom he was responsible. He recalled discussing its contents with both Generals Gerow and Miles.

When asked about receipt of the Pilot message, General Marshall at first gave an indirect answer referring to the first 13 parts of the answer to the ultimatum mentioned in the Pilot message. He admitted he was in Washington that entire day. He further admitted there was someone on duty in his office who would have known where he was. Finally, as Senator Ferguson pressed he stated: "The point is I did not receive the [Pilot] message."

General Gerow, Chief of War Plans, took a position similar to his superior. When shown the message and asked about it, he replied: "I do not recall having received that message, sir." He too had a duty officer who "knew where to reach me, sir." This duty officer could go home "but he remained at his telephone so he could be reached at any time." General Gerow "had a search made" for the duty roster but had been unable to locate it. He did testify:

> I think that I was down at the office myself until 6 or 7 or 8 o'clock. Of course, that was a very busy time and we had a lot of unfinished business.

General Miles, Chief of Army Intelligence, was another matter. Testifying before the Congressional Committee, in advance of General Marshall, he stated:

> We were thoroughly prepared and had been for some days to receive an unfavorable reply to the message of November 26.

As to when he first knew of it, he testified he "certainly knew it" before he left for home that Saturday. He attended a dinner party that evening at the home of Admiral Wilkinson.

At a later time, Senator Ferguson asked him:

> How do you account personally for the pilot message not being delivered to General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, who was the only man under his testimony that could act, he or the President or the Secretary of War, as I understand his testimony? Now how do you account . . . that that was not delivered on the day it was translated?

> General MILES: Senator, my answer is, first that I had every reason to believe that General Marshall did receive the locked pouch which contained this message. I heard his testimony this morning. I think he is mistaken in saying he did not receive that message on the afternoon of the 6th. . . .

Two days later, after Marshall had returned from the White House and complete his testimony, Miles returned to the witness seat.

> Senator FERGUSON: Well, you knew the pilot message—and you know what I mean by the "pilot message"—was in on the 6th?
> General MILES: Yes, sir.
> Senator FERGUSON: Did you have any reason why that was not delivered to General Marshall?
> General MILES: I testified, sir, to the best of my knowledge and belief it was in the Saturday afternoon locked pouch among several other messages, which you will find were translated on that day, and that it did go to General Marshall. He does not remember seeing it.

Japan's Much-Awaited Reply

Next came the first 13 parts of Japan's 14 part reply to our ultimatum of November 26. We had known since November 22nd, that if agreement was not reached by November 29th, "things are automatically going to happen." A week had passed since that date with no agreement. The Navy's West Coast intercept station started picking up these coded parts on the morning of December 6th at 8:03 a.m. Washington, D.C. time. The first five parts were picked up by 10 a.m. and they had the first 13 parts by 11:25 a.m. They were sent in batches by teletype to the Navy in Washington.

The first four parts were received before noon and the Navy's decryption section went to work on them. The Army's section had closed down at 1 p.m. By two o'clock the Navy was swamped with work and the Army was asked to recall three of their decrypters. They came in by about three o'clock. All the first thirteen parts were in Washington by 2:51 p.m. The Army decoded parts 9 and 10 while the Navy decoded the other 11 parts. They were in English, so no translation was necessary. All thirteen parts were typed up and ready for delivery about 9 p.m.

Bratton's first testimony of record was before the Clarke Investigation on September 14, 1944. He had with him "a memorandum which I made at the time for the record." He was not then asked any question about the Pilot message. When queried on September 15, 1944, about Japan's 14 part reply, he responded:

> I believe that the message started coming into the Navy on the 6th. My recollection is that I transmitted a copy to the Secretary of State that night.

There were no other questions or references to December 6, in his testimony before the Marshall-sponsored Clarke Investigation.

Bratton next appeared before the APHB on three occasions—September 30, October 2, and 6, 1944. His first appearance was the day after Marshall had testified.

Marshall had skipped over the question submitted to him in writing as to what the War Department knew on December 6, 1941. When later asked the same question orally, Marshall dodged a direct answer, referring to his testimony about December 7. He did finally say:

> My understanding was—though I am not the best witness on this, and I am indulging largely in hearsay—that the major portion of that message was delivered to the Secretary of State on the night before, although I don't know.

On Bratton's first appearance before the APHB, he replied to a question concerning Japan's lengthy 14-part reply to our ultimatum:

> I had had the bulk of it since the evening before, sir. It came in fourteen parts, I believe. Thirteen of those parts were received the afternoon and evening of the 6th and were delivered by me to the office of the Chief of Staff, the A.C. of S. G-2 [Miles], the office of the Secretary of State. The last part didn't come in, as I remember, until very late at night or very early in the morning of the 7th, and it was delivered at that time to those same agencies.

On his second appearance, he was asked:

> General RUSSELL: Whom did you deliver them to that night?
>
> Colonel BRATTON: To the office of the Chief of Staff; A.C. of S. G-2; WPD [Gerow]; and the State Department. I gave the Secretary of State's copy to the watch officer in the State Department, with the request that it be gotten to Mr. Hull immediately.

He was then asked, when the President and leading Admirals had that message Saturday evening,

> why it was that the Chief of Staff [Marshall] was not called and advised, as were others, that this important document had been received. In view of the tenor of its contents . . . why did not the Chief of Staff get that message?
>
> Colonel BRATTON: I cannot verify it or prove it, at this time, but my recollection is that those three officers [Generals Marshall, Miles and Gerow] got their copies the evening of the 6th.

* * * *

Colonel TOULMIN [APHB Executive Officer]: Is it your recollection that you handed that long 13-part message, on that evening, to the Secretary of the Chief of Staff?

Colonel BRATTON: Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN: And it is your recollection that you handed it on that evening of December 6 to General Gerow, or some representative of General Gerow?

Colonel BRATTON: Yes.

Colonel TOULMIN: Did you hand it to General Gerow directly, or to his Secretary?

Colonel BRATTON: To his executive officer . . . Colonel Gailey.

Colonel TOULMIN: And what is the name of the Secretary of the Chief of Staff?

Colonel BRATTON: Colonel Smith, Bedell Smith, now Lieutenant General.

* * * *

Colonel TOULMIN: Did you talk to General Miles on the night of the 6th?

Colonel BRATTON: My recollection is that I did, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN: You talked to him on the phone, or in his office?

Colonel BRATTON: No, I believe I talked to him in his office.

* * * *

Colonel TOULMIN: And how about General Smith? Did you get any reaction from him, or any action, rather?

Colonel BRATTON: No. General Smith did not have access to these pouches. You mean General Bedell Smith?

Colonel TOULMIN: Yes.

Colonel BRATTON: He didn't have a key to the bag.

Colonel TOULMIN: Did you tell him that it was an important document in the locked pouch?

Colonel BRATTON: Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN: And that the Chief of Staff should know about it?

Colonel BRATTON: Should see it right away.

Colonel TOULMIN: What was General Smith's response—that he would get in touch with the Chief of Staff, or would not?

Colonel BRATTON: It must have been, because if it had been otherwise, it would have registered on my memory.

On his third appearance before the APHB, the following interchange took place:

General RUSSELL: As I recall your testimony, you stated that

you delivered it to this man Smith on Saturday night, is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON: That is correct, sir, to the best of my knowledge and belief. My recollection is that I found Colonel Smith in his office. It may have been one of the other secretaries, but my recollection is that it was Colonel Smith, and that I told him that this was a very important paper, and that General Marshall should see it at once. My recollection is that he said we would send it out to the General's quarters by courier. In any event, my mind was at rest about the Chief of Staff, I didn't worry about him any more that night.

General GRUNERT: Had this occurred frequently in the past?

Colonel BRATTON: Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT: So it was just a normal thing to say, "Here is a pouch that has got important stuff in it"?

Colonel BRATTON: No. When I thought that the Chief of Staff should see it at once, I made a point of telling Smith so, and he would say, "All right, I will sent it out by a special courier."

General GRUNERT: Did that happen very frequently?

Colonel BRATTON: It happened several times; yes, sir.

General GRUNERT: Now, about this time, most everything was important?

Colonel BRATTON: Most everything was important; and I was further urged on by the fact that if the Chief of Naval Operations ever got one of these things before General Marshall did and called him up to discuss it on the telephone with him, and the General hadn't gotten his copy, we all caught hell.

What We Knew

FROM "THE REAL INFAMY OF PEARL HARBOR"

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.

Before presenting the testimony relating to December 7th, it would be helpful to review the information available to Generals Marshall, Gerow and Miles as well as Secretary of War Stimson before they left their respective offices on December 6th. There was a mounting accumulation of facts and events that could not help but create an increasingly apprehensive atmosphere which called for an ever higher degree of alertness for possible Japanese action. There were a myriad of such developments, but only the highlights will be mentioned.

On November 5, 1941, Marshall and Stark signed a joint memorandum for Roosevelt in which they concluded that

> The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound. . . . Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of

several contingencies. These included a Japanese movement

> against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies.

It also included the movement of Japanese forces across a specified line previously described. Because of their desire for more time to build up forces in the Far East, their final recommendation was:

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

That same day a MAGIC message told them that:

> Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month

if Japanese-U.S. relations are to be saved

> from falling into a chaotic condition.

A week later they read in MAGIC that:

> the date set forth . . . is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time. . . . The situation is nearing a climax . . . time is indeed becoming short.

This was further confirmed three days later when a November 15th Tokyo message closed:

> The date set forth . . . is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date.

A November 16 message was read on November 17, stating:

> The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before. . . . I set the deadline . . . and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

Final Deadline Set

On November 19, a MAGIC message informed them that if the U.S.-Japan diplomatic negotiations failed:

> It is most probable that diplomatic relations between the two countries would be broken off immediately.

The Japanese Ambassadors in Washington sought instructions from Tokyo as to reducing Japanese personnel in the United States.

On November 22nd, the Ambassadors' plea to Tokyo for more time was answered:

> It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set. . . . There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if

> within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.

Two days later, on the 24th, our top Washington officials read a Japanese intercept stating that:

> The time limit set . . . is in Tokyo time.

This is a day (14 hours) earlier than Washington time.

On Tuesday, November 25, the War Cabinet, including Marshall and Stimson, met at the White House. Stimson's diary notes the President:

> brought up entirely the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday [December 1], for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition. . . . The others brought out the fact that any such expedition to the South as the Japanese were likely to take would be an encirclement of our interests in the Philippines and cutting into our vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia. I pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first steps toward an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border into Thailand she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation of a warning we had already given.

Our military and naval advisors had warned us that we could not safely allow the Japanese to move against British Malaysia or the Dutch East Indies without attempting to prevent it.

A number of Japan's intercepts were translated and circulated on November 26th. Perhaps the most informative was one sent on November 14, from Tokyo to Hong Kong and eleven other Chinese cities. It read in part:

> Though the Imperial Government hopes for great things from the Japan-American negotiations, they do not permit optimism for the future. Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet . . . is:

a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China.
b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China. . . .

We will cope with a world war on a long-time scale. Should our reserves for total war and our future military strength wane, we have decided to reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. This has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire. . . .

Please keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions and the fact that they have been transmitted to you.

On November 26, our officials read another highly interesting intercept sent the day before, probably the 24th U.S. time, from Japanese forces poised at Hanoi to Tokyo:

We are advised by the military that we are to have a reply from the United States on the 25th. If this is true, no doubt the Cabinet will make a decision between peace and war within the next day or two. . . .

Should . . . the negotiations not end in a success, since practically all preparations for the campaign have been completed, our forces shall be able to move within the day. . . .

State Department Surrenders

On November 26th, that same day, Roosevelt summoned Hull to the White House and, without consulting his military and naval advisors, authorized Hull to hand the Japanese Ambassadors an ultimatum to Japan that it was known Japan could not accept.

On November 27, Hull told Stimson:

I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox—the Army and the Navy.

Stimson then checked with Roosevelt, consulted with Knox, Stark and Hull, before preparing with Gerow a message "we shall send to MacArthur" over Marshall's signature. A similar message was incidentally sent to Hawaii.

It was also the date of a joint Marshall-Stark memorandum to FDR, the Commander in Chief that stated:

If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.

Marshall and Stark again asked for more time until more men and materiel reached the Philippines. However, they stood by their agreements with the British and Dutch, while asking that a joint British-American warning be sent to Japan if she should advance into Thailand.

November 28 brought alarming indications that Japan was getting ready for action. A telephone conversation the day before between the Tokyo Foreign Office and one of the Japanese Ambassadors was taped, translated and decoded. It told us that "a crisis *does* appear imminent." That same day, FDR and his War Cabinet also read a Tokyo cable to Japan's Washington Ambassadors. This cable revealed Japan's highly negative reaction to our ultimatum of the 26th.

> Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions. . . . From now on do the best you can.

The reports from the Philippines about the Japanese expeditionary force moving south were so alarming to Stimson on November 28th that he personally took them to FDR in the White House. 25,000 Japanese troops were going to land somewhere. Later that day, there was a meeting of the War Cabinet at the White House. Stimson's diary reports:

> It was now the opinion of everyone that if this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indochina and go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines. It was the consensus of everybody that this must not be allowed. Then we discussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we would have to fight. . . .
>
> It further became a consensus . . . that the only thing for us to do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight.

War Not a Dream

On Saturday, November 29th, Hull met with the British Ambassador. He informed him that he had told our Army and Navy officials that the diplomatic phase "was virtually over." Then "speaking in great confidence" he said

> that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas.

On Monday, December 1st, the recipients of MAGIC read a Tokyo to Berlin message that stated:

> The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April . . . now stand ruptured—broken. . . . In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. . . . Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams. . . .
>
> Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

That same day we read Tokyo's instructions for her embassies in London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila to destroy their code machines while Washington was informed on how to destroy theirs by chemical means.

On Tuesday, December 2nd, these matters were all discussed at the White House, including proposed FDR messages to Congress and the Japanese Emperor. Stimson met with Marshall, Miles and Gerow concerning their attempts to speed up supplies to the Philippines. Stimson cancelled an out-of-town engagement "in order to stay in Washington over the week end."

Japan's Moves Known

On Wednesday, December 3rd, our War Cabinet read Tokyo's instructions to her Washington Ambassadors to destroy one of their two "Purple" machines and certain other codes. As a result, G-2's Bratton sent a man to observe the Japanese Embassy and confirm the fact that papers were being burned. As Bratton later testified, this "meant that time was running out and the approach of the crisis."

On Thursday, December 4th, we ordered our representatives in Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, Tientsin and Shanghai to destroy our top code system. Guam was told to "destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter" with minor exceptions which they should "Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency." The "Winds Execute" message, about which there has been so much controversy, was received. This

indicated Japan's break with the United States and Great Britain, but not Russia.

On Friday, December 5th, our War Cabinet read a December 1 Tokyo order to her London Embassy to dispose of its code machine and to report back when that was done.

Saturday, December 6, produced more evidence that Japan was on the move. On that date we first read a circular MAGIC message of December 2, in which Japan ordered her diplomatic representatives abroad to start "the burning of all their telegraphic codes." That order had been issued to all Japanese officials in North America and the South Seas, as well as those in British and Netherlands territories. Our War Cabinet also read a Japanese December 3rd Rome to Tokyo message reporting on a meeting of Japan's Ambassador with Mussolini in which Mussolini was asked if Japan declared "war on the United States and Great Britain . . . would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini replied: 'Of course'." That same Saturday morning the members of our War Cabinet read a Japanese December 5th Washington to Tokyo message stating, "We have completed destruction of codes" except for the one "Purple" machine needed for receiving the expected reply to the United States ultimatum of November 26.

Still more alarming were the reports from both Admiral Hart in the Philippines and the British, via London, that large Japanese convoys had been seen moving south. Even more alerting was the report that at least one of these convoys had crossed the line which Marshall and Stark had on November 27 told Roosevelt was "a threat to Burma and Singapore." In that case the

> "United States, British and Dutch military authorities in the Far East [had] agreed that joint military counter-action against Japan should be undertaken."

The End Approaches

Our War Cabinet members also read Tokyo's orders for the departure from the United States of certain important Japanese nationals. Then, on Saturday afternoon, December 6, the intercepted Pilot message informed those privy to MAGIC that the long awaited Japanese reply to our ultimatum would soon be on its way from Tokyo, to be held for delivery at a specified time. As we had learned on November 22, that specified time would undoubtedly be when "things are automatically going to happen."

The 14 part reply began coming in that Saturday afternoon, December 6th. At the White House, a young Navy Lieutenant was detailed to remain after hours to deliver to Roosevelt material "of such importance that the President expected to receive it." The

Lieutenant was told that "during the evening Captain Kramer would bring up some "magic" material and that I was to take it and give it immediately to the President." Meanwhile, the President was busy redrafting a face saving message which went off to the Japanese Emperor at 9 p.m., with an announcement to the press.

At the War Department, the urgency that Saturday afternoon was such that several Army cryptographers were summoned from their homes to expedite the decoding of the anxiously awaited Japanese reply. To keep him informed of important developments, Marshall had Colonels on duty around the clock at his office and orderlies at his residence up to 10 p.m. or, when he was out, until he returned. His office, home and bedside had secure telephones passing through the White House switchboard. Yet, according to Marshall's original testimony before the JCC, he wanted the world to believe that he, like Stark, was unaware of all this quickening of developments crying out for his attention and action.

The first time Stark and Marshall testified, each, in turn, implied that he was following his usual Sunday morning activities and weekend routine. As Marshall stated it, "the probability is" that he was at home on Saturday evening and that he took his habitual horseback ride on Sunday morning. Stark had no memory whatsoever as to where he was that Saturday night. As regards the time of his arrival at his Navy Department office on Sunday, December 7, 1941, Stark's first reply was:

> I usually got down to the office on Sunday mornings around 10:30 or 11 o'clock. I was lazy on Sunday mornings unless there was some special reason for getting up early. I usually took a walk around the grounds and greenhouse at the Chief of Naval Operations' quarters and didn't hurry about getting down and my usual time, as I recall, was about 10:30 or 11. What time it was that particular Sunday morning I couldn't go beyond that.

The memory of a member of Stark's December 6 theater party forced Stark to revise his earlier testimony that he did not know his whereabouts that Saturday evening or recall the fact that Roosevelt had asked him to phone late that night. Stark thus learned there was a "special reason for getting up early" that Sunday morning. Testimonies of subordinates placed him in his office as early as 9 a.m. or a few minutes later. Unfortunately, no witness enlightened the JCC as to the actual whereabouts of Marshall during many of these crucial hours.

Where Was General Marshall?

*SOME NEW VIEWS AND CONTRIBUTIONS RELATIVE TO THE ONGOING MYSTERY OF PEARL HARBOR.**

JAMES J. MARTIN

We have been solemnly assured even in our own day that gossip is part of history. We find it from Thucydides to Tacitus; Suetonius' *History of the Twelve Caesars* is liberally seasoned with gossip. And some of the most graceful and elegant gossip ever committed to posterity is to be found in Plutarch.

Apparently it is an almost inescapable part of any episode which persists in remaining cloudy as to origins or content regardless of efforts to penetrate to the core of the affair by assemblage or analysis of facts. Perhaps there is more excuse for gossip in classical accounts, when the writing of such often took place many years after the events described, by which time some of the sources may have disappeared, and could not be examined. There is undoubtedly less excuse for it now. But we have events all the time which result in such circumstances, with any number of reasons prevailing to help explain either why there is a mystery, or why none should prevail.

The real burden of holding up under gossip bears most heavily upon those who wish to maintain sweet and innocent versions of the past which they dearly love, despite being faced by all manner of harsh and discordant facts which simply do not fit, and cannot be reconciled with the original or desired accounts. This is the predicament of all history which must deal in subsequent times with uncomfortable disclosures and discoveries, resulting either in the noticeable alteration of the original narratives, or

subjecting them to deep suspicions and discount if they are able to withstand the uncomfortable heat of contradiction. And if this defense of official versions cannot come to terms with new facts or the uncovering of old ones, or discrepancies caused by lack of supporting documentary evidence, then gossip and its cousin rumor fills the space resulting from the failure of the upholders of prior rectitude to account for their inability to reinforce their credibility with anything but bluster, *ad hominem* criticism of their challengers, or the employment of devious and diversionary maneuvers intended to draw attention away from the problem. Like legal processes, history, when it cannot stand on documentary evidence, relapses and tries to make do by the substitution of testimony and opinion.

As we approach our own time, however, there are many complications which do not face those who are mainly concerned with the more distant past. One may write with relative ease of a time from which no one survives, and be guided only by respect for the sources, there being no one to issue heated challenges to one's product as a consequence of feeling injured by the account thus rendered. This state of affairs grows from residues of political significance which may still survive even if the events under question are many decades old. And the partisans of a person or policy surviving the demise of the actual participants become a veritable interest-group-industry in trying to perpetuate a memory and version more felicitous to their state of mind and well-being. Hence a clash is inevitable when those interested in the events too, come upon the scene unencumbered by the emotional and political baggage which marks the position of the defenders of an established narrative. The case of the late General George C. Marshall and his connections with the drama of the Pearl Harbor attack of December 7, 1941 can hardly be surpassed as an example of this phenomenon.

Despite an immense volume of print which has been inspired and stimulated by the complicated events transpiring, we still do not know much of anything, and in some cases, nothing at all, concerning some of the actions or whereabouts of Gen. Marshall for most of the 24 hours which elapsed between roughly noon of Dec. 6 and the same hour on Dec. 7. This is of immense significance, since Gen. Marshall was Army Chief of Staff and as such directly in charge operationally over all Army affairs, which included the command at Pearl Harbor. This fact is at the center of the entire incident, and should be clearly emphasized at the outset, lest the usual muddiness prevail as to what the situation was. Percy Greaves, Jr., summarized the command situation in the following way in his expert chapter titled "The Pearl Harbor Investigations," in the symposium edited by Harry Elmer Barnes,

Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1953), pp. 409-410:

> The Pacific Fleet was subject to orders of the Chief of Naval Operations [Adm. Harold R. Stark, in 1941] in Washington, *but when it was in Pearl Harbor, the Army was charged with its protection.* The Hawaiian Army Commander [Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short] took orders directly only from the Chief of Staff [Gen. Marshall], the Secretary of War, [Henry L. Stimson], or the President of the United States [Franklin D. Roosevelt]. (Emphasis added.)

It will be seen, therefore, that the commander of the Pacific Fleet, which was based at Pearl Harbor beginning in April, 1940, and under Adm. Husband E. Kimmel beginning in January, 1941, had some defensive duties. But he and the Fleet were there largely to make ready *offensive* actions against the Japanese in the Pacific, in liaison with the Dutch and British navies in particular, as well as the naval forces of Australia, contingent upon various possible Japanese actions in this vast area.

All of this grew out of the very secret ("Rainbow") agreements which emerged from the joint strategy talks in Singapore, January-April, 1941. What Adm. Kimmel's *real* job with the Pacific Fleet was, in this context, was put on the record via the testimony of Adm. Richmond Kelley Turner before the board of inquiry conducted by Adm. Thomas C. Hart between mid-February and mid-June, 1944 (see Greaves, *Perpetual War*, pp. 421-422.) Knowledge of his duties undoubtedly played a big part in the official Navy Court of Inquiry (July-October, 1944) finding Adm. Kimmel innocent of any derelection of duty during the events leading up to and through the attack of Dec. 7, 1941. (For an insight into how far political partisanship can go in covering up the truth, one should consult the observations on the infamous way in which the Roberts Commission went about its blackening of Adm. Kimmel, in the latter's own book on the entire business, *Admiral Kimmel's Story* [Chicago: Regnery, 1954], pp. 146-185. This should be supplemented by consulting the report of the interview with Adm. Kimmel by the Associated Press in December, 1966, published in varying length here and there about the country, *e.g., Denver Post*, Dec. 7, 1966.)

Part of the difficulty in sorting out the various elements in the Pearl Harbor situation prior to the day of the attack stems from what may be called the "From Here to Eternity" syndrome, a reference to the famed moving picture of 1953, based on the novel of the same name by the late James Jones. This movie, now made much worse in a re-filming which reduces the pre-attack total scene in Hawaii to a monstrous soap opera, did much to induce the hazy ignorance as to what the situation was in the closing

weeks of 1941. One gets from this much-shown picture that an aura of lazy unconcern with the world at war was the order of the day and that the Navy was simply there for a casual vacation, while the Army was involved in even more trivial diversions. One absorbs the impression that all were there to indulge in sexual peccadillos and mild dissipation, with nothing on their minds except a succession of empty dinner parties for the officers and opportunities for drunken forays into Honolulu for the enlisted men.

However, since the picture dwelled mainly upon the empty distractions consuming the Army, and hardly involved the other services, lost entirely is the purpose of the Fleet being in Hawaii in the first place. There is not the faintest allusion to its preparation for likely attack on the Japanese, or even a single reference to the general situation in the Pacific. The casual atmosphere of scatter-brained lightheartedness allegedly prevailing there conveyed by this film helps to ingrain among its viewers a possible desired propagandist attitude, reinforcing the conviction that the eventual attack truly was totally unexpected, and unprepared for, thus sanctifying Roosevelt's pious "day of infamy" rhetoric and rendering those exposed uninclined to consider any other view of the entire affair later on, when sobriety returned to temper hysteria. Moving pictures may be entertainment, but it is a rare one devoid of political messages.

That Adm. Kimmel was not empowered to engage in unilateral actions regardless of the situation, but had to await directions from Gen. Short, based on prior orders from Washington from either Stimson or Marshall, was already demonstrated in the case of the famous "warning" to Hawaii purportedly emanating from Marshall (his name was appended to the message, at least) of November 27, 1941, in which Gen. Short was the addressee, with instructions further to establish liaison with the Navy, in effecting a *sabotage alert* at the combined Pearl Harbor facilities.

The Base had promptly been placed on such an alert, and there it remained to the moment of the bombing on the morning of December 7. (There has recently been a curious diversion related to this subject growing out of the Burns Oral History Project at the University of Hawaii headed by Stuart Gerry Brown. In the transcripts of portions of Tapes #2, #5 and #6, former Gov. Burns seemed to recall that his informant on the upcoming attack on Pearl Harbor, Robert L. Shivers, the FBI's agent in charge in Honolulu, was supposed to have gone to the Pearl Harbor commanders with this information, though no evidence ever surfaced that he ever did, or even mentioned his special knowledge before the Roosevelt-handpicked whitewash Roberts Commission, before which he testified. Burns could not understand where Shivers got

this information, though one might suspect that the Bureau may have acquired such intelligence in New York from their liaison work with British intelligence headed by Sir William Stephenson, who had full access to Purple "Magic" via their cracking of the analog of Purple, the German "Ultra" code. British possession of a Purple machine in London from January, 1941 on surely did not get in their way, either. (One should consult William Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid* [New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1976] for a revelation of some of the interaction between American-based British intelligence and the FBI prior to U.S. formal involvement in World War II.)

This British connection was originally established by testimony of William F. Friedman, who headed the Army cryptanalytical team which first broke the Japanese Purple code in August, 1940, largely as a consequence of the work of Harry L. Clark, before the top-secret inquiries conducted by Col. (later Gen.) Carter W. Clarke for the War Department in September, 1944 (see Greaves, *Perpetual War*, p. 475.) However, in view of the chain of command prevailing, it does not seem that a visit by Shivers to either Adm. Kimmel or Gen. Short would have done much of anything other than stimulating a barrage of telephone calls and telegrams back and forth between Honolulu and Washington, with the Pearl Harbor commanders' superiors in the latter city becoming quietly hysterical over how Shivers and the FBI might have acquired such intelligence.)

We may now get on properly to an attempt to find the trail of Gen. Marshall, dividing the time span involved into three segments: 1) the afternoon of Dec. 6; 2) the evening of Dec. 6-7; 3) the morning of Dec. 7. Shortly after noon on the 6th there took place the interception of the so-called "pilot message" sent by the Japanese to their Washington embassy, announcing that a long communication, in 14 parts, was about to be sent to them, which was to be presented to the American Secretary of State the next day under conditions to be relayed later. A few moments after receiving this news, in his office in the old Munitions Building (the Pentagon did not exist in 1941), Gen. Marshall disappeared, and was not seen again until the following morning, at 9 a.m., 10 a.m., or around 11:30 a.m., depending on which testimony one wants to accept.

At the moment of learning of the "pilot message," asserted Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, chief of Naval Combat Intelligence at Pearl Harbor from June, 1941 on, and the key figure in the cracking of the Japanese naval code which led to the U.S. naval victory of the battle of Midway in the spring of 1942, Gen. Marshall, instead of disappearing, should have been on the scrambler telephone to Gen. Short in Honolulu. In a number of conversations

with Capt. Rochefort in which this writer took part, in the mutual company of Dr. Harry Elmer Barnes, in the 1960s at Redondo Beach, Calif., it was asserted by Capt. Rochefort, though professing to be ignorant of the famous "Winds Execute" message of Dec. 4 wherein the Japanese had announced to their diplomatic people around the world a situation which could hardly be interpreted as anything but a coming declaration of war on the U.S., disguised in a false weather report, that he too was convinced that what was coming through the 6th was a sure prelude to a formal announcement of the breaking of diplomatic relations. And with Pearl Harbor still on sabotage alert since Nov. 27, the Base was in grave danger if an *attack* were to follow, with aircraft and naval vessels still bunched up in various concentration points, in accordance with sabotage alert procedures. (That the aircraft carriers, heavy cruisers and submarines were not there at the time of the attack was a fortunate break.)

But Gen. Marshall executed one of the most famous disappearing acts in history instead. Testifying before the Joint Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack during the second week of December, 1945, Gen. Marshall declared under oath that he could not recall where he was the rest of Dec. 6 four years earlier, surely a day of major importance in his life. His memory was later "refreshed" by his wife, Katharine Tupper Marshall, resulting in the conclusion that he had been with her, through the evening. Her engagement book, indicating they had not been anywhere else, presumably was the evidence, though, strangely enough, in her book *Together* (Atlanta: Tupper and Love, 1946), published the following year, she did not say that. She spoke of returning to their quarters at Fort Myer, Va., the evening of the 6th, but she did not say the General was with her, or was already there when she got home, or that he came in later in the evening. Nothing was said about his presence until she commented on him having breakfast with her the morning of the 7th, about which more later. Though Gen. Marshall's comments were confused, even with the support of his wife's engagement book, by default, there still is no positive statement on his part as to whether he was home or not.

Though all of Gen. Marshall's strongest contemporary supporters flinch from making this positive statement as to his whereabouts, also, this does not faze his very formidable hagiographer, Forrest C. Pogue, who, in Chapter 10 of Volume II of what has been emphasized as the only *official* Marshall biography (*George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942*; New York: Viking, 1966), flatly declares the General was home all evening with his wife. He presents no evidence or citation for that declaration; we are supposed to take his word for it (*Ordeal and Hope*, p. 223).

For those who are not impressed with Pogue, and they exist, the absence of any solid documentary evidence of his whereabouts has led to the other areas which make up history: testimony and opinion. How much of this is plain gossip or speculation, regardless of point of origin, is unmeasurable, but durable.

Pogue, the reverent curator of the George C. Marshall Research Library for years, and now Director of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Institute for Historical Research, from the small mountain of official papers over which he presides, has been unable, apparently, to find anything at all to substantiate where Gen. Marshall spent the time from shortly after noon on Dec. 6 to around 9-11 a.m. the next day. In the meantime, some have volunteered suggestions. There is one account which tries to place him at a dinner reunion of fellow graduates of the Virginia Military Institute. There have been those who have ruminated out loud that Gen. Marshall spent into the early morning hours of the 7th hiding somewhere in the White House under Pres. Roosevelt's protection. One long-held account maintained he spent Dec. 7 morning at the airport in Washington as part of the welcoming committee greeting the arrival of Maxim Litvinov, Stalin's new ambassador representing the Soviet Union, though this proved to be based on false information derived from a worshipful biography of Litvinov, later, by a specialist in Iranian art and a dogged admirer of the USSR, Arthur Upham Pope. There is still another, in an oral tradition among retired Army intelligence who are still too frightened to reveal their identity, who insist Gen. Marshall was a "closet dipsomaniac," and could not be found the evening of Dec. 6, 1941 because he was being treated for over-indulgence at the Walter Reed hospital, presumably masked by a false identity in the hospital admissions log.

Of course, there is not a shred of documentary evidence for any of these, but the persistence of a lack of explanation for the legendary mysterious absence of Gen. Marshall from all of normal channels of association and communication for a man that prominent has lent encouragement to those stories. For those who are devoted to the veneration of Important People, these are horrendous, unmentionable things even to think about, even though they are not yet punishable as offenses against "the officially established and sanctioned opinions of the State," shall we say, as are certain views in West Germany on various aspects of wartime history, 1939-1945. But they are perfectly valid "questions" to advance about someone else's heroes, in the time honored manner as a further example of the whose-ox-is-being-gored department. Perhaps this irreverence may have useful consequences in times to come. An audience ready to accept the recent accounts of the sexual adventures of both Pres. and Mrs. Frank-

lin D. Roosevelt, let alone those of Pres. John F. Kennedy, may in due time come to terms with the revelation of the real whereabouts of Gen. George C. Marshall during the 24 hours preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, though this will obviously be something of a far different order than the matters mentioned above, if it ever takes place.

Shortly after Gen. Marshall vanished early Saturday afternoon, Dec. 6, the Japanese Memorandum #902 from Tokyo began to come in, and while the Japanese Embassy in Washington was busy taking it down, unknown to them, the American intelligence systems were doing the same, and converting it into English somewhat faster. And this had catastrophic consequences. The combined Army and Navy team of code-breakers were not only more successful than the Japanese Embassy people in coming up with an English language version of this memorandum, and well ahead of the latter. The difficulties of the Embassy decoders led to a delay in furnishing their diplomats with a version in time to make the scheduled presentation at the State Department, compounding their problem with accusations of planned deceit to cover the air attack on Hawaii as a consequence.

But this legend does not fit with the facts. Even the Japanese educator-historian Saburo Ienaga, though bitterly hostile to the Japanese regime which took Japan into war with the U.S.A., exonerates them of the almost universally-held notion in the U.S.A. that they had "planned a perfidious attack without any prior warning." This is "incorrect," Ienaga flatly declared. It was the Japanese government's clear intention to notify the State Department "immediately before the attack" at Pearl Harbor that diplomatic relations were considered broken, but this formal notice was delayed because "they had difficulty with the last long message from Tokyo." (Ienaga, *The Pacific War, 1931-1945*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978, p. 136. This book was first published in Japanese language in Tokyo in 1968.)

Ladislas Farago in his *The Broken Seal* (New York: Random House, 1967), the most recent heavily-documented pro-Administration apologia and diversionary effort, frankly admitted it was the Japanese Embassy's inefficiency in failing to have the 14-part message in acceptable English in time for delivery to Sec. of State Cordell Hull, as originally promised, and not a part of some devilish "sneak attack" plot, though the latter misconception persists as the almost universal American belief.

What is really repelling about the drama in the offices of the State Department early in the afternoon of Dec. 7, 1941 was the fakery of Sec. Hull in pretending to read what was tendered him by the Japanese diplomats Nomura and Kurusu, and then launching into a diatribe of billingsgate aimed at these two, intended

more for the record than anything else. Like everyone else privileged to read "Magic," Hull had already seen this message, thanks to the more speedy efforts of U.S. intelligence. Therefore, his whole performance was far more theater than it was the execution of his duties as a diplomat, and his simulated sense of outrage simply another contribution to the tight little scheme of propaganda being built around the entire incident by the Administration, to make themselves look like aggrieved innocent victims and the Japanese sinister, scheming deceivers. It worked in precisely that way, and the American public responded in a manner which must rank close to the top as an achievement of a propagandist's dream, probably unequalled in the history of devious statecraft.

Work on the Memorandum #902 was originally begun by Navy Communications Intelligence under the direction of Capt. Laurance F. Safford shortly after noon on the 6th, but the Army was eventually brought in to help out. This was no brief or routine communique. It went on for pages, amounting to well over 3000 words. Rather than being a catalog of "infamous falsehoods," as Sec. Hull raged, for public consumption, it was a sober and restrained summary of the Far East situation, from the Japanese point of view, and stating why they thought further attempts to negotiate the crisis in the Pacific were not worth continuing. Had Sec. Hull and his subordinates had to compose a similar memorandum, there are grave doubts that they could have come up with something less inflammatory in tone or more subdued in emphasis. It is significant that the U.S. public was not allowed to read the text of this fateful diplomatic paper at that time, which would have put to the test of critical appraisal whether or not it was a tissue of lies, as Hull succeeded in getting nearly all to believe, sight unseen. (What purports to be the entire memorandum, including the 14th part, received early Sunday a.m., the 7th, can be found in *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor* [8 vols., Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, Vol. IV Appendix, pp. A-130—A-134.] This ponderous gathering of intelligence derived from the secret cracking of the Japanese "Purple" diplomatic code has finally been made available for students of the year before American entry into the Pacific War, but gives the appearance of having been well-laundered and bleached, or "sanitized," as the euphemism goes in document-verification circles.)

Memorandum #902 was decoded and in an English-language version ready for distribution around 9 p.m. the evening of Dec. 6. Now began the activities connected with its distribution. And Gen. Marshall enters the front row once more, as a prime receiver of a copy, but whom no one could locate in order to deliver

it to him. Thirteen of the fourteen parts were in, and, according to Farago, the Navy delivered six copies, typed up on official Navy message forms, to Col. Rufus S. Bratton, Chief of Army Intelligence, Far East Section. According to the procedure in effect that week, it was the Navy's job to get "Magic" (translated copies of "Purple" code intercepts) to the President, among others, while the Army was entrusted with seeing that the Secretary of State and the Chief of Staff, among others, received copies.

At this point, the story splinters and nearly disintegrates. Col. Bratton told so many conflicting stories, some of them under oath before various Pearl Harbor investigations, that they cannot be clearly understood yet. Those he told off the record in subsequent times were even more puzzling. But the upshot of them all is that he failed to encounter Gen. Marshall at all, and it is unverified that he managed to deliver a copy to anyone even close to Gen. Marshall, despite claiming that he did so in delivering a copy to the Secretary of the General Staff, Col. (later Gen.) Walter Bedell Smith. Smith later filed an affidavit in 1945 denying that he had even been in the Munitions Building when Col. Bratton allegedly arrived there and purportedly left Gen. Marshall's copy for delivery to the General when he could be located. (Smith later was to become Chief of Staff himself, in the Eisenhower presidency.)

We do know, however, that Pres. Roosevelt[1] received a copy, and we are told that he shortly thereafter frantically tried to locate Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations. Why he should have done that, if a warning to Pearl Harbor was on his mind, escapes understanding. Contacting Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, Adm. Stark's superior, might have made more sense. However, warnings to Pearl Harbor were already stipulated as having to emanate from the office of the Chief of Staff, not the Chief of Naval Operations, keeping in mind that the protection of the Fleet and the Base was the Army's job, not the Navy's. Therefore, Pres. Roosevelt should have been looking for Gen. Marshall in great agitation, not Adm. Stark, or Gen. Marshall's superior, Sec. of War Henry L. Stimson, for sure. But we do not learn from any source that Pres. Roosevelt tried to locate Gen. Marshall anytime during the night of Dec. 6, and though it was plain from the context of the 13-part message in hand that a diplomatic rupture, at least, was soon to occur, no one lifted a finger at that moment to call or wire Gen. Short in Honolulu. In view of the above, it may seem to some that it might be more fundamental to ask where Sec. of War Stimson, Gen. Marshall's superior, was during the crisis of the night of Dec. 6, and why he was not enlisted in the effort to find Gen. Marshall, to tell him of the ominous context of this latest message, and have him direct Gen. Short, and through him, Adm. Kimmel, to reverse the sabotage alert under which the Base was operating, and replace it with an *attack* alert, which was the

reverse, a wide dispersal of all important operational factors, especially planes and ships. Yet no one located Gen. Marshall all the rest of the night, either, even though Pogue tells us that an orderly was at Gen. Marshall's quarters "to take calls." In a succinct comment on the lapses of the Congressional investigation of Pearl Harbor, especially in neglecting to call at least *forty* important witnesses who could have added immensely to what we were to know about the entire event, Greaves (*Perpetual War*, p. 459) mentioned specifically this aide to Gen. Marshall, who presumably was on duty at least until 10 p.m. the night of Dec. 6, and might at least have been able to report if the General had arrived home by that time. (In later hearsay, Gen. Marshall was supposed to have been overheard telling Sen. Alben W. Barkley of the majority side of the Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack that he could not tell anyone where he had been the night of Dec. 6 because it would have got Pres. Roosevelt in trouble, meaning, presumably, the President's memory, Mr. Roosevelt having died seven months before the investigation hearings began.)

We now come to the early morning hours of Dec. 7, and the picture becomes a little more cloudy. In Mrs. Marshall's book *Together* (subtitled *Annals of an Army Wife*) she reported that the General had breakfast with her, eating from a tray at her bedside, she being indisposed as a result of breaking four ribs in an accident a few days before (the General is reported to have thought that she spent the entire day of Dec. 6 helping out at "an old-clothes sale," a rather wearying chore for someone with four broken ribs, it would seem.) She did not say anything about his whereabouts prior to the bedside breakfast. Pogue reports a different story on Marshall's breakfast, taken alone, and an hour later than usual, though both stories agree the General proceeded to go thereafter on his customary Sunday morning horseback ride, certainly one of the most fateful canters in history. We still have not been told the time this took place, and over the years we have been treated to two accounts of where it took place. The earliest generation of Administration apologists for Gen. Marshall's non-presence in his office Sunday morning, when everyone was allegedly looking for him, explained that he had been riding in Rock Creek Park, and those who knew nothing about this place were led to assume that it was so inaccessible that while there the General was virtually incommunicado. But that was soon blown away after the publication of the booklet *Pearl Harbor* (1946) by Charles Sweeny, one of the earliest skeptics over the entire Pearl fable. Sweeny pointed out that Rock Creek Park was really little more than "a narrow gully" running through "the heart of the residential district of Washington," and that it was only a half mile wide, with all its trails clearly visible

from its ridges. A courier from the War Department could probably have contacted Gen. Marshall in a few minutes, using a motorcycle. But this account quietly shifted a later years, the ride then supposedly taking place on the Virginia side of the Potomac, and presumably occupying 50 minutes or more, according to the General's later recollections, as recorded by Pogue (*Ordeal and Hope*, p. 227).

It was followed by a return to quarters, a shower and dressing prior to the trip to the Munitions Building office. When did all this take place? It would seem that it would have had to have happened quite early. Though the Administration apologia had Gen. Marshall appearing at his office only at around 11:20 a.m., two other officers in sworn testimony declared they had seen him or were in his company in his office or that of someone else well before that time. Commander (later Adm.) Arthur N. McCollum, head of Naval Intelligence's Far Eastern desk, twice declared, once under oath, that the General, accompanied by an aide, had come to Adm. Stark's office around 9 a.m., and Col. (later Gen.) John R. Deane asserted he saw Gen. Marshall in the latter's office an hour later. However, the official legend rolls on, and in Pogue's masterpiece of official chronicling we find Gen. Marshall leisurely wandering on to the premises close to 11:30, a story dating back to the very first efforts at fabricating an innocent record for the Chief of Staff. By that time he was presumably the *last* of ten prominent political and military figures to read the Japanese Memorandum #902 *in toto*, something which Pogue thinks is almost commendatory (one may leave out here the possibility suggested by revisionists that Gen. Marshall's casual attitude toward this critically-important document, with its sophisticated implications of a state of war immediately impending, was due to his already having read it, or at least its first 13 parts, sometime in the previous evening.) Nevertheless, the tale told in the closing four pages of Pogue's chapter 10, "The Fatal Week," in *Ordeal and Hope*, is one of such unbelievable ignorance and innocence on the part of Gen. Marshall that one can conclude that perhaps it is a version of the past intended for a child's history of this grim and dramatic morning.

The picture that Pogue leaves with us, of a composed, almost diffident General Marshall, making his measured way about among several agitated, loud-speaking and near-hysteric subordinates and associates, is indeed charming, but the aspect involving his attitude of mystification as to the significance of the Japanese memorandum's content and further puzzlement over the import of the delivery-time of 1 p.m. at the State Department strikes especially hollow. If there was one man in the land who knew more of what the situation was all about than Gen. Marshall, it would be a prodigious task to pick him out. The direction

of the Administration's entire drive since late July, 1941 was obvious to many who hardly knew anything about American statecraft, diplomacy and intelligence, let alone one who had total access to the entire substance of Japanese confidential discourse and planning. The circumstances of late morning, Dec. 7, 1941, were such that hardly anyone in Gen. Marshall's position would have labored and pondered more than a minute over the implications of this lengthy piece of "Magic" in his hands.

The insubstantial portrait of Gen. Marshall at this critical moment clashes in total contradiction with that revealed nearly a quarter of a century later by Robert Sherrod, who attained great prominence as a combat reporter in the Pacific War on a par with Clark Lee and Ernie Pyle. Sherrod, in his memoir in the symposium *I Can Tell It Now* (New York: Dutton, 1964),[2] disclosed a completely different Marshall, who called together a very secret meeting of seven trusted Washington correspondents early in the morning of Saturday, Nov. 15, 1941, just over three weeks before the attack on Hawaii. Gen. Marshall explained that his purpose in calling together this hush-hush seance was to tell the attendants that the U.S. was "on the brink of war with Japan," (this was a week and half before Sec. of State Hull's brusque "ultimatum"), and that America's position prior to it was "highly favorable," because "We know what they know about us, and they don't know that we know it," a roundabout way of telling the reporters the consequences of "Magic," but concealing from them that the Japanese diplomatic traffic divulged that they were vigorously seeking an accomodation with the U.S.A., and trying their best to escape involvement in a war with America. And Gen. Marshall further seemingly outlined to them Adm. Kimmel's real mission at Pearl Harbor by confiding to them that "We are preparing for an offensive war against Japan."

But when one reads Sherrod's account in its entirety, it reveals a Marshall so abysmally ignorant of the realities of Pacific geography that one may wonder what was going on in the War Plans Division under his trusted underling, Gen. Leonard T. Gerow. When questioned by one of his handkpicked journalists as to what part the Navy was scheduled to play in this coming offensive war against Japan, Sherrod quoted Gen. Marshall as saying, " 'the grand strategy doesn't include the use of much naval force.' " Gen. Marshall, said Sherrod, stated that "he believed that our [the Army's] bombers could do the trick against Japan's Navy and Japan's cities 'without the use of our shipping.' " Were Sherrod not such a trusted member of the official reportage team and rewarded so many times for his faithful description of the war later on in harmony with official guidelines, one would be

inclined to think he was out to make Marshall appear to be a simpleton. Nevertheless, Sherrod's "Secret Conference With General Marshall" (in *I Can Tell It Now*, pp. 41-42) described someone which makes one wonder a bit about who Forrest Pogue was limning on pages 228 to 231 of *Ordeal and Hope*.

But, as has been observed before, someone in his position with his knowledge of the total situation should have issued an attack alert both to Hawaii and the Philippines some 14 hours earlier, by the fastest means available. A rather feeble excuse in Gen. Marshall's behalf, that he eschewed the scrambler telephone on his desk because he did not want to run the risk of being intercepted by Japanese electronic surveillance, does not wash. There was no indication whatever that the Japanese had broken any American code (Marshall had boasted to the reporters about Japanese ignorance of American secrets three weeks before), and, furthermore, making recourse to commercial telegraph cable was certainly no better guarantee of confidentiality. The odds in favor of suspecting that RCA might already have been tapped were far higher than that the scrambler telephone ran such a risk. In any case, the real issue was the several thousands of American lives being jeopardized; new codes can always be structured. But Japanese discovery of defense precautions being taken in Hawaii would surely have led to the calling off of the attack.

In this matter it may be pertinent to inquire if Gen. Marshall violated Army regulations by failing to send such an important message by *multiple* means of transmission, in addition to waiting until the last moment. The one chosen, the slowest available, resulted in the ultimate futility. There has long been a suspicion among people intimate with the Pearl Harbor affair that this action alone by Gen. Marshall was the tip-off that something extremely important was at stake, and that the incredible slowness in warning the Base was not just a happenstance.

The story from this point on has been told many times and does not need to be gone over exhaustively. The lethargic response to the Japanese message, with the additional intelligence that it would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1 p.m., and the final realization of the significance of that, and then the sending out of a "warning" to Pearl Harbor, by the slowest method available short of homing pigeon, which arrived to Gen. Short after the attack had already concluded, is embalmed in our folklore.

A carefully-plotted-out excuse for Gen. Marshall has been expertly constructed over the years, though little of it holds up under criticism based on facts. Administration apologists have been able to produce an explanation for almost everything, especially the circumstances surrounding the sending of the last

message to the Hawaiian command, circumstances which are far from clear and straightforward. In a re-examination of this it is clear that a large part of the total account demands another look, and a consideration of previously skimped, or ignored or avoided facts and implications.

It is acknowledged by Pogue and others that the famous "warning" of Nov. 27 which ordered Gen. Short, in liaison with Adm. Kimmel, to put Pearl Harbor on a sabotage alert, was not prepared by Marshall at all, the General being in South Carolina observing Army maneuvers that day. Its authors were the Secretary of War, Stimson, and Gen. Gerow, Chief of the Army War Plans Division, who apparently was responsible for attaching Gen. Marshall's name to the message, for years assumed to be an authentic signature.

In later years, this message, and that of Dec. 7 also addressed to the Hawaiian Army commander, universally attributed to Gen. Marshall, attracted the critical attention of the famed Navy intelligence officer, Capt. Safford, a central figure in the controversies aroused over the 13-part and "East Wind Rain" Japanese intercepts. Capt. Safford became a student of serious insights into the Pearl Harbor story, and was the key figure in stimulating Adm. Kimmel in taking up his own vigorous defense after having been made the "goat" of the Hawaii fiasco by the clever dissimulation of the cover-up diversionary artists working in behalf of whitewashing the Administration's favorites and pets.

It was Capt. Safford's firm view, after comparing the message of Nov. 27 with that of Dec. 7, that Gen. Marshall had not composed either of them. Utilizing the tools of internal criticism, he noted four separate particulars in which the two messages were almost identical in composition, not to mention the vague and civilian-like construction of both, which he ascribed to Sec. of War Stimson.

In a long 15-page single-spaced typed memorandum which he wrote with Commander Charles C. Hiles, and distributed to a fairly wide circle of interested revisionist students in the late winter and early spring of 1963, accompanied by a copy of his letter to Dr. Barnes of Feb. 1, 1963, Capt. Safford scrutinized the two messages in detail (Exhibits #36 and #61, respectively, as reproduced in the Joint Congressional Committee Proceedings of the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack), the first from Part 14, p. 1393, a better copy of which was Exhibit #15 of the Clarke investigation hearings, Part 34, pages 182-183, and Part 15, page 1640.

The latter, the Dec. 7, 1941 message, was not the version previously introduced, but was the *transmission* copy of the message, Capt. Safford emphasized, and that as Exhibit #61 it marked

the only time he believed it ever appeared in the entire investigatory proceedings. He called attention to the clearly legible pencilled notations on the Clarke #15 photostatted version, which listed the times-and-places order of transmission, definitively listing Hawaii as fourth, and last, and not third (the official line), thus putting the location most likely to be struck by a sunrise attack last in order of notification. (1 p.m. Washington time was also about the same. Canal Zone time, the first notified, a very poor time for a sneak attack, while it was midnight, Manila time, the second notified, utterly out of the question as far as a carrier-based aircraft attack was concerned. Why they took precedence over Honolulu, where it would be 7:30 a.m., an ideal time for such an attack that time of the year, was what aroused Capt. Safford's questioning of the adequacy of this "warning.")

In support of his contention that not only did Gen. Marshall have no part in the construction of the fateful war "warning" of Dec. 7, 1941 but was not even on the premises housing his office when the message in question was filed for transmission in the War Department Signals Room, Capt. Safford called attention to the stumbling responses to questions by Major Edward C. French, in charge of the message Center, before the Clarke investigation on Sept. 28, 1944 (JCC Proceedings, Part 34, pp. 32-33.) The gist of this was that there was no proof Gen. Marshall was present when the efforts were made to get a legible copy of the "Warning" for telegraphic transmission.

The above material may be peripheral to the topic of this extended commentary on the story which has grown around the whereabouts and activities of Gen. Marshall in the 24 hours prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, but that does not render it insignificant. And all such labors have been systematically minimized and defused over the years by official apologists skilled at creating diversionary obfuscation. Probably the best example of such is Roberta Wohlstetter's *Pearl Harbor* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), ostensibly prepared, as Dr. Barnes suggested, with the assistance of the RAND Corporation think-tank and the presumable support of related networks of "mega-death intellectuals" fashionable 20 years ago.

In a somewhat different tactical exercise, this was also the fate of the "East Wind, Rain" Execute, in the course of which incredible efforts were undertaken to discredit repeated testimony even on the part of Admirals who testified under oath that it had been received by the Navy. Here the device was employed of getting their inferiors in rank to declare *they* had not seen the transmission copies. (The battery of people recruited to diminish the credibility of Captain Safford in this case was indeed a revelation. The shameful roundelay of witnesses changing their sworn

testimony under the frantic pressure of armed service legal officers, ultimately leaving Capt. Safford alone in maintaining that a Winds Execute had been received Dec. 4 and translated copies widely circulated, is a very dismal story. The 14th and 15th chapters of George Morgenstern's *Pearl Harbor* [New York: Devin-Adair, 1947] is still the best account of this sad affair. The plain implication is that several higher-ups, with knowledge of this impending break in diplomatic relations between the Japanese Empire and the U.S.A., had violated their trust in failing to place American bases all over the world on an attack alert despite possession of this crucial information.)

In a further consideration in this exploratory commentary, is there any significance in the observation that, among retired principals involved in the Pearl Harbor business who later became engaged in revisionist investigations, almost all of them have been from the *Navy*? Admirals Standley, Kimmel, Theobald and Tolley, Commander Hiles, Captains Safford and Rochefort, and the expert testimony of Captain Alwyn Kramer and Admiral McCollum, stand out.

Nor should one omit from this group of retired Navy revisionists on Pearl Harbor the celebrated Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, who actually carried out a mock attack on Pearl Harbor uncannily similar to what the Japanese brought about, but some nine years earlier than they. In war games testing the Hawaii defenses, Adm. Yarnell, with a task force consisting of two aircraft carriers, four destroyers and 152 aircraft, launched an air assault 30 minutes before dawn on Sunday, Feb. 7, 1932 from sea about 60 miles from Oahu, coming in from the northeast, as did the Japanese Navy planes nine years later. The referees of the war games ruled that Adm. Yarnell's action caught the Base entirely by surprise, and theoretically sank every ship in the harbor and destroyed every Army warplane on the ground.

Adm. Yarnell was one of the very first and very enthusiastic reviewers of Morgenstern's *Pearl Harbor* and similarly commended the joint contributors to the *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* symposium, edited by Barnes. In a letter to Barnes, Dec. 16, 1953, Adm. Yarnell warmly congratulated them on their work, and said, "If the efforts of yourself and others could only succeed in your efforts to break down the Iron Curtain of dictated literature, it will do much to save our nation."

As against Navy busyness, there is no comparable output of publication, research and testimony from Army figures, despite occasional oblique contributions such as those by Gen. Douglas MacArthur's intelligence chief in the East Asian sector, Gen. Elliot R. Thorpe, and the strangely-unexploited commentary attributed to Gen. Clarke of May 4, 1961 in a widely circulated

manuscript report by Professor Charles Callan Tansill, about which more later.

Could this preponderance of critics in one branch of the armed services have been an unconscious resentful response to the realization that the Navy had been unconscionably smeared with responsibility for the fiasco in Hawaii, via a process which had at the same time taken the Army, the real responsible entity for the safety and security of the Base, off the hook? Especially irritating must have been the extenuating circumstances found for excusing the top figures of the Administration, the War Department, including the Secretary, the Chief of Staff, his subordinates, and nearly everyone else related to them, while allowing Gen. Short to be thrown to the wolves as a diversion and a specious gesture of "objectivity" in spreading and allocating responsibility around a bit. The exception in this matter is of course the findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, whose deliberations began in July, 1944 and whose secret report was not made until after the end of the war in Europe in May, 1945. This report heavily involved the Secretary of State, Hull, the Chief of Staff, Gen. Marshall, and his War Plans head, Gen. Gerow, citing them for delinquency in failing to keep the Hawaiian command informed as to what was going on and, as Greaves put it (*Perpetual War*, p. 424), pointedly mentioning Gen. Marshall as responsible "for the fact that the Army was not prepared to defend the Fleet on the morning of December 7, 1941."

But the APHB noticeably omitted Gen. Marshall's superior from the list of responsibles neglectful of their duties: could it have been because Sec. of War Stimson had brought their investigation into existence in the first place, and making them loath and tender when it came to the subject of criticizing the man at the head of all of them? Though the central matter in this essay concerns those aspects of the Pearl Harbor subject related to Gen. Marshall, it becomes clear to almost anyone pursuing the literature surrounding the entire matter that the General's superior, Sec. Stimson, was an even more sacred cow when it came to pressing him for information. Sec. Stimson reportedly suffered a heart attack the day he was scheduled to testify before the congressional investigation, and did not recover until it was all over. He answered only in part the questions submitted to him in writing, and largely escaped the barrage of light and sound that was directed at all the main characters in the cast which took part in that fateful event.

Sec. Stimson, a sophisticated and veteran Japanophobe who gave away points in this department to no one, not even the implacable Stanley K. Hornbeck, of the Far East desk of the State Department, has been documented by several historians as an

enthusiast for war in the Pacific against Japan even when he was Pres. Herbert C. Hoover's Secretary of State, leaving office early in 1933. His reappearance as Pres. Roosevelt's Secretary of War seven years later found him still of the same view.

And historian-apologists have been pushed to the limits of their abilities in explaining away that painful entry in his diary for Nov. 25, 1941, just two days before he sent out over Gen. Marshall's signature the famous sabotage alert to Hawaii with its mixture of "dos" and "don'ts" to Gen. Short (it was Capt. Safford's view that the "dos" were Stimson's and the "don'ts" were Gen. Gerow's, "like a duet in grand opera.") Whatever may be the truth, this famous diary entry, which became part of the public record which has stuck in the craw of every official apologist for the last 35 years, discussed a White House strategy meeting, and included the following: "The question was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves." As much paper and ink has been spent in trying to denature this remark and to mollify the quizzical as to its import, and to tell us what Sec. Stimson "really meant" here, as used to be expended by Marxian zealots trying to tell us what Marx "really meant" by various bits of his much more murky and tangled prose in one or another semi-intelligible book. (It was ironic that U.S. forces fired the first shot anyway, the Navy sinking a Japanese submarine at the entry to the Harbor well before the air attack came on the Base.)

A constant in the whitewash-blackout defense of Rooseveltian official history on the evolution of the attack on Pearl Harbor is the repeated categorical denial that there was any traffic among the armed forces, their civilian political chiefs, and the intelligence services, indicating that Hawaii was the prime, if not the *only* target in case war broke out between Japan and the U.S.A. Right down to the very hour of the bombing on Dec. 7, 1941 we find repeated statements in the defensive apologia that the attack was suspected as likely to be on half a dozen other places, even as distant as Borneo, but Pearl is pointedly left out as a locus for concern. A favorite distraction of the diversionists is the Philippines, though what American forces were there which might inhibit in any way the invasion of Southeast Asia which the Japanese were simultaneously conducting is indeed a dark secret. That the Philippine-based forces could not even defend themselves for more than a few weeks was shortly demonstrated, let alone cause much trouble for Japan south and west of there.[3] It was the American Fleet in Hawaii that represented the only assistance the European colonial powers could expect in their effort to retain their grip on Singapore, Malaysia, what is now

known as Indonesia, and the former French colonies now known as Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. But posing the Philippines as where the Administration expected an attack (precious little was done to frustrate one) distracts the inquisitive, and partially satisfies the hope that the latter will come to share the simulated surprise and conclude that this innocence pose in genuine.

In actuality, the strong possibility that the war might start with a Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor was a subject of heavy discourse, officially, in January and February, 1941. Navy Sec. Knox dispatched a four-page letter to Army Sec. Stimson on January 24, which became part of the record of the Roberts Commission investigating the attack, in December, 1941—January, 1942. But few people have ever seen it or bothered to read it. This letter was entirely devoted, not to just a vague speculation on the possibility of attack *somewhere*, as one would gather from the preliminary remarks in Vol. 1 of the Defense Department's 1977 compilation, *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor* (p. 1), but to a single topic, the likelihood of a bombing and torpedo plane attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet while it was berthed at Pearl Harbor. Sec. Knox began by declaring that the "security of the U.S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor" had been under consideration among the Navy for several weeks prior to his letter, long before U.S. Ambassador Joseph Grew's much-publicized letter from Tokyo, also in January, 1941, suggesting a likely attack coming upon Hawaii.[4] Navy concern probably went back to the moving of the Fleet to Hawaii in mid-summer of 1940. Said Sec. Knox in the last sentence of his first paragraph,

> If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

Again it should be understood that Sec. Knox's long letter was devoted *in toto* to Pearl Harbor, not to Panama, Manila, the Presidio, Guam or Enderbury Island, and was responded to by Sec. Stimson on Feb. 7, 1941 in a 1½ page letter addressed to Sec. Knox, headed "Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii." Like Sec. Knox's letter of Jan. 24, there was not a word devoted to any other place except Pearl Harbor. Copies of both letters reached Chief of Naval Operations Harold R. Stark, which he acknowledged Feb. 11, while Sec. Stimson declared at the end of his reply to Sec. Knox that copies of both letters were also going to the Commanding General in Hawaii. The presumption was that the Chief of Staff, Gen. Marshall, the Hawaiian Commander's superior, would also be a recipient, though this is not specified in the postscript notation concerning other designates of copies. But Sec. Stimson would hardly have deprived his immediate subordinate of documents of this importance.

Four days later (Feb. 15, 1941), a six-page confidential letter from Adm. Kimmel from his flagship, the *USS Pennsylvania*, under the heading address "Pearl Harbor, T.H." went out to nearly everyone possibly concerned with naval affairs in Hawaii, and also was exclusively devoted to a discussion of the problems involved in guarding against the possible sabotage of the Fleet, or its protection in case "That a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor." The timing was too close to the Knox-Stimson exchange and the recognition of it by Adm. Stark to indicate anything but concordance and cooperation on Adm. Kimmel's part. (The Knox-Stimson correspondence of early 1941 and Adm. Kimmel's confidential letter to the Pacific Fleet are dealt with by Gordon Prange in his book *Tora! Tora! Tora!* [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963], but in an obfuscatory manner. It might be pointed out that Joint Chiefs of Staff position papers throughout the 1920s and 1930s reveal repeated concern about a possible attack by Imperial Japan upon Pearl Harbor.)

It is in the light of the above, and because of the above, that Sec. Knox's 19-page double-spaced typewritten "Report by the Secretary of the Navy to the President" is such a sorry commentary, in effect suggesting the defensive neglect all around was so grave and encompassing, that one finds it hard to comprehend what he is trying to establish. Handed to Pres. Roosevelt personally by Sec. Knox the eveing of Dec. 14, 1941 on his return from Hawaii (the President endorsed it in his own handwriting, "Given me by F.K. 10 p.m. Dec. 14 when he landed here from Hawaii"), the report on what had happened at Pearl a week earlier crawled with inaccuracies, especially in the parts dealing with non-combat aspects. One obvious concession was Sec. Knox's willingness to saddle the Navy with a large part of the blame, "due to a lack of a state of readiness against such an air attack by both branches of the service," a half-*non sequitur*, since this ignored the Army's primary responsibility for protecting the Fleet and the entire Base.

But what was immensely intriguing was Sec. Knox's declaration, also on the first page of his report, that a "message of warning" had been sent to Gen. Short from the War Department in Washington at midnight, Dec. 6, a warning which did not reach him, as he told Sec. Knox, until after even the warning sent under Gen. Marshall's signature around noon the following day. It would be of great interest to know who sent that warning from Washington at midnight, Dec. 6, and what it consisted of. Since no one could locate Gen. Marshall and since Col. Bratton testified that his superior, Gen. Sherman Miles of Army Intelligence, told him not to try to find him any longer after 11:30 p.m. that night,

the sender of this warning must surely be a mysterious entity, if not ectoplasm. There is no account of anyone in authority in the War Department being awake at midnight, Dec. 6, 1941. No one credited Sec. Stimson with this action, and undoubtedly no subordinate of Gen. Marshall would have dared to do so without the General's permission. One may be induced to ruminate over whether this actually happened, or were both Gen. Short and Sec. Knox involved in a substantial error?

Sec. Knox seemed to be befuddled on the reason for the Hawaii Base being still on a sabotage alert, at the time of the attack, failing to recall that this was precisely what the two commanders had been ordered to do on Nov. 27, and had not been ordered to do anything different after that date. Another question comes up: why had not the men responsible for the defense of the Fleet and the Base, Sec. Stimson and Gen. Marshall, been sent to Honolulu by the President to conduct an investigation? Sec. Knox should have been third in line, along with Adm. Stark, for such an assignment. However, his mission there alone, with the Army men not participating, further spread the impression, false but probably desired, that it was the Navy, which had sustained by far the largest part of the damage, which had been the delinquent in its protection, rather than the Army. This is how it worked out in terms of public relations and propaganda, and the traditional accounts to this day reflect this bias.

Knox, crediting Japanese espionage with informing their attacking forces of the precise location of the American ships, for obvious reasons did not give the slightest hint that American intelligence was well aware of this traffic via "Magic" intercepts for many months, though here he may have been in the dark himself as a result of the failure to communicate this "need-to-know" information to him. An examination of the majority of the actual copies of the "Magic" intercepts received ultimately by the Navy, though liberally covered with rubber stamps "Army," "Top Secret," "Ultra," and others, also reveals a rubber stamp legend, "Records of Naval Communications do not indicate transmittal of this specific information to authorities in Hawaii." One may conclude that, knowing Sec. Knox's reputation for integrity, this "specific information" never reached the Navy in Washington, either, and he simply did not know about all this.

To cap it all off, Sec. Knox omitted making the faintest reference to his four-page warning letter to Sec. Stimson early in 1941 of the need to develop a plan to defend Pearl Harbor specifically from a Japanese attack. And, of course, there is no indication of anyone's knowledge of the growing desperation in Japan as a result of the accelerating economic pinch caused by the global economic warfare against Japan by the Western colonial powers, also plainly discussed by the Japanese diplomatic service in the

"Magic" intercepts of the late fall of 1941. (Especially pertinent here are the November, 1941 intercepts reproduced in Vol. IV Appendix of *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor.*)

This aspect of the Pacific crisis is systematically neglected by the fuglemen of Anglo-American innocence, the increasing economic warfare carried out against the Japanese after the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting off Newfoundland in August, 1941. On October 23, the U.S. Commerce Department reported that Japanese raw material shortages had become so acute as a result of stepped-up curtailment that Japanese trade with a number of its biggest customers had virtually stopped, and that shipping to and trade with the U.S., the British Empire and the Netherlands East Indies had become almost "non-existent." (New York *Times*, October 24, 1941, p. 36). On December 1, the National Industrial Conference Board published a work titled "The Effects of the Allied Economic Blockade on Japan," in which it stated that normal Japanese imports of raw materials covering not only war supplies but necessities for the civilian population had been reduced by about 75%, and cited a report of the Chinese News Service that Japan was "on the verge of economic collapse." (New York *Times*, December 2, 1941, p. 6.) And in the *Congressional Record*, 77th Congress, Second Session, December 8, 1942, Rep. Jeanette Rankin of Montana, the only member of Congress who had refused to vote for a declaration of war on Japan the previous year on that date, remarked that near the same day as the NICB report on Japanese economic desperation was published the previous year, a "prominent non-Japanese Oriental" had told her that the situation in the Pacific was not only "serious," but that "Japan has no choice but to go to war or to submit to economic slavery for the rest of her existence." General information of this nature, if widely read and understood, might have made possible an appreciation of another reason for Pearl Harbor other than the simpleminded explanation fed into public discourse for the purpose of maximizing patriotic sentiments and nationalistic outrage and hatred.

The veteran reporter, political analyst and commentator for the New York *Times*, Arthur Krock, made a glancing remark in his memoirs (*Sixty Years on the Firing Lines*) about the "posse of apologists" who made a veritable industry out of "explaining away" all the disjointed irregularities in the Roosevelt Administration's conduct of affairs in the months prior to the Pearl Harbor bombing. In actuality, Krock's "posse" grew over the last 40 years to comprise a multitudinous constabulary. No defensive apologetic effort in American history has been so extensive or sustained as that which has sought to perfume Mr. Roosevelt and his eager-for-war regime, and how they eventually got it, while

seeking to banish all criticism and suspicion of their role in this disaster.[5]

However, the more this industriousness in behalf of Administration purity and innocence branches out, the more tenacious grows the conviction that the total situation seen in the light of over 35 years of revelations, exposures and discoveries confirms the reverse, and the belief hardens that a gigantic camouflage diversion has taken place instead, succeeding in part at least in diverting attention from many basic disagreeable and distressing facts, while seeking to encourage favorable consideration of an evasive mollification.

As the people involved die (very few of the participants and principals in that great drama are still alive), and as the documents either vanish, one by one, or are declared never to have existed, there will tend to precipitate out a vague narrative steering its readers into accepting a genteel and respectable Establishment whitewash. But the anti-Establishment's counterstory will hardly give ground for that reason. The former's eyewash may appear to have won the day, if one considers the simple tales told the youth, to this time still nearly clean of any reconciliation with the contradictory material placed on the record by their adversaries, the revisionists. But it is unlikely that the latter will disappear or go away, or abandon the field, in the future. It is just as possible that the efforts to modify or demolish the Establishment monolith will be augmented instead. For there are many in close accord with the observations of Joseph D. Harrington, the author of *Yankee Samurai* (1979), who maintained that challenging the *official* accounts of *everything* was not only a "civic responsibility" but also "great fun."

A Pertinent Postscript on the "Winds" Message Affair

When the Japanese Foreign Office sent out Circular #2353 Nov. 19, 1941, advising their embassy and consular people in Washington and presumably a number of other places in the world of the possible coming announcement of the suspension of diplomatic relations with any of three other countries, it was sent in Purple code, which they believed no one had deciphered. Early in December, the 1st and 2nd, all materials and machines connected with handling Purple were ordered destroyed. Therefore, when the decision was made to break relations and go to war with the U.S.A. on Dec. 4, the decision buried within a radio newscast disguised as a pre-arranged false weather report, the Foreign Office sent it out in Japanese Morse Code, which made its transmission and subsequent understanding quite simple to all. Believing that the confidential message informing intended recipients what HIGASHI NO KAZE AME would mean in this context

was still a secret, its execution would therefore excite no suspicion among non-Japanese interceptors, while widespread dissemination, repeatedly, would guarantee that few if any of those for whom it was intended would miss it. The official American line is and has been that though Circular #2353 was intercepted, the "execute" was not.

The editors of the world-known Tokyo newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*, in their book *The Pacific Rivals* (New York: Weatherhill, 1972, p. 91), declare that the "Easterly wind, rain" message was "flashed repeatedly" at the direction of Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo. But the defenders of official innocence here have made a convention out of denying that it was received here no matter how often it was sent out, or that it was received in a garbled form which made it unintelligible, or that it was too ambiguous to be construed as a coded message indicating a definite decision of Japan to go to war with the U.S.A. Furthermore, if received, it could not have been of any real assistance to American intelligence because it had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor. This latter line apparently is based on the notion that the Winds Execute should have been accompanied by a map of the naval and military installations in Hawaii, in order to be taken seriously.

The smugness about and surefooted dismissal of this critical issue has especially characterized the approach of the Roosevelt defense squad since the publication of Mrs. Wohlstetter's book in 1962, and is reflected in the official publication of the "Magic" intercepts beginning in 1977 by the Defense Department, described above. This massive multi-volume work, weighing 20 pounds, escapes mention of the subject entirely, except for a repetition of a 1945 commentary which passed over the matter airily as of no consequence.

However, before we move on from the Winds Execute matter, one more contribution should be made to the subject which should shake the official diversion specialists and the "blackout" and "blurout" (to use Barnes' terms) exponents, and bring into focus again Capt. Safford's stubborn position on the reception and wide distribution of this message. What time has effected should make all the scoffers at Capt. Safford stand back a bit (even the would-be revisionist book on Pearl Harbor by Bruce R. Bartlett, *Cover-Up: The Politics of Pearl Harbor, 1941-1946* [New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1978], contains a malicious sally at Capt. Safford in the manner of Pogue that would have done justice to the work of any "blackout boy," from the original old masters, Morison, Millis, Feis, Bailey, Perkins or Rauch, to any of the undistinguished non-entities of the current scene.)

On March 11, 1980 there was declassified and placed in the National Archives Document SRH-051, in Record Group 457, a

"sanitized" version of a 17-page typewritten interview, January 13, 1977, conducted by Raymond Schmidt, a historian with the Naval Security Group (since reassigned to the National Security Agency), with Ralph T. Briggs. Briggs, chief watch supervisor at the Naval Communications Station at Cheltenham, Maryland in December, 1941, related in detail his interception of the Winds Execute message the evening of Dec. 4.[6] He went on to relate his transmission of it to Naval Communications in Washington by teletype, the message also being delivered later by pouch. He also stated that he entered this interception of the false weather report, HIGASHI NO KAZE AME, in his log sheet of intercepted messages.

Briggs added the sensational information that this log sheet, presumed by all to have been destroyed sometime during the war, had survived, and that he had come across it himself between 1960 and 1962 while he was officer in charge of Naval World War II intelligence and "crypto" archives. He described his verification of the time of receipt on the log sheet, and said, "I then made a written entry on the upper right hand margin of this log sheet concerning the fact that I, as officer in charge, on the date in question, had sighted and verified that this was a recorded original entry of the Winds execute message."

Briggs then returned the log sheet to the files without making a copy, from which point it presumably went into Naval Security Group archives. It is believed that Brigg's log has been rediscovered by NSG, and that it is possible copies have been made available to favored personages, though others seeking it have been thus far stonewalled in their efforts also to get access to it.

The puzzling aspect of all this is the silence of Capt. Safford for so many years on Briggs. It might be explained that Brigg's existence was known to revisionists as well since 1945-46, yet the failure of a single work on Pearl Harbor to mention even his name is fully as mystifying. Briggs relates in his interview with Dr. Schmidt that Capt. Safford had contacted him and that the possibility of his testifying before the Congressional investigation had been discussed by them four or five times. Briggs stated that he was not averse to this, but that he was eventually ordered by his superior at the Cheltenham installation, a Capt. John Harper, that he was not to testify, nor was he to continue meeting with Capt. Safford. (Briggs stated that Capt. Harper was very disturbed when he ordered him, Briggs, to remain silent about this subject; it would be most interesting to discover how far up the chain of command Capt. Harper's orders could be located.)

It is strange that no revisionist ever asked Capt. Safford where his operation, on Nebraska Avenue in Washington, got their copy of the raw intercept of the Winds Execute. They were not an

intercept station, and obviously had to get it from someone. That Cheltenham had made the intercept was a matter of record among all, but how it got from there to Capt. Safford's team, and Capt, Alwyn Kramer, under whom the translated copies were prepared for distribution, was never explained by anyone. The Briggs interview furnishes us with this missing piece.

In a similar manner, the famed luncheon of May 4, 1961 involving Gen. Carter W. Clarke, Gen. Bonner Fellers and Prof. Tansill, during which other materials relating to Winds Execute were revealed, never became utilized by an writers of revisionist persuasion, then or later, even by Prof. Tansill himself. Though a 4-page single-spaced typed copy of Tansill's notes has circulated for nearly 20 years, it has not been employed in any context, to this writer's knowledge. Gen. Clarke, Deputy Chief of the Military Intelligence Service, was reported by Prof. Tansill to have declared that the Winds Execute was picked up also by the Coast and Geodetic Survey Station at Mobile, Alabama and sent on to Washington the following day.

The next move is up to the official defenders and the salvagers of prior legends of ignorance and innocence. But the publication of Ralph T. Briggs' January, 1977 interview and his December, 1941 message reception log should take place at the same time the next obfuscatory campaign is made to wrap up the Winds Execute in impenetrable diversionary irrelevance and historical bafflegab.

DOCUMENT

No. 148

From: Tokyo
To: Washington

November 19, 1941
Circular 2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency, (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger—HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (East Wind rain).

(2) Japan-USSR relations—KITANOKAZE KUMORI (North Wind cloudy).

(3) Japan-British relations—NISHI NO KAZE HARE (West Wind clear).

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and last sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Trans. 11-28-41

Above from p. A-81 of *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor*, Vol. IV Appendix (8 vols., Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1977).

Notes

*It is not the purpose of this essay to try to condense in this much space the entire story of Pearl Harbor. This is a task which has eluded more than a score of writers who have tried to do it in large books. The principal objective here is to concentrate on the drama of the ten days, and especially the last 24 hours, prior to the outbreak of war between the U.S.A. and Japan following the attack of the latter on Hawaii December 7, 1941. It is intended to be read in conjunction with this writer's essay, "Pearl Harbor: Antecedents, Background, and Consequences" (in *The Saga of Hog Island and Other Essays in Inconvenient History* [Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles Publisher, 1977], pp. 114-131). The essay at hand was inspired as a follow-up to a single sentence in the former (9th line from bottom, p. 122), where something of the larger picture of U.S.A.-Japanese relations was one of the principal concerns.

The course and collapse of the diplomatic talks between the American and Japanese governments between September and late November, 1941 is the real backdrop of the account here narrated, with emphasis on what are new or previously unstressed aspects of the happenings from November 26 through December 7. Analysis of the fine points of the diplomatic presentations dealing with the Far Eastern situation is also of secondary consideration at this stage. Partisans of the rival positions may quarrel over the rightness or wrongness of them for a long time. But Americans had the upper hand in these conversations, by dint of cracking the Japanese diplomatic code of highest priority, "Purple," having made it possible to read their adversary's ideas and secrets while at the same time keeping theirs from Japanese scrutiny. The foundering of the talks over differences on China policy can be blamed as easily on the Roosevelt Administration as on the Japanese, even if neither side were ready to make any substantial concessions to the other on this specific point. But, in retrospect, what the Roosevelt partisans wanted in East Asia was never implemented, even after winning a war, and probably could never have been implemented, unless it was preferred that there be a solidly-Communist Far East at the conclusion, which does not seem to have been expected by the short-view politicians. But such a possibility was plain to see prior to the war, and a Red East Asia was certainly no political improvement over a Japanese-dominated East Asia as it was in 1941. As the near-total destruction of the European colonial system in East Asia and the Pacific, the succoring of which was jointly a high Roosevelt original priority, also swiftly followed the immense Communist encroachment from 1945 onward, one can hardly look upon the "New Order" thereafter as something to take much pride in, and the later wars over real estate still in dispute from the Pacific War, in Korea and Viet Nam, have certainly added emphasis to this observation.

A thousand evasions of this political reality are possible and many of them have been paraded by us over the years, including the revival of such primitive ones as the bogus indignation over, and the necessity to destroy, the allegedly unequalled political sin of unique Japanese "militarism" (for the past 20 years our politicians and journalists have

whined and stewed that the Japanese are lamentably too *anti*-militaristic). So the problem is an endemic one, and may be centuries in existence prior to satisfactory resolution, a matter deeply imbedded in our total situation. As good a statement as one is likely to find in so few words on the remaining difficulty is that of the late William L. Neumann:

> "Good patriot, bad historian," a comment first made in regard to Poggio Bracciolini, author of *Eight Books of Florentine History*, can all too often be applied to modern historians as well. Enveloped in nationalism, that omnipresent malaise of the modern world, the scholar has made little progress toward his commonly proclaimed goal of objectivity when his subject has involved the interests of his own nation or its enemies.

(Neumann, "World War I Revisionist," in Arthur Goddard, ed., *Harry Elmer Barnes, Learned Crusader: The New History in Action* [Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, Publisher, 1968], p. 261.)

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1. Lewis Carroll's fantasy character who suggested salutary consequences might follow in developing the ability to believe six impossible things before breakfast probably had an unconscious impact upon establishment official writers of Roosevelt Administration innocence in developing their version of the Pearl Harbor story. *In toto* they eventually gathered together somewhat more than six, but the most imaginative of all, perhaps, was the fable the Roosevelt rarely if ever saw the "Magic" intercept transcripts, despite being first on the list of intended recipients via the joint Army-Navy delivery system. This has been advanced with the airy and casual aplomb of someone reporting that it is raining outside. When placed against the many-times-told account of the delivery to the President of the "Magic" intercept of the first thirteen parts of the Japanese Memorandum #902 shortly after 9 p.m. the evening of Dec. 6, and his agitated response upon reading it, surely it must stretch the credulity of even his most devoted self-serving partisans to the cracking point to be told this was one of his rare exposures to these English language transcripts of intercepted Japanese diplomatic intelligence traffic. Several historians of England and the British Empire have declared that the Russians in their campaigns against Napoleon conducted their intelligence service in the language of the enemy, French. This "Magic" windfall surely was the next best thing to that, and one can hardly expect the American Chief of State to be ignorant of it in the manner described by his apologists.
2. David Brown and W. Richard Bruner, eds., *I Can Tell It Now*, by members of the Overseas Press Club. Foreword by Dwight D. Eisenhower, 363 pp. New York: Dutton, 1964.

3. The Defense Department, instead of publishing the "Magic" intercepts in chronological order, or all of the traffic between any two points (e.g., Panama-Tokyo or Tokyo-Bangkok) all in one place, has arranged them in various sequences, some of which are a little fanciful or imaginative, but probably making more sense to those with mainly technical interest in the content. But one effect of this procedure, or "methodology," if one prefers contemporary cliches, is in effect the preparation of a scheme leading to a sort of history of the 15 months before Pearl by themselves, unintentional or otherwise.

   Scattered through this assemblage of what is supposed to be exclusively "Magic" derived from translated intercepts of Japanese intelligence are several pieces of American Naval communications which are not part of "Magic" at all, and seem to be inserted at strategic spots which convey the impression of being self-serving additions to the potential account which might result from using this material. Some of this may also have the intention of reinforcing the official line on innocence of Pearl Harbor being the primary attack point for the Japanese upon rupture of diplomatic relations.

   However, there is one especially interesting dispatch included (*"Magic" Background*, Vol. IV Appendix, pp. A-109/A-110) from the Chief of Naval Operations (Adm. Stark) to the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Far Eastern Fleet (Adm. Thomas C. Hart) #271442, Nov. 26, 1941, the same date as that of the State Department's "ultimatum" to Japan. This instructs Adm. Hart to wage, at the outset of a state of belligerency with Japan, *unrestricted* submarine and aerial warfare south and west of an area bounded by 7° and 30° North Latitude and 122° and 140° East Longitude. The region covered by these stipulated compass points incorporates the Philippines and the Philippine Sea, and some areas of British and Dutch interest as well, and was to be treated as a "strategic area." The unrestricted warfare was to be conducted south and west of this, presumably in the areas of the South China Sea, plus the environs of Singapore, Malaya in general, the Dutch East Indies and the region stretching into and including the Gulf of Siam (Thailand) and adjacent areas of the seacoast of the French Indo-Chinese colonies, now Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (Kampuchea).

   Adm. Hart was further instructed to work in liaison with the British and Dutch forces in defining the circumstances under which this vast region of the Far Eastern waters was to be policed, but it was especially interesting that Adm. Stark specifically cautioned Adm. Hart that in dealing with the leaders of these two other powers he was to "take care not to disclose for the present these instructions to wage unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare."

   This communication said nothing about Army cooperation or any contingency priority deriving from the Army until two days later, when Adm. Stark's #271912CR0863 informed Adm. Hart that Gen. Marshall had requested that Gen. MacArthur be informed so that the Army Air Force might "make appropriate plans" to cooperate

with this unrestricted warfare plan. (This writer has repeatedly encountered in recent years individuals who reflect a faint smile and murmur, upon hearing such details of 40 years ago, "I didn't know the Army has its own air force," and must conclude that he is in the presence of someone who does not go back very far.)

We thus have additional information about American plans for southeast Asia, and further confirmation that a concerted effort to wage offensive war versus Japan was substantially envisioned well before the Hawaiian attack, as opposed to the general misconception of mindless lazing-about in huddled defensiveness a la *From Here to Eternity* in utter ignorance of the Pacific realities.

That this contingency involved deception of "allies" as to the decision to wage unrestricted submarine and aerial war in a large area of the East Asian waters is of more than casual importance, and suggests that such a change had been made by the Administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a secret decision to "revise" the arrangements previously incorporated in the Rainbow/WPL-46 understanding arrived at during the extended meetings in Singapore between January 29th and March 27th, 1941. That the Japanese had rather quickly found out about these meetings, where Rainbow had been born, has been suggested by a variety of reactions, but whether they found out about Adm. Stark's Nov. 26 message to Adm. Hart is uncertain. Constant interest in Tokyo concerning the presence and movement of U.S. submarines in Manila, in addition to news about troop movements in the Philippines and the disposition of Army fighting aircraft, accelerated in November, 1941 but in part preceded Adm. Stark's "unrestricted warfare" pronouncement. Submarines far outnumbered other U.S. Navy craft based in Manila and vicinity, and two "Purple" messages from there to Tokyo Nov. 24 and Nov. 26, intercepted by American intelligence and available for consultation in English translation a short time later, mentioned some two dozen U.S. submarines leaving Manila Bay, "destination unknown." On the general interest in submarine movement one can consult the following Japanese "Purple" dispatches: #742 (Nov. 8, 1941); #745 (Nov. 10, 1941); #757 (Nov. 14, 1941); #767 (Nov. 15, 1941; #785 (Nov. 22, 1941); #790 (Nov. 25, 1941); #805 (Nov. 29, 1941); #812 (Dec. 1, 1941). The last two were not translated until Dec. 8 according to official records but the others were available as "Magic" intercepts shortly after each of the original sending dates in question. The messages mentioned above have been reproduced in *The "Magic" Background To Pearl Harbor*, Vol. IV Appendix, pp. A-161/A-170.

In retrospect, this U.S. plan for the conducting of unrestricted submarine warfare was resolutely put into operation after Dec. 7, 1941. In a shrewd and percipient commentary on the U.S. Senate ratification of the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 by a vote of 77-0 in July, 1955, summarizing their essential futility and predicting their sure coming violation by future belligerents (so amply vindicated by what happened between 1955 and 1980), the *Chicago Tribune* ("Civilizing War," July 11, 1955) pointed out the grave Allied violation during World War II of the previous proto-

cols of this sort, especially the Hague Convention of 1907, the Washington conference of 1922, the Geneva Convention of 1928 and the London naval treaty of 1930. As to the latter the *Tribune* pointed out pithily,

> . . . the laws governing submarine warfare were clearly and precisely defined in the London naval treaty of 1930, which specified that attacks were to be confined to unmistakable men o'war, and then only after seeing to the safety of all hands. The American navy, in its official report on the submarine campaign against Japan, admitted an indiscriminate campaign in which nine of every 10 Japanese ships sunk were noncombatant vessels. Of 276,000 Japanese drowned in these attacks, 105,000 were civilians.

Among the rarest of all the narratives of history is an account of the indictment, successful prosecution and punishment of the *winners* of a war for violations of international law governing the conduct of belligerency. In the round of post-World War II trials in Germany conducted by the U.S. under Allied Control Council Law No. 10, when German defense counsel pointed out Allied breaches of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 during the war, spokesmen among the prosecutors such as Telford Taylor airily dismissed the pertinent articles of these Conventions as inapplicable to Allied behavior because they were "antiquarian." Some wry comments on such selective application of international law can be found in in such books as those by August von Knieriem, *The Nuremberg Trials* (Chicago: Regnery, 1959) and Werner Maser, *Nurnberg: Tribunal der Sieger* (Dusseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1977), rendered in fanciful English translation as *Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1979).

4. Grew's report to the State Department is undoubtedly the best-known and most widely divulged pseudo-intelligence tidbit allowed to reach the American public. This may have been an electrifying possibility to Sec. of State Hull, but could hardly have stirred much response from the Navy, which had already rehearsed two Pearl Harbor attacks on their own in simulated war games off Hawaii in the half dozen or so years prior to the outbreak of war in Europe in September, 1939. Probably picked up third hand as a consequence of drunken talk at a diplomatic cocktail party, there is an almost-comic dwelling upon its significance in the book *The Pearl Harbor Cover-Up* by Frank Schuler and Robin Moore (New York: Pinnacle Books, 1976). In parts this book reads like a brief in behalf of the pro-Maoist wing in the State Department's version of how war came in the Pacific.

What is missing from the record, to the release of the "Magic" intercepts by the Defense Department just recently, is the simultaneous war scare in the Japanese Foreign Office, a matter of even greater curiosity. On February 15, 1941 the Japanese vice-consul in Honolulu, Otohiro Okuda, dispatched his #027, which was addressed to the Foreign Ministry for routing to the General Staff and the chief of Japanese Naval Intelligence, American Section, Capt.

Kenji Ogawa. This relayed second hand information that the Roosevelt Administration would declare war on Japan sometime between the sending date and the end of the first week of March.

Since American intelligence had cracked "Purple" almost six months previous to this, it may be that Japanese intelligence in Hawaii had been victimized by the process we now call "disinformation," in an effort to determine how long it would take to be released in Japan, being able to read both transmission and return reaction with equal ease. Nothing has been made public via release of appropriate "Magic" intercepts as to how this sensational piece of non-fact was handled or whether any response was made to this manufactured war scare. In view of the mollifying press conference given by Japan's new ambassador to the U.S.A., Adm. Kichisaburo Nomura, on Feb. 20 (he had just arrived in Washington on Feb. 11), the Japanese Foreign Office seems not to have taken seriously this prediction of a war declaration by the U.S.A. Nevertheless both Japan and the U.S.A. on the highest diplomatic levels went through separate war scares in the first two months of 1941.

Whether both were the result of deliberate incitement by one another's "dis-information" agents can only be ruminated upon at this point. But there is no doubt of Japanese interest in possible U.S. Navy action in the event of a state of war during this time, as the intercepts #011 and #029 (neither of which are in the Defense Department's published collection of "Magic") attest. As one can see, these reports on ship-harbor activities in Pearl Harbor began well before the presence in Honolulu of the new Japanese consul general, Nagao Kita, who first arrived on March 14, 1941. (Though Kita's name is associated with similar reports to Japan dealing with what was going on in Pearl Harbor starting in September, it is obvious that this letter was well after a stream of "Purple" intercepts indicated that in the event of trouble between the two countries, Hawaii was a prime target for an early if not initiating attack by Japanese forces. Even Farago, in his essentially establishment-supporting book *The Broken Seal*, concedes as much. Though American intelligence never found in their interceptions of traffic of the Japanese Imperial Navy one word even hinting that Pearl Harbor might be a future target, Farago concedes, "On the other hand, 'Magic' produced this evidence actually in abundance, from February 15, 1941, until the morning of the attack.") (*The Broken Seal*, p. 167.)

5. Some idea of the richness of the obscurantism and diversionary genius now applied to the Pearl Harbor epic as we approach the 40th anniversary of the attack can be derived especially from fairly current histories of wartime intelligence. Especially revealing is how the subject is handled in William R. Carson's *The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire* (New York: Dial/James Wade, 1977, pp. 151-159). After a brief treatment excoriating those who reject the official establishment line as "isolationists" enamored of "conspiratorial" fixations, Carson manages to sketch out the layers of camouflage which have been laid

upon the subject over the years, while getting to mention only two students of the affair, the undeviating establishment apologists and chroniclers, Mrs. Wohlstetter and Hans L. Trefousse. No one is to blame, and the author seems to believe that the main trouble was that not enough people were privy to the "Magic" intercepts to enable the dispatch of a proper "warning" to the Hawaii commanders. That every responsible figure in the highest authority echelons was quite conversant with or on the automatic delivery list for "Magic," including the President, his Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, and the very top commanders in the intelligence departments of the armed services, does not appear to impress or to have been adequate according to Carson. How an underling with less knowledge could have gone over the heads of this group of men to "warn" Pearl Harbor escapes all understanding. But the unknown ignorant and unauthorized all appear to gain in stature and importance in the wake of the event, when anything they might have attempted to say or do would have left them vulnerable to swift censure and possible demotion, in addition to off-hand dismissal of their words or actions.

Further evidence that histories of intelligence in harmony with accepted official positions prefer to come no closer than the views of 20 years ago, and conclude in a consensus that Mrs. Wohlstetter had the last word in 1962, can be found in Ronald Lewin's *Ultra Goes to War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978). "Ultra" (as the British named it) was the German analog of the Japanese "Purple" code, and the actual "Magic" intercepts circulated by American intelligence all bore the word "Ultra" rubber-stamped on them. Lewin's view is close to Carson's, but is more subdued, though similarly following closely in support of the too-mixed-"signals," no-one-could-be-blamed obsurantism of Mrs. Wohlstetter's *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*. The position taken by Lewin not only requires ignoring the multitude of errors in this latter book, in part pointed out by Percy Greaves and Charles C. Hiles, but also a most selective approach to the matter of the chain of command, approvingly pinpointed when something of credit is to be assigned, but studiously avoided when something blameworthy demands the designation of some responsibility.

6. An unusual development in this dramatic account relating to the significance of the Briggs interview, unprecedented in the literature related to the Pearl Harbor topic, was the publication of the entire interview, from a facsimile copy originally deposited in the National Archives, in the Fall, 1980 (No. 24) *Newsletter* of the American Committee on the History of the Second World War, a solidly official-establishment organization, with presumably no real interest in this kind of disclosure. The reproduction indicates the elisions and other deletions made in the copy made available to other scholars previously (the *Newsletter* did not make its appearance until around Christmas time, 1980 despite its date), and which substantial interest from March, 1980 onward on the part of several investigators undoubtedly precipitated. But the persistence

of deleted material even forty years after the event helps to convey the impression that we are still too close to the event to allow full disclosure.

There is a mysterious aspect of the Briggs Winds Execute matter which requires some official explanation and extended discourse. though the previous accounts for 35 years have centered on Captain Safford's repeated insistence on its receipt December 4. the material related to the Briggs interview recently made public clearly indicates the latter originally received the Winds message *December 2*, which actually makes the official gloss on the matter look even worse.

The above essay was originally published in the author's *Beyond Pearl Harbor: Essays on Some Historical Consequences of the Crisis in the Pacific in 1941*, 1983, Plowshare Press, RR1, Little Current, Ontario P0P 1K0, Canada, $10.00.

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In two of the chapters from his book pre-published in this issue, Mr. Greaves presents an extended look at Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall's crucial testimony before the congressional committee. It was on the stand there that Marshall had his famous attack of "amnesia," explaining that he could not for the life of him remember his whereabouts on the night of 6-7 December, the most important few hours of his life. The mystery of his whereabouts and activities, not only on that night but late into the next morning as well (with precious intelligence on hand at the War Department indicating war and an attack *somewhere* in the Pacific at one p.m. Washington time, and precious hours slipping away until the fatal hour—which was sunrise over Pearl Harbor on a lazy Sunday morning, the best possible time for a surprise attack on the best possible target, the Pacific Fleet moored peacefully at anchorage), is one of the key elements in the whole Pearl Harbor saga. Any conspiracy by Washington to withhold vital information from the Hawaiian commanders, especially in these late hours, would have *had* to involve the Army's Chief of Staff. If FDR had something up his sleeve, Marshall was in on it. And anything Marshall was up to would have to have been with the approval of his Commander-in-Chief, the President. With FDR no longer alive in 1945-46 to answer questions (a situation which would very likely have been impossible in any case, given Democrat-imposed political realities), it was up to investigators to focus on Marshall, and prominent others, attempting to find out what had gone on at the very top by finding out what had gone on just-below-the-top. The whereabouts of Marshall on that crucial night and morning thus might not only be considered a "key element" of the puzzle, but perhaps even *the key*. Was Marshall in fact—as revisionists have suspected all along—at the White House part of that night, huddled with FDR, conveniently and deliberately out of the reach of War Department underlings who, knowing what was coming, would have pressed for the warning to Hawaii's General Short that had to come with Marshall's authority? Clear evidence of this would be the equivalent of the "smoking gun" tape recording that did a later president in, in a similar tale of conspiracy at the highest levels of government.

Greaves having provided us here with the best description and analysis yet of just what Marshall said (and couldn't, or wouldn't, say) before the congressional investigators, we follow with James J. Martin's pointed *tour de force*, "Where Was General Marshall?"—the most comprehensive piece of research yet accomplished on this question, which reviews *all* the evidence and theories ever generated, and leaves the reader at the point where he cannot but draw conclusions which are devastating indeed to the "official" version of events. The essay was completed in 1981 and has been published heretofore only in a limited edition in Canada, directed mainly to Japanese there. We are pleased now to put it in general circulation in the United States and throughout the world. This publication event is especially felicitous in view of the recent interest in Marshall generated by hagiographer Leonard Mosley, whose *Marshall: Hero For Our Times* constitutes the latest whitewash effort, and by the announcement of yet another major biography of Marshall currently being prepared by a professor at the University of Southern California.

With the combination herein of new and highly significant revisionist material from Mr. Greaves and Dr. Martin, *The JHR* makes its contribution to a process which has been at work, slowly but inexorably, for four decades, and is ever-hastening: the dismantling of the cherished Establishment myth of

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Rooseveltian innocence on the road to war with Japan and at the gate to war which was Pearl Harbor. That myth has been, and continues to be, bitterly defended by those who for whatever emotional or practical reasons have a stake in it, and who have more than once taken it upon themselves to blithely announce that revisionism on the subject is "dead"—as if the mere announcement itself were the bullet. But revisionism in fact maintains a vibrant existence, bounding along; the old questions will not go away, some answers are found, some new questions are raised. And significant converts gained. Nothing demonstrates better than the remarkable wave of interest, revelation, and contention of the last few years the utter *persistent* quality of Pearl Harbor revisionism.

There has long existed a sly musing in revisionist circles that the Roosevelt defenders, in view of their long record of fantastic performances in the realms of obfuscation, double-talk, whitewash, tortuous justification, suppression, sleight-of-hand, ad hominemism, etc., would , in order for their minds to be finally changed, require the revisionists to prove their viewpoint with nothing less than clear evidence not only that FDR welcomed and knew about the Japanese attack in advance, but that *he had actually flown the lead Japanese plane!* The musing is meant facetiously, of course. And so is this:

Considering the evidentiary progress of the last few years, revisionists *might well* say: "No, we can't show you FDR making his dive-bombing run. But, by God, that fellow suited up on the flight deck with the Scotch terrier better get rid of his cigarette holder before he starts a fire!"□

—*Keith Stimely*

About the Contributors

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR. is the former chief of the minority research staff of the 1945-46 Joint Congressional Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. He is probably more qualified to speak with authority on Pearl Harbor than any man alive, and indeed has spoken and written prodigiously on the subject, including a chapter, "The Pearl Harbor Investigations," for the classic book edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*. Mr. Greaves is additionally a free market economist of note. He has served as financial editor and research economist for *U.S. News and World Report* in Washington, D.C., as Armstrong Professor of Economics with Professor Ludwig von Mises at the University of Plano, Texas, and as a seminar speaker and discussion leader with the Foundation for Economic Education in New York.

JAMES J. MARTIN graduated from the University of New Hampshire in 1942 and received his MA (1945) and Ph.D. (1949) degrees in History from the University of Michigan. His teaching career has spanned twenty-five years and involved residence at educational institutions from coast to coast. Dr. Martin has contributed some of the outstanding books of revisionism related to the Second World War: the two-volume classic *American Liberalism and World Politics, 1931-1941*, *Beyond Pearl Harbor*, the collected essays *Revisionist Viewpoints* and *The Saga of Hog Island and Other Essays in Inconvenient History*, and the soon to be released, *The Man Who Invented 'Genocide'*. He is a three-time contributor to the *Dictionary of American Biography* and has as well contributed to recent editions of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.